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She don’t like that kind of behavior. 
So, throw down your guns. 
Don’t be so reckless. 
― James Reyne, “Reckless (Don’t Be So)”. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 Despite considerable evidence that certain life-course transitions can play a 
significant role in helping some offenders abandon crime, several fundamental issues 
remain unresolved. In this dissertation, I examine the links between crime and two life-
course transitions related to the development of families in adulthood: cohabitation and 
marriage. Using data from the National Youth Survey (NYS), I investigate the extent to 
which both types of relationships can contribute to desistance. I then evaluate the major 
theoretical mechanisms through which marriage is most likely to promote behavioral 
change. Finally, I examine the degree to which these relationships foster desistance for 
both men and women. Results indicate that marriage has the capacity to promote 
desistance, whereas cohabitation does not, and that the effects of marriage on crime are 
conditional on both the social orientation of the spouse and the quality of the marital 
relationship. These and other results are mostly consistent with social control and social 
learning theories of crime and desistance. In addition, the results of the analyses indicate 
that the effects of marriage on crime are similar among men and women. 
 
 x
CHAPTER 1 
“One of the best known facts about crime” is that criminal involvement rises 
fairly rapidly in early adolescence, peaks in the late teenage years, and then declines 
steadily in adulthood (Nagin, Farrington, and Moffit 1995, p. 112; see also Farrington 
1986). As these patterns imply, the overwhelming majority of people who engage in 
crime do so in the latter years of adolescence only to abandon it shortly thereafter 
(Farrington 1986). Despite the consistency of these patterns and their documentation in 
published research since the early 1800s (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983), criminologists 
have only recently begun to show an interest in explaining why people give up on crime 
and delinquency. For much of its history, criminology as a discipline has tried to 
understand the causes of crime by trying to explain criminal participation. Rather than 
attempting to explain either the initiation of delinquency or its termination, the dominant 
modus operandi in criminological research has been to identify the characteristics that 
distinguished criminals from non-criminals. Given that criminal participation is most 
common in adolescence, this research agenda has focused, not surprisingly, on the 
teenage years. As a result, the task of explaining why people commit crime often has 
given way to the task of identifying the correlates of delinquent participation at one stage 
of the life-course (Laub and Sampson 1992).  
Ironically, the study of desistance — the term used by criminologists to describe 
the abandonment of crime — took off as a field of study as a result of the realization that 
a small proportion of juvenile delinquents do not abandon crime in early adulthood. 
These serious, chronic offenders who accounted for the majority of offences committed 
by their cohort (Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin 1972) became a real concern of researchers 
and policy-makers in the 1980s and lead to substantial interest in the development of 
criminal and delinquent behavior over the lifespan (Blumstein et al 1986; Blumstein and 
Cohen 1987). As this research tried to reconcile the persistent criminal behavior exhibited 
by this smaller group with the large-scale desistance that occurred in early adulthood (e.g. 
Moffit 1993), it became increasingly apparent that the macro-level relationship between 
age and crime obscured a considerable degree of micro-level variation in rates of 
offending over time (Nagin and Land 1993; Nagin, Farrington and Moffit 1995; Bushway 
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et al 2001, 2003). Recognition of these variations has prompted considerable research 
aimed at explaining these trends and patterns, especially as they pertain to differences in 
the scope and duration of criminal careers. 
The shift in focus, from a preoccupation with explaining inter-individual 
differences in criminal behavior at one stage of the life-course to a concern with the 
causes of crime as they develop over the lifespan, has been accompanied by the 
emergence of a “new paradigm” known as life-course criminology (Laub 2006). The 
adoption of the life-course perspective entails, among other things, sensitivity to the 
social and historical conditions that affect human lives, variability in developmental 
processes, the role of personal choice and human agency in personal development, and 
the interconnectedness of different facets of human lives. More than anything, however, 
the life-course perspective is distinguished by its focus on developmental change, 
including changes in criminal behavior, as a life-long process (Elder 1994, 1995; Benson 
2002; Laub and Sampson 2003; Sampson and Laub 2003; Laub 2006).  
Recognition of the importance of studying human lives in their entirety has lead 
researchers to place greater emphasis on long-term longitudinal studies that enable them 
to observe changes in offending patterns even into late adulthood (Laub and Sampson 
2003, Blokland and Nieuwbeerta 2005). Despite continued debates about the prevalence 
of persistent offending over the lifespan, the results of these studies indicate that even 
serious, chronic and seemingly persistent offenders eventually desist from crime at some 
point in their lives (Laub and Sampson 2003). In other words, offenders vary in the 
timing and occurrence of their desistance ― not the likelihood that they will desist from 
crime. In terms of the development of criminological theory, the apparent inevitability of 
desistance implies two things. First, unless criminologists are prepared to abandon the 
task of explaining the most prevalent aspects of criminal and delinquent behavior, they 
need to develop an explanation for criminal desistance. Second, the focus of that research 
should shift from preoccupation about who desists and why to an exploration of the 
reasons why people give up crime at different stages of their lives. 
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Life-Course Transitions and Desistance 
Given that the overwhelming majority of people who become involved in crime 
abandon it in early adulthood, it is hardly surprising that the changes in the life-course 
that most commonly occur in the early and mid-20s have emerged as some of the most 
important correlates of desistance. In numerous studies, researchers have observed strong 
empirical relationships between the occurrence of significant age-graded life-events and 
changes in criminal and delinquent behavior (Sampson and Laub 1993, Laub, Nagin, and 
Sampson 1998, Warr 1998). These developments ― often described as life-course 
transitions because they reflect significant changes in social roles, responsibilities, and 
status ― include marriage, the commencement of full-time employment, and military 
service (Elder 1986; Laub and Sampson 2003; Laub, Sampson and Allen 2001). Some of 
these life-events are associated with individual changes in offending in the short-term 
(Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995) and over an extended range of the lifespan (Laub 
and Sampson 2003). Hence, at least some life-course transitions appear to be significant 
factors in the process of desisting from crime for a large number of people. 
Despite the strong empirical associations between several life-course transitions 
and desistance from crime, a number of important theoretical issues need to be resolved 
before researchers can claim to understand the role that these events play in the 
development of criminal and delinquent behavior. First, there is considerable theoretical 
ambiguity about how to interpret the empirical relationships between events such as 
marriage, employment, or military service and crime. At best, scholars can rattle off lists 
of possible reasons why these events might promote changes in criminal behavior, but in 
the absence of more rigorous empirical evaluations of these theories they cannot state for 
certain whether any or all of these explanations apply across the population of desisting 
offenders. Second, there are some notable differences in the apparent effects of key life-
course transitions on desistance, but most theoretical explanations for the associations 
between life-course transitions and crime are not able to account for these differences. 
Third, as the in-depth study of individual lives indicates, the ability of events such as 
marriage, employment, or military service to promote genuine and lasting changes in 
criminal conduct varies across the population, yet the sources of these variations have 
begun to be explored only recently. As things currently stand, the reasons why the same 
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role transition can lead to desistance among one offender, while having little or no effect 
on another, are the subject of conjecture. 
 
 
Why Do Life-Course Transitions Affect Desistance? 
The empirical relationships between events such as marriage, employment, 
military service and crime have been claimed to support explanations of desistance based 
on a number of established theories of crime causation, including rational-choice, social 
control, and social learning theory (Cusson and Pissoneault 1985; Sampson and Laub 
1993; Laub and Sampson 2003; Warr 1998). Proponents of the control perspective 
contend that these transitions combine elements of interpersonal attachment and 
commitment to conventional goals and that their effects on crime are due to their effects 
on these processes of socialization (Laub and Sampson 2003, Sampson and Laub 1993). 
At the same time, these events can limit criminal involvement by reducing opportunities 
for crime or access to criminal associates (Osgood and Lee 1993, Warr 1998) or 
enhancing direct supervision over the individual offender (Laub and Sampson 2003).  
Although these are the most commonly cited explanations for why life-course 
transitions can help deflect an offender away from crime, other perspectives, developed 
primarily to account for change or stability in criminal behavior, are sometimes used to 
explain the links between delinquency and the occurrence of transformative life events. 
These include the theory of cognitive transformation which contends that life-course 
transitions encourage desistance by facilitating shifts in the attitudes, values, and personal 
identities of desisting offenders (Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002). 
Irrespective of which theories seem most plausible, the main problem for 
desistance research is that only rarely have these theories been evaluated empirically in a 
manner that could exclude rival hypotheses or ascertain their applicability across the 
population. Those studies that have attempted to exclude rival explanations have been 
limited in the number of theories they could examine or the number of life-course 
transitions they could investigate (e.g. Maume, Ousey, and Beaver 2005). As a result, 
little is really known, as opposed to postulated, about why life-course transitions are so 
important to the process of moving away from crime. 
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In fairness, ambiguity over how to interpret the links between transformative life 
changes and desistance from crime has resulted, in part, from the predominance in 
criminology of theoretical controversies over the likelihood that individuals can change 
(e.g. Laub and Sampson 2003; Hirschi and Gottfredson 1995; Sampson and Laub 1995). 
Instead of testing different theoretical explanations for why various life-course transitions 
affect criminal involvement, the scholars most interested in the crime-suppressing 
benefits of key life-course transitions have been preoccupied by the need to demonstrate 
to their more skeptical colleagues that such effects are real and not imagined (e.g. Laub 
and Sampson 2003). Too frequently, this has been achieved by subsuming diverse 
perspectives into a single theoretical viewpoint. For example, Laub and Sampson (2003) 
argue that the distinct processes that link changes such as marriage, employment, or 
military service to criminal involvement are, to a large extent, different manifestations of 
informal social control. At the same time, they also contend that these events can affect 
criminal involvement through other means by reducing the amount of time that people 
spend in the company of criminal acquaintances or by affecting major psychological 
changes including shifts in self-perception (Laub and Sampson 2003).   
Even if there are benefits to integrating theories in this way (Bernard and Snipes 
1996), one of the major drawbacks of trying to do so is that it impedes theoretical 
falsification (Hirschi 1979). If theoretical integration occurs merely by combining risk 
and protective factors that might be causally related to crime in a multitude of ways, as 
appears to have been the case in prior research on the links between life-course 
transitions and crime, then it may occur at the expense of developing a real understanding 
of the processes that underpin desistance from crime. It is hard to imagine how anyone 
can claim to understand the desistance process if they do not know which of the 
numerous individual and social changes that can accompany marriage, employment or 
military service are most critical to fostering desistance from crime. 
 
 
Which Life-Course Transitions Promote Desistance? 
As an explanation for desistance, the “age-graded” version of social control 
theory implies that anything that helps attach a person to conventional society and 
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increase his or her commitment to mainstream goals can reduce his or her criminal 
motivation (Sampson and Laub 1993; Laub and Sampson 2003). In similar respects, any 
role change that leads to more supervision or direct control of the individual should also 
promote desistance by reducing his or her opportunities to commit crime. By contrast, the 
changes that matter most from the perspective of social learning theory are those changes 
that alter the company that people keep or the rewards and punishments derived from 
crime (Warr 1993, 1998). The key to explaining the effects of life-course transitions is to 
know how these events affect the proximate causes of crime.  
By implication, life-course transitions that appear to affect the causes of crime in 
analogous ways should have reasonably similar effects on desistance. Multiple studies 
suggest, however, that seemingly analogous transitions do not affect criminal and 
delinquent behavior in consistent and predictable ways. For example, even though the 
associations between marriage and crime have been demonstrated in a plethora of studies 
(Meisenhelder 1977; Gibbens 1984; Sampson and Laub 1993; Farrington and West 1995; 
Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995; Laub and Sampson 2003; Sampson, Laub and 
Wimer 2006; King, Massoglia, and MacMillan 2007), the evidence that cohabitation also 
engenders desistance is decidedly mixed (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995; Warr 
1998; Sampson, Laub and Wimer 2006). In fact, some studies have even observed that 
cohabitation is positively related to criminal and delinquent involvement (Horney, 
Osgood, and Marshall 1995; Warr 1998).  Research concerning the links between 
parenthood and desistance could be described in very similar terms (Farrington and West 
1995; Hughes 1998; Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002). Even so, the reasons why 
ostensibly comparable life-course transitions should have such divergent effects on 
criminal behavior have not been fully investigated. 
Explaining these differences is an important step towards clarifying the role of 
life-course transitions in the desistance process. In broad terms, there are two possible 
explanations for why some life-course transitions may be more likely to affect desistance 
than others. First, it may be that seemingly analogous events are not as similar as they 
appear. In that case, of course, identifying the ways in which they truly differ may help 
identify why some life-course transitions are more likely than others to foster successful 
transitions away from crime. Second, it is possible that similarities between the effects of 
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these different life-course transitions are obscured by variations in their effects across the 
population. For example, it is possible that parenthood affects crime by men and women 
in distinct ways. Life-history narratives of female offenders often reveal the 
transformative effects of motherhood, but fatherhood rarely emerges in such studies as an 
important reason for desistance among men (Shover 1983; 1996; Giordano, Cernkovich, 
and Rudolph 2002; but see Hughes 1998). Since more men commit offences than women, 
the potentially positive impact of motherhood on desistance among female offenders may 
be overshadowed by the null effect of fatherhood on crimes committed by men. 
In that sense, failure to illuminate relationships between these states and crime 
does not mean that such relationships do not exist; indeed, it is not surprising that 
researchers have not found equivalent relationships between parenthood, cohabitation, 
and crime if one considers that virtually every study that has examined these relationships 
has ignored the tremendous variation that exists in both types relationships. In much the 
same way as the positive benefits of marriage are confined to those for whom marriage 
heralds genuine changes in lifestyle and thinking, the benefits of non-marital cohabitation 
or parenthood might accrue only to those who make emotional commitments to their 
partners and children. As I argue in Chapter 4, this may be an especially relevant 
consideration when examining the effects of cohabitation on crime. Thus, researchers 
need to be attentive to the possibility that contingencies in the effects of life-course 
transitions may deflect attention from the benefits of other transformative experiences. 
 
 
The Limits of Life-Course Transitions 
It is important not to overstate the role that life-course transitions play as the 
harbingers of desistance. Many former delinquents have abandoned crime even in the 
absence of these transitions, as indicated by the life-histories of numerous desisting 
offenders (Shover 1983, 1986; Leibrich 1997; Maruna 2001; Giordano, Cernkovich, and 
Rudolph 2002). Even though large-scale quantitative studies indicate that finding a job, 
getting married, or joining the military increases the likelihood that an individual should 
give up crime, these events clearly are not the only paths to desistance. If an 
understanding of the links between life-course transitions and changes in criminal 
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behavior is likely to contribute to the development of a theory of criminal desistance, it is 
imperative that researchers can reconcile their explanations for the effects of these 
changes with the ability of offenders to desist from crime even in their absence. 
The more pressing issue, however, is for researchers to account for the reasons 
why some offenders who experience these events continue to commit crime. Even if their 
stories are lost sometimes in large-scale quantitative studies, detailed case studies based 
on the life-history narratives of offenders often reveal examples of individuals who 
experience events such as marriage, employment, and military service, but do not 
undergo significant changes in their rates of offending or in the likelihood that they will 
commit crime (Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002; Laub and Sampson 2003). 
Even for the lay observer, spousal violence is an obvious exception to the claim that 
marriage helps offenders abandon crime, just as occupational theft is an example of the 
limits of employment as a contributor to criminal desistance. For some offenders, these 
life-course transitions might be associated with initial attempts to abandon crime that 
merely dissipate over time as the challenges of sustaining a conventional lifestyle 
intensify. For countless others, however, it is clear that these events have little or no 
impact on their desire or their ability to change. 
These exceptions may be too infrequent to contradict the rule, but they do imply 
that “one cannot simply extrapolate that involvement in tightly-knit families or paid-
employment produces the kinds of social capital that reduces offending” (Gadd and 
Farrall 2004, p. 141). Desistance research requires a far more nuanced explanation of the 
role that life-course transitions play in the desistance process. The effects of life-course 
transitions vary dramatically across the population and the task of explaining these 
variations is an important step towards clarifying the links between these transitions and 
behavioral change. 
Researchers have already begun to note some of these sources of variation. For 
example, even the most optimistic observers of the links between marriage and crime 
acknowledge that it is not the act of matrimony that helps divert offenders from their 
lives of crime, but the nature of the marital relationship (Laub et al 1998, Laub and 
Sampson 2003). In fact, “marriage alone may even increase crime” if the marriage is not 
successful (Laub et al 1998, p. 234). In similar respects, stable, full-time employment is 
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often associated with reductions in offending, but working in a series of short-term, 
transient jobs appears to have no such benefit (Laub and Sampson 2003). But these types 
of contingencies tell only part of the story. Precisely, why some individuals are able to 
maintain steady jobs or develop stable, prosperous, and ultimately crime-stopping 
marriages, while others do not, remains an intriguing mystery.  
On one hand, differences in the effects of these events could reflect differences in 
the causes of criminal behavior across the population (Moffit 1993; Blokland and 
Nieuwbeerta 2005). There is a strong tradition in criminology of typological models of 
criminal behavior that argue that individual-differences in the developmental course of 
offending behavior are related to differences in the etiology of antisocial behavior (e.g. 
Loeber and LeBlanc 1990; Moffit 1993; Patterson and Yoerger 1993). Depending on the 
theoretical basis for the links between life-course transitions and desistance, these 
classifications could also correspond to important variations in the relationship between 
marriage, employment, or military service and crime. 
On the other hand, differences in the effects of life events might be due to 
differences in the meanings that people ascribe to the transformations that punctuate their 
lives. As Laub and Sampson (2003) note, the men in their study were active participants 
in their own lives and the choices they made helped determine how their lives progressed; 
indeed, “adaptation to life events is crucial because the same event or transition followed 
by different adaptations can lead to different trajectories” (Laub and Sampson 2003). In 
short, choice and the occurrence of life-events interact and the ways that they interact 
have important implications for desistance from crime. 
Unraveling the differential impacts of internal and external forces presents a 
formidable theoretical and methodological challenge. Even sophisticated studies that 
control for the effects of unobserved, individual-traits have failed to take account of the 
plethora of unobserved, dynamic factors that are subsumed by terms such as human 
agency or personal choice. There are some who argue that, given the difficulty involved 
in making sense of human agency, “an understanding of how and why some of these 
transitions fostered desistance ― while others sparked more persistent or different forms 
of offending ― is a matter that can only be resolved through engagement with the 
specifics of the cases” (Gadd and Farrall 2004, p. 141). In short, they argue that 
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researchers need to abandon the goal of making broad generalizations about the effects of 
life-course transitions on crime and focus, instead, on in-depth studies of individual lives. 
The alternative is to acknowledge the possibility that the apparent chaos and 
variability of individual lives may be explained by some underlying, albeit currently 
unobserved, order. The rising popularity of the complexity sciences in the social sciences 
is premised on the recognition that the seeming unpredictability of life may reflect the 
paucity of contemporary theories and methods more than the sheer randomness of human 
existence (Kiel and Elliot 1996). Even though personal choice or human agency are likely 
to play a significant role in moderating the effects of life-course transitions on crime, 
initially, a more modest and realistic approach to understanding the limits of life-course 
transitions is to start with some concrete predictions regarding possible variations in their 
effects. At the very least, the impact of key life experiences might depend on observable 
differences between individuals, especially with respect to differences that are known 
already to be consequential to the study of crime, such as age, sex, ethnicity, and socio-
economic status. In so far as these characteristics might reflect broad differences in the 
meaning of events, the likelihood of their occurrence, or their links to the causes of crime, 
they may be significant sources of variation in desistance. 
 
 
The Current Study 
The purpose of this dissertation is to answer these three questions by focusing on 
one specific type of life-course transition — the establishment of adult family 
relationships. Specifically, I examine two life-course transitions related to the 
development of families in adulthood ― cohabitation and marriage ― and investigate: 
first, the extent to which both types of relationships can contribute to desistance; second, 
the theoretical mechanisms through which cohabitation and marriage are most likely to 
promote behavioral change; and third, the degree to which these relationships foster 
desistance for both men and women.  In doing so, I aim to contribute to a more refined 
understanding of how adult life-course transitions affect the desistance process.  
Family environments are among the major foci of some of the most prominent 
theories of crime causation (Hirschi 1969, Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990, Agnew 1992) 
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and the empirical links between crime and family characteristics have been demonstrated 
in a plethora of studies (e.g. Nye 1958; McCord and McCord 1959; Glueck and Glueck 
1968; Hirschi 1969; Cernkovich and Giordano 1987; Sampson and Laub 1993). Even so, 
the majority of this research has concentrated on the causes of childhood and adolescent 
antisocial behavior (Sampson and Laub 1993). Examining the effects of these 
relationships on criminal behavior in adulthood may help provide a more complete 
understanding of the links between crime and a major social institution. 
Those studies that have examined the influence of families on the behavior of 
adult offenders have found important links between some adult family relationships and 
desistance from crime (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995; Sampson and Laub 1993; 
Laub and Sampson 2003; Warr 1998). As noted previously, these studies have shown 
with considerable consistency that marital relationships, for instance, help restrain crime 
in adulthood even among individuals with extensive criminal histories (Meisenhelder 
1977; Farrington and West 1995, Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995; Sampson and 
Laub 1993, Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998, Laub and Sampson 2003, Warr 1998).  
Even so, the study of adult family relationships and their effects on desistance 
suffers from the same problems that undermine research on the links between other life-
course transitions and crime. First, researchers are not able to fully explain why adult 
family relationships affect criminal behavior. Second, those theories that have been used 
to explain the links between marriage and desistance have provided only limited insights 
into the reasons why analogous relationships, such as parenthood or cohabitation, do not 
affect crime in the same manner. Third, far too little is known about the limits of adult 
family formation as a cause of desistance from crime. Does the impact of marriage vary 
across the population? If so, why are some marriages more likely than others to steer 
partners away from crime? In similar respects, researchers know very little about possible 
variability in the effects of similar family relationships such as cohabitation. Do the 
effects of cohabitation also vary? If so, how can we explain differences in their effects?  
The answers to these questions are fundamental to the development of a more 
detailed understanding of the ways in which family factors are related to criminal 
behavior in adulthood. To that end, the dissertation proceeds in two parts. In Part One, I 
look at cohabitation and marriage and consider their impacts on self-reported criminal 
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and delinquent behavior. The major purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical 
clarification of the links between the cohabitation, marriage, and desistance from crime. 
In Part Two, I look at the extent to which the effects of these two types of adult family 
relationships on desistance are contingent on sex.  
Sex is the most important correlate of involvement in crime. It has been alleged 
that everywhere, in all times and places, men are more likely to commit crime than 
women (Steffensmeir 1996; Steffensmeier and Allan 2000). Despite its importance, 
however, the association between sex and crime remains a relatively under-explored area 
of research. In countless studies, even in the field of desistance research, sex is treated as 
just another risk or protective factor to be controlled in additive models of crime or is 
excluded altogether from consideration (e.g. Sampson and Laub 1993; Warr 1998; Laub 
and Sampson 2003). As a result, these studies are frequently criticized for being unable to 
explain criminal and delinquent behavior among women. In reaction to these allegedly 
“androcentric” accounts of crime, a number of scholars contend that the onset, escalation, 
persistence, and desistance of female offending require their own explanations (e.g. Daly 
and Chesney-Lind 1988). As a result, there is a growing body of research that examines 
the distinct pathways that girls and women follow into crime, and to a lesser extent, away 
from it (Chesney-Lind and Sheldon 1998; Uggen and Kruttschnitt 1998; Sommers, 
Baskin, and Fagan 1994; Holtfreter, Reisig, and Morash 2004). 
This research agenda has highlighted a number of key transformative experiences 
that affect involvement in crime among women, including sexual victimization in 
childhood and adolescence, in addition to several life-course transitions that lead to 
reductions in criminal and delinquent behavior among women. Since a number of these 
events appear to influence crime and desistance exclusively among women, these studies 
have been cited as evidence of the need for specifically female theories of crime and 
criminal desistance (Chesney-Lind and Sheldon 1998). 
Useful as this research agenda has been, its emphasis on theoretical innovation 
presupposes that the mechanisms that facilitate and discourage crime among men and 
women are so different that they cannot be explained by existing theories of human 
behavior. This research has not yet demonstrated satisfactorily that the underlying causal 
process ― as distinct from the events that instigate it ― are so different that they cannot 
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be explained by existing criminological theories. Whether men and women follow 
different pathways into and out of crime and the degree to which these pathways are 
distinct is an empirical question, but the issue of whether such differences are so great as 
to require fundamentally different theoretical propositions is also a theoretical one. Even 
if the transformative experiences that trigger the termination of offending are distinct for 
men and women, similarities in the underlying processes that explain the effects of these 
transitions implies the need for a gendered, rather than gender-specific, theory of 
desistance (Steffensmeier 1996; Steffensmeier and Allan 2000). 
It is important, therefore, to distinguish gender differences in the effects of life-
course transitions from differences in the process or processes that underpin desistance 
from crime. Men and women may encounter divergent experiences in their lives and the 
meanings and opportunities afforded by these events may vary significantly across the 
two sexes. That is not to say, however, that the pathways out of crime are vastly different 
for men and women. If men and women benefit from different types of relationships, but 
essentially for the same reason — for instance, if they become attached to conventional 
others and in doing so become more cognizant of the costs of continued involvement in 
crime — then there is little reason to claim that different processes govern their behavior. 
 
 
The Outline of the Dissertation 
In Chapter 2, I begin the process of investigating these issues by discussing the 
meaning of desistance and the implications of its definition for understanding changes in 
criminal involvement. I then summarize the major theoretical perspectives that have been 
used to explain desistance from crime. These are: first, theories that explain desistance as 
a natural development process; second, typological differences between offenders and 
heterogeneity in the causes of desistance; third, theories that emphasize changes in social 
control; fourth, theories that emphasize changes in the perceived costs and benefits of 
crime as the catalyst for disengagement; fifth, theories that attribute desistance to changes 
in the opportunities to learn crime; and sixth, those that explain desistance as a function 
of a series of important cognitive and perceptual transformations. In describing these 
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perspectives, special consideration is given to the role that each ascribes to life-course 
transitions in promoting desistance from crime. 
Chapter 3 extends these discussions to consider some of the methodological 
issues surrounding the empirical study of desistance and its relationship to life-course 
transitions such as cohabitation and marriage. In particular, I describe the two approaches 
used in this dissertation to measure desistance and identify its principal correlates. I then 
describe briefly the key features of the National Youth Survey (NYS) ― the data used to 
answer the three research questions ― and the way those data are used to measure crime, 
cohabitation, and marriage. I end the Chapter by considering an issue that has hampered 
and continues to hamper our efforts to study the desistance process and the impact of key 
life-course transitions on crime and delinquency ― the problem of self-selection.  
The major contribution of this dissertation to research on desistance from crime is 
outlined in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, which consist of three empirical studies examining the 
links between cohabitation, marriage and crime in detail. In Chapter 4, I start by 
investigating the empirical relationships between marriage, cohabitation, and criminal 
behavior. As noted already, although the empirical links between marriage and desistance 
are well known, the evidence that cohabiting relationships can also facilitate changes in 
criminal behavior is less conclusive (Sampson and Laub 1993, Farrington and West 1995, 
Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995, Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998, Laub and 
Sampson 2003, Sampson, Laub, and Wimer 2006). Hence, in Chapter 4, I ask whether 
cohabitation, in the absence of marriage, promotes desistance from crime and if so, if it 
does so as effectively as marriage. A key concern, evaluated in Chapter 4, is whether the 
effects of cohabitation and marriage are contingent on the strength of the relationship.  
In Chapter 5, I aim to further clarify these relationships in theoretical terms. I test 
three of the most prominent explanations for the links between marriage and desistance 
derived from three of the six theories of desistance, outlined in Chapter 2. These are the 
age-graded theory of social control, social learning theory, and the theory of cognitive 
transformation. The theoretical mechanisms implied by each theory are explored, to the 
degree that available data permit, and then tested against one another in a manner that 
seeks to identify which processes are most relevant to understanding why marriage 
promotes desistance from crime.  
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Chapter 6 explores at least one of the factors that might condition the impact of 
marriage and cohabitation on crime by focusing on sex differences in their effects. As 
mentioned earlier, a key theoretical concern in criminology and in the study of 
desistance, in particular, is the extent to which men and women follow distinctive 
pathways into and out of crime. Thus, even though age, ethnicity, and socio-economic 
status are important correlates of crime and delinquency (Steffensmeier and Allan 2000; 
Walker, Spohn, and Delone 2004; Harris and Shaw 2000), their roles in conditioning the 
effects of cohabitation and marriage on desistance are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. As noted also, an important challenge facing such research is the need to rule 
out the possibility that sex differences in the effects of adult family relationships are due 
solely to differences in the baseline rates of offending or sex differences in the likelihood 
of experiencing these events. Excluding these rival explanations, however, is also beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. Thus, Chapter 6 is intended to provide a preliminary 
evaluation of one potential source of demographic variation in the effects of marriage and 
cohabitation on desistance from crime. 
In Chapter 7, I review the major findings of the study and consider some of their 
implications, with particular focus on the policy implications of these results. Despite the 
contributions that this dissertation makes to the literature on desistance, some important 
issues that are beyond the scope of the project remain unresolved. Thus, in this final 
Chapter, some consideration is given to avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
In this chapter, I review the meaning of desistance, as the term is commonly used 
in the literature, and consider some of the conceptual problems that different definitional 
approaches pose for our understanding of desistance from crime. I then outline the 
meaning of the term as it is used throughout this dissertation; that is, a process that results 
in abstinence from crime among individuals who had previously engaged in crime, for 
the maximum period of time for which criminal and non-criminal behavior can be 
observed. In this chapter, I also review a number of theoretical models that have been 
used to explain how and why people disengage from crime focusing on explanations 
provided by six distinct theoretical frameworks: aging and maturation; developmental 
and typological theories; social control theory; rational-choice theory; social learning 
theory; and the theory of cognitive transformations. 
 
 
The Definition of Desistance 
Despite considerable scholarly interest in the ways in which people disengage 
from crime, research into desistance from crime is hampered by lack of agreement 
regarding the meaning of the term (Bushway et al 2001, Laub and Sampson 2001; 
Maruna 2001; Mulvey et al 2004; Maruna and Farrall 2004; Bottoms et al 2004). To 
some extent, this lack of definitional agreement has resulted from the tendency of 
researchers to avoid defining the term altogether, thereby, substituting implicitly the 
measurement of the concept for its definition. For example, in failing to define 
desistance, Warr (1998) left readers to assume that it equated to his measure of the 
concept; namely, having smoked marijuana in the year preceding a survey interview, but 
having abstained from marijuana use in the year preceding a subsequent interview (see 
also Maume, Ousey, and Beaver 2005). It goes without saying that the definitions and 
indicators of concepts should converge as much as possible. However, if concepts are 
defined according to the measures that are most readily available for them, then their 
meanings become random and imprecise, thereby limiting the ability of other researchers 
to replicate and extend the results of prior studies. Moreover, in avoiding the problem of 
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definitions, researchers risk conflating the meaning of their concepts with factors that 
influence the accuracy of the measures of those concepts. 
In any case, definitional ambiguity surrounding the term appears to have persisted 
despite deliberate attempts to define the term and standardize its meaning and 
measurement (e.g. Bushway et al 2001, Maruna 2001). Indeed, as articles continue to 
appear advocating the use of new or innovative definitions of the concept (e.g. Maruna 
and Farrall 2004; Bottoms et al 2004), it would seem that scholarly efforts to take the 
definition of desistance more seriously have only exacerbated the confusion surrounding 
the term. Most commentators agree that, at its simplest level, desistance relates in some 
way to the termination or cessation of offending. The major point of contention, however, 
concerns the nature of that relationship; specifically, whether desistance is the same thing 
as termination or whether it refers to a process that ends in the termination of offending. 
These debates may seem trivial, on the surface, but they have important ramifications for 
the measurement of desistance and, as a consequence, the ability of researchers to 
contribute to a deeper understanding of how and why people disengage from crime. 
Indeed, different definitions of desistance can lead to differences in which individuals are 
classified as either desisting or having desisted from crime (Bushway et al 2003; 
Bushway, Paternoster, and Brame 2003).  
 
 
Desistance as Termination 
Desistance is often defined as the termination of criminal offending. For example, 
Shover (1996, p. 121) defined it as the “voluntary termination of serious criminal 
participation” and Farrall and Bowling (1999) described it as “the moment that a criminal 
career ends”. In most cases, studies such as these have measured desistance as the 
absence of offending over a specified period among those people who had engaged 
previously in crime. Thus, an offender who had desisted from crime was one who, 
despite some earlier involvement, had remained free from crime over time. This 
definition of desistance, as termination, is consistent with the basic meaning of the term 
as ceasing or stopping criminal behavior, but its usefulness for criminological research is 
limited in two important respects.  
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First, the definition more or less assumes that offenders are continuously involved 
in crime, but abruptly cease to commit crime thereafter. Most research suggests, however, 
that criminal behavior is sporadic (Luckenbill and Best 1981) and those who engage in it 
tend to “drift” (Matza 1964) or “zig-zag” (Glaser 1964) in and out of crime. In effect, this 
means that termination may occur on an annual, monthly, weekly, or even daily basis 
(Maruna 2001, p. 23).  However, desistance carries with it some notion of maintenance: 
to desist is to stop doing something and to refrain from doing it again. By defining 
desistance as termination, therefore, researchers may be capturing an interruption in 
offending rather than its actual end. 
Second, the definition of desistance as cessation naturally focuses attention on the 
points at which changes in criminal behavior are first manifested. As Maruna (2001, p. 
26) notes, “if a watch stops ticking … we look for new things that happen at about the 
same time as the termination event that could be responsible for the change”. Despite its 
emphasis on the moment of change, however, this approach offers little insight into how 
best to measure the termination moment. One could focus on the decision to abandon 
crime (or the “moment of clarity” described by many desisting offenders as the moments 
in which they realized that they needed to change their behavior), but this presupposes 
that all offenders have such experiences. There is considerable evidence in qualitative 
studies of desistance to indicate that many offenders experience “desistance by default” 
(Laub and Sampson 2003, see also Shover 1983, 1985); that is, they abandon crime 
without ever intending to do so. Moreover, even among those who describe their 
desistance from crime as being precipitated by epiphanies, moments of clarity or 
“bottoming out” experiences, there is considerable evidence that initial attempts at 
desistance are often unsuccessful (Maruna 1997). For many offenders, most of the work 
involved in desisting from crime involves the maintenance of non-offending. Hence, the 
factors that are most important to an understanding of desistance may be the factors that 
enable desisting offenders to remain steadfast in their efforts to abandon crime.  
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Desistance as a Process Ending in Termination 
The alternative to defining desistance as the termination of offending is to define 
it as a developmental process that results in termination and continued abstinence from 
crime. To that end, Laub and Sampson (2001, p. 11) define desistance as “the causal 
process that supports the termination of offending”. In similar respects, Maruna (2001, p. 
26) agrees that the definition needs to reflect the fact that desistance is ongoing (although 
he rejects the idea of defining desistance as a causal process). Thus, Maruna (2001, p.26) 
defines it “as the long-term abstinence from crime among individuals who had previously 
engaged in persistent offending”. The common theme in both of these definitions is that 
desistance encompasses both a change in offending (i.e. moving from a state of offending 
to a state of non-offending) and continuity in non-offending (i.e. maintaining the state of 
abstinence from crime). This approach avoids some of the problems inherent in static 
definitions of desistance that focus on termination as an event, but it raises two other 
complications that need to be addressed. First, it introduces the need for researchers to 
define the beginning and end of desistance. Second, in order to study the process before it 
leads an offender to abandon crime, researchers may need to identify alternative 
manifestations of the desistance process other than the termination of crime. 
A dynamic definition of desistance implies that the process may begin even 
before the last offence has been committed. Thus, as in the popular scenario of a thief 
who plans one last score before quitting his life of crime or in the more realistic scenario 
of the ex-convict who decides to abandon crime but slips back into the life when faced 
with the strains and boredom of a conventional life, the desistance process may 
encapsulate periods of offending (Bottoms et al 2004). More importantly, the definition 
of desistance as a process implies that desistance never ends; that is, since crime is 
sporadic and many desisting offenders experience relapses, desistance may not end until 
an offender dies (Maruna 2001; Bottoms et al 2004). This indeterminacy of desistance 
implies that, at any point in the life-course, an ex-offender who has not committed an 
offense for several years might still be regarded as desisting from crime.  
The concept of desistance as an interminable process has much in common with 
the language used by participants in twelve-step addiction recovery programs when they 
describe themselves as alcoholics or addicts, even years after they have last had a drink or 
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used other drugs. It also may reflect, more accurately, the way that offenders view their 
own transitions away from crime. As Maruna (2001) notes, even though offenders do not 
use words like desistance, they do talk about “going straight” or “making good” — 
expressions that imply a developmental process without any clear end in sight. Hence, 
desistance, notes Maruna (2001, p. 26), has “no end state where one can be; rather, it is a 
perpetual process of arrival”.  
In part, the willingness to see desistance as an indeterminate process may be due 
to an over-reliance on the model of desistance from legal and illegal drug use in 
desistance research. Giving up crime and giving up drugs may share some important 
similarities and the two may even be linked causally (Laub and Sampson 2001, Giordano, 
Cernkovich and Rudolph 2001, Laub and Sampson 2003, Sommers, Baskin and Fagan 
1994), but similarities in the processes of desistance from seemingly analogous behaviors 
do not imply that the model of the perpetually recovering alcoholic or addict is an 
appropriate model with which to understand desistance from crime. Even if criminal 
behavior is habitual, it certainly is not addictive. Although desisting offenders may face 
enormous challenges in their efforts to live within the law, in the absence of a strong 
physiological compulsion to commit crime, it seems unreasonable to portray the desisting 
offender as a person who is constantly and perpetually at risk or relapse. That is not to 
say that people do not falter or that relapses do not occur. However, the prevalence and 
frequency of these relapses is hardly sufficient to warrant the image of the desisting 
offender as an individual constantly at risk of criminal recidivism. 
The idea that desistance has “no end state” is clearly at odds with the results of 
criminological research showing that the overwhelming majority of people who become 
involved in crime actually stop committing crime at some point and cease to commit 
offences ever again (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983, Laub and Sampson 2003). Even 
among those who were heavily embroiled in a criminal lifestyle at one or more stages of 
their lives, the probability of committing another offence at some later stage will be so 
low that at some point it seems completely nonsensical to talk about desistance as an 
ongoing process. For all intents and purposes, for these people, the seductions of crime 
have faded so much in the distant recesses of memory that the idea of ever committing 
another offense seems unimaginable. Indeed, even those formerly wayward individuals 
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who appear most nostalgic about the lives that they left behind, and ambivalent about 
their change, hardly intimate a strong desire to return to their old ways. As one such man 
remarked to Laub and Sampson (2003, p. 147), “There’s many times I wanted to go back 
… But we can’t do that. We’re hoping to go to Disney next March”. In these and other 
related cases, surely researchers should be able to talk about the process of going straight 
as something that can reasonably, if not definitively, come to an end. 
All this implies, to some extent, that the definition of desistance should in some 
way take account of criminal propensity or some other concept that can predict the 
likelihood that an individual will be involved in crime. Hence, some researchers prefer to 
define desistance as “the process by which criminality, defined as the propensity to 
offend, changes with age” and declines to a negligible level (Bushway et al 2003, p. 494), 
but without identifying additional sources of information that can predict the 
commencement of some metamorphosing process it is difficult to see how this approach 
moves beyond the basic problem that plagues all desistance research; that is, how to 
make inferences about the progress of behavioral change by observing (or not observing) 
the outcome of that process. Moreover, as some critics have pointed out, it is difficult to 
envisage how this approach could be adapted to the study of desistance using qualitative 
research methods (Laub and Sampson 2001).  
A more practicable solution to this problem is to define desistance less 
ambitiously in a manner that specifies desistance over periods of time. Thus, desistance 
can be defined as the abstinence from crime, for the maximum period of time for which 
criminal and non-criminal behavior can be observed or even over a number of years, 
among individuals who had previously engaged in it. In that sense, people can only be 
classified as desisting offenders up to a specified point in time; that is, if she or he has 
avoided crime for the period of time over which their behavior has been monitored. Of 
course, this approach may lead researchers to classify some individuals as having 
desisted even though they may re-offend at a later stage. In reality, however, the 
desistance process is truncated anytime that researchers attempt to measure it. All 
desistance studies are sensitive to the length of follow-up, therefore, and all studies run 
the risk of misclassifying some individuals (Eggleston, Laub, Sampson 2004; Nagin and 
Tremblay 2005). The main difference implied by the definition of desistance, that I 
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propose, is that it acknowledges the variable length of the desistance process. In doing so, 
a definition of desistance that is focused on crime-free periods is likely to shift attention 
from the study of the abandonment of crime for life (which rarely can be studied anyway) 
to studying the avoidance of crime at specific stages of life. In time, research adopting 
this approach may even reveal that different factors account for differences in the length 
of time for which desisting offenders manage to avoid crime. 
If desistance is a dynamic process that results in the termination of offending then 
it is also likely that the desistance process begins well before the termination of 
offending. This, of course, presents researchers interested in studying the process as it 
develops with a considerable challenge. If desistance begins before the individual 
abandons crime, how can the desistance process be observed? What kinds of changes 
might be considered the harbingers of desistance? Laub and Sampson (2003) attempt to 
avoid this problem by defining desistance as the causal process resulting in the 
termination of crime. Hence, they approach the study of desistance by trying to identify 
factors that are associated with termination, thereby eliminating the need to observe a 
process that culminates in change. Although this appears to shift the focus of attention 
away from the end result of the desistance process, in practice it amounts to little more 
than identifying the factors that are predictive of changes in criminal behavior.  
Others have tried to study alternative manifestations of the desistance process by 
identifying stages that offenders are thought to encounter as they move away from crime. 
For example, a number of researchers have concentrated on trying to explain the decision 
to give up crime (e.g. Cusson and Pinsonneault 1985). Although these studies have 
helped advance our understanding of how offenders disengage from crime, without a 
clear appreciation of how the decision to quit relates to the overall process of abandoning 
crime, which presumably requires a definition of desistance, it is difficult to know exactly 
what their contribution has been. In simple terms, if desistance is the equivalent of 
deciding to abandon a life of crime then presumably the contribution of these studies to 
our understanding of desistance has been quite considerable. However, if there is more to 
desistance than the decision to quit, then researchers still have plenty more work ahead of 
them. Precisely how much more work is required depends on how much more there is to 
desistance than the initial decision to abandon crime. 
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In similar respects, Maruna and Farrall (2004) have proposed that researchers 
distinguish between primary desistance and secondary desistance. Whereas primary 
desistance represents changes in actual behavior, secondary desistance refers to 
behavioral changes that are accompanied by fundamental changes in personal identity 
and, in particular, the assumption of a non-deviant identity (Maruna and Farrall 2004). 
The problem with this approach is that it assumes that all offenders follow a common 
process as they disengage from crime. Although it may be useful to look for potential 
harbingers of desistance along the way, other than the absence of offending researchers 
do not really know what other changes are relevant. Such things as deciding to avoid 
crime in the future or merely reducing the volume or types of offenses committed could 
be important supplementary indications that desistance is underway, but these changes 
should not replace abstinence from crime as the key indication of desistance. Although 
there may be no solution to this problem, it implies that without an understanding of what 
the desistance process looks like, at least in the majority of cases, it may be impossible 
for researchers to really study desistance as anything other than the absence of offending. 
Irrespective of whether desistance is defined as the termination of offending or as 
an ongoing process that results in cessation, most researchers appear to agree that the 
term is only useful if applied to individuals who engaged in some form of persistent 
offending. This means, more broadly, that desistance “cannot be meaningfully studied 
independent of a conception of crime and the offender” (Laub and Sampson 2001, p. 10). 
Thus, Maruna (2001, p. 26) defines desistance as “the long-term abstinence from crime 
among individuals who had previously engaged in persistent patterns of criminal 
behavior”. Laub and Sampson (2003, p. 22) are even more explicit, stating that 
“termination and desistance should be studied among those who reach some reasonable 
threshold of frequent and serious offending”. This approach, however, begs the question: 
how much offending and over what period of time might constitute either “persistent 
patterns of criminal behavior” or a “reasonable threshold”? 
Understandable as this position may be, there are two important problems with it. 
First, in suggesting that little can be gained by studying the termination of offending 
among low-level, adolescent offenders, researchers such as Laub and Sampson (2003) 
seem to be implying that the causal process that underpins desistance is different for 
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different types of offenders. Such a position is sharply at odds with their general 
theoretical model, however, known as the age-graded theory of social control, which 
emphasizes that the causes of persistence in and desistance from crime are the same for 
all offenders irrespective of their prior patterns or levels of criminal behavior. Of course, 
the causes of desistance for low-level and high-level offending may differ, but that is not 
to say that researchers should assume from the outset that such differences exist. Second, 
the above argument is also neglectful of the fact that most people who have engaged in 
crime at some point in their lives did so at very low levels during adolescence. In similar 
respects, most people who abandon crime will do so in that same period, disengaging 
from what might be described as low-level and non-serious criminal careers. Surely, a 
complete understanding of desistance also requires that their desistance be explained. 
 
 
Towards a Definition of Desistance  
The overall point, therefore, is that when it comes to studying desistance no 
definitional approach is perfect. Perhaps the most defensible solution is to treat desistance 
as an “essentially contestable concept” (Gallie 1964); that is, accept that no standardized 
meaning of the concept exists (or is likely to exist) and merely define the concept 
precisely as it seems best to use it being sure to note the limitations and implications of 
such usage. For the purposes of this dissertation, therefore, desistance is defined as a 
developmental process that results in the cessation of and abstinence from offending over 
specified periods of time among individuals who have previously been involved in crime. 
This developmental process may manifest itself in a variety of ways including 
reductions in the volume or diversity of offending (especially if specialization is 
associated with a decline in the overall seriousness of the offenses committed). Of course, 
the defining characteristic of desistance is behavioral change. Hence, researchers 
interested in understanding the desistance process should be interested above all in 
explaining within-individual changes in offending, especially when such change 
constitutes the abandonment of crime by individuals with a history of misconduct. At the 
same time, the definition of desistance as a developmental process recognizes the 
importance of continuity of conventional behavior. As a result, factors that can account 
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for between-individual differences in crime are important, particularly as they relate to 
enduring differences between active offenders and non-offenders who had previously 
been involved in crime. It is important to note, however, that the only reliable hallmark of 
desistance is the existence of extended periods of time during which individuals who had 
previously been involved in crime refrain from committing it.  
 
 
Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Desistance 
Despite lack of agreement about the meaning of desistance, as noted in Chapter 1, 
a number of theoretical perspectives have been used to explain the abandonment of 
criminal and delinquent behavior. This research literature can be summarized and broadly 
categorized into six different theoretical frameworks. These are: first, theories that 
explain desistance as a natural development process; second, typological differences 
between offenders and heterogeneity in the causes of desistance; third, theories that 
emphasize changes in social control; fourth, theories that emphasize changes in the 
perceived costs and benefits of crime as the catalyst for disengagement; fifth, theories 
that attribute desistance to changes in the opportunities to learn crime; and sixth, those 
that explain desistance as a function of a series of important cognitive and perceptual 
transformations. In similar respects to traditional criminological theories, these desistance 
accounts often acknowledge the same factors as important facilitators of behavioral 
change. They differ, however, in terms of the causal processes that are thought to link 
those factors to human behavior. 
 
 
Desistance as Natural Development 
Given the robustness of the relationship between age and crime, it is not 
surprising that aging should feature prominently in many explanations of criminal 
desistance. One of the first studies to have adopted this approach was conducted by 
Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck (1950, 1974). They argued that desistance resulted from a 
process of maturation, which they defined as “the development of a stage of physical, 
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intellectual, and affective capacity and stability, and a sufficient degree of integration of 
all major constituents of temperament, personality, and intelligence, to be adequate to the 
demands and restrictions of life in organized society” (Glueck and Glueck 1974, p. 170). 
For these authors, physical, intellectual and emotional maturation was not synonymous 
with aging; that is, maturity is not reached automatically with the passage of years. Those 
individuals who engaged in persistent offending did so because they lacked maturity 
whereas those who desisted from committing crime were believed to have achieved 
sufficient emotional and intellectual development. Nonetheless, in as much as recidivism 
rates declined with age, Glueck and Glueck (1950) suggested that for most people 
involved in crime and delinquency, desistance reflected normal development. Despite the 
acknowledgement that maturity did not equate with chronological age, therefore, the 
argument implied that desistance was a normal part of the human development process 
and an indication of healthy development. 
This approach has been criticized for a number of reasons, especially for its 
implied contention that crime and delinquency reflects immaturity whereas law abidance 
represents a more advanced state of emotional, intellectual and physical development 
(Laub and Sampson 2003). Others have provided somewhat more reasoned explanations 
as to why individuals should be more inclined to abandon crime as a result of normal 
developmental processes. For example, Gove (1985) argued that cognitive and 
physiological changes were relevant to explaining the large-scale desistance from crime 
that occurred in late adolescence and early adulthood. Although critics have since argued 
that the changes in physical capabilities that he described are not as rapid as or 
coincidental to the decline in offending that is suggested by the age-crime curve 
(Steffensmeier and Allen 2001), there is growing evidence that important cognitive 
changes do take place in adolescence as a result of normal brain development. These 
changes, which appear to coincide with the period in which most individuals begin to 
disengage from crime, are thought to lead to improvements in executive functioning, 
including impulse control and the individual’s capacity for consequential thinking 
(Benson 2000). It is possible, therefore, that these changes do trigger desistance from 
crime for a great many adolescent criminals and delinquents. 
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Perhaps the best known contemporary version of the maturational perspective is 
that outlined by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) in their theory of self-control. A key 
component of their explanation of desistance concerns the distinction between crime and 
criminality, which they defined as the propensity to commit crimes. For Gottfredson and 
Hirschi (1990) crimes are circumscribed events, whereas criminality refers to time-stable 
differences between individuals in the proclivity to commit crime. The primary 
determinant of criminal propensity is self-control or “the tendency to avoid acts whose 
long term costs exceed their immediate short-term benefits” (Hirschi and Gottfredson 
2001, p. 83). According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), self-control is formed early in 
life as a result of effective parental socialization. At some point, in late childhood, 
differences in levels of self-control between individuals become fixed and immutable 
such that those who were low in self-control as children will also be low in self-control, 
relative to others, as adults. This relative stability in self-control is especially important 
because it explains the widely observed stability of antisocial behavior. Those who 
commit crime as adults are likely to have committed crime as children because 
throughout their lives they have been among the group with the lowest levels of self-
control and hence the greatest propensity to engage in crime. 
At the same time, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) recognized that self-control, in 
absolute terms, could increase over time. In fact, they argued that as a result of continuing 
socialization throughout the lifespan, increases in self-control would continue to occur 
and that these absolute changes in self-control would lead to an overall reduction in the 
pool of potential offenders. Even though some individuals would continue to have low 
self-control, relative to all others throughout their lives, in time even their absolute levels 
of self-control should increase sufficiently to enable them to move away from crime. 
Thus, a defining feature of self-control theory as it relates to desistance is its refutation of 
the criminal career paradigm and the idea that the age-crime curve obscures a small, but 
significant group of offenders who do not desist from crime. In sharp contrast to that 
viewpoint, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argued that all offenders eventually abandon 
crime. In fact, in light of their insistence that the age-crime curve described the patterns 
of offending of all individuals across time and place desistance could not be explained 
with reference to any sociological factors such as employment, marriage or military 
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service (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Instead, changes 
in criminal behavior occurred as a result of maturation or “the inexorable aging of the 
organism” (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990, p. 141). As these authors put it, “this 
explanation suggests that maturational reform is just that, change in behavior that comes 
with maturation; it suggests that spontaneous desistance is just that, change in behavior 
that cannot be explained and change that occurs regardless of what else happens” 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990, p. 136). 
An important implication of self-control theory, in addition to other theoretical 
explanations that view desistance as the result of a normal development process, is that 
even though changes in criminal and delinquent behavior may coincide with key life-
course transitions, such as marriage, these transitions are not causally related to the 
movement away from crime. Instead, life-events such as marriage are likely to be viewed 
from this perspective as indicators of the developmental process that promotes desistance 
or as, in the case of self-control theory, the result of an individual characteristic that 
makes involvement in crime less likely. Above all, these theoretical accounts are 
distinguished by their insistence that change is something that happens ordinarily as the 
result of normal developmental processes which themselves defy explanation. As 
explanations for desistance, therefore, they are largely incomplete. 
Despite the strong relationship between age and crime in the aggregate, most 
criminologists seem to agree that the aggregate-level relationship between age and crime 
obscures a considerable degree of variation between individuals (Nagin, Farrington, and 
Moffit 1995). This research has been made possible by recent advances in statistical 
modeling that have enabled researchers to identify reasonably homogenous clusters of 
individuals who follow distinct patterns of development (Nagin and Land 1993, Nagin 
2005). Use of these methods in multiple settings to analyze both self-report data and 
official measures of crime has led to the identification of a number of distinct offending 
profiles used (e.g. Nagin, Farrington, and Moffit 1995, Laub et al 1998, Bushway et al 
2001, 2003). Although disagreements have centered on the number of distinct offending 
trajectories (Benson 2002), these studies recognize that although the overwhelming 
majority of offenders give up crime in early adulthood, a significant minority of offenders 
continue to commit crime at later points in their lives (Nagin, Farrington, and Moffit 
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1995, Bushway et al 2001, 2003). Even though these findings may not refute the 
assertions of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) that desistance is inevitable, they clearly 
indicate that desistance does not follow the same pattern for all offenders. Thus, those 
theoretical accounts that emphasize developmental changes that occur most prominently 
in the adolescent period are useful for explaining the large-scale exodus from crime that 
occurs at that time, but they may not be able to account for the considerable variability 
that exists in the relationship between age and crime across the population. To explain 
desistance, therefore, requires an explanation of this variability without resorting to the 
tautological retort that those who desist from crime at one point are those who have 
matured. 
 
 
Developmental and Typological Approaches 
In a review of the literature on stability and change in criminal offending, Moffitt 
(1993) offered an explanation for the divergent patterns of onset, continuation and 
desistance observed in empirical studies. She argued that the aggregate-level age-crime 
curve obscured two distinct types of offenders: adolescence-limited (AL) and life-course 
persistent (LCP) offenders. Although she has since acknowledged the likelihood that 
other offending typologies exist (Wright et al 1999, Moffitt et al 2003), her original 
taxonomy is an important example of the typological and developmental explanations for 
continuity and change in criminal behavior. These theories are distinguished by their 
emphasis on distinctive etiologies of criminal behavior for different categories of 
offenders as well as distinct prognoses for change.  
Moffitt (1993) argued that the onset of offending for LCP offenders resulted from 
the interaction of neighborhood and individual psychological characteristics. She 
maintained that a small proportion of children were either born with or developed 
neuropsychological impairments early in life and that these impairments included an 
inability to regulate impulses and restrain their behavior (Moffit 1993). As a result of 
these impairments, which were most likely to manifest themselves in conduct problems at 
early stages (Caspi et al 1987), LCP children were more likely to attract harsh and erratic 
parental responses. The inconsistency of parental treatment could then lead to an 
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exacerbation of existing behavioral problems that would in turn elicit further negative 
reactions from parents (Moffitt 1993). Overtime the antisocial tendencies of LCP children 
could “knife away” opportunities. For example, conduct problems in school would be 
associated with poor school performance which could reduce opportunities further and 
increase the likelihood of continued antisocial behavior. At some point, Moffitt (1993) 
reasoned that LCP children would attract the attention of the police and criminal justice 
agencies and that this would further increase the likelihood of continuation. In the end, 
LCP offenders would be distinguished by continuity of antisocial behavior over the 
course of their lives. 
Adolescence-limited offenders, by contrast, as they name implied, engage in 
crime for a short period only. In fact, as the most numerous group of offenders, the late 
onset and early desistance from crime and delinquency in adolescence is the source of the 
distinctive shape of the age-crime curve. Moffitt (1993) argued that most adolescents are 
challenged by a maturity gap; that is, although they reach biological maturity and hence 
the physical capacity to live as adults, in most cases, they are socially precluded from 
achieving the same status as adults. During the adolescent years, these children engage in 
crime as a form of “social mimicry” (Moffitt 1993). Frustrated by the “maturity gap”, 
these individuals start to imitate the behavior of the LCP children around them and 
engage in crime as a way to achieve the trappings of adulthood to which they aspire (e.g. 
access to money, status, and sexual relationships). Gradually, however, these individuals 
are believed to age out of crime as they encounter a series of age-graded changes that 
lead to a diminution of the “maturity gap” and its disappearance altogether. 
Importantly, Moffitt (1993) was cognizant of the possibility that some 
adolescence-limited offenders could be apprehended for their offenses and “entrapped” 
by their delinquent roles as predicted by labeling theory (e.g. Lemert 1972). However, for 
the most part, these individuals are able to abandon crime; instead, it the life-course 
persistent offenders who are most likely to be overtaken by the consequences of their 
criminal involvement to the point that change becomes less likely as time wears on. 
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Social Control Theory 
Laub and Sampson (2003, Sampson and Laub 1993) provide a different 
explanation for continuity and change in criminal behavior as well as a different 
assessment of its extent. Although the process by which individuals entered into crime 
was a critical concern in their work, it is their life-course theory of social control as an 
explanation for continuity and change that has attracted most attention. In essence, their 
theory seeks to explain the apparent continuity of offending, at the same time as 
demonstrating the widespread possibility of change. The key premise of the age-graded 
theory of social control is that involvement in crime is caused by the loosening of the 
social bonds that constrain criminal behavior. Conversely, reductions in criminal 
offending, including desistance, can be explained by the establishment or re-
establishment of social bonds. Hence, according to the age-graded theory of social 
control, as opposite sides of the same coin, continuity and change are explained by the 
same causal process. 
Their rejection of the typological approach and their insistence that continuity and 
change are explained by the same process are based on two key arguments. First, even 
though a large proportion of adult criminals had been involved in crime and delinquency 
at an early age, childhood and adolescent criminality are exceedingly poor prospective 
predictors of crime in later life (Sampson and Laub 1993, Laub and Sampson 2003). Far 
too many antisocial children managed to avoid criminal lives and this was true even of 
those individuals who had been officially labeled as criminal or delinquent (Laub and 
Sampson 1993). Their research shows that using childhood and adolescent antisocial 
behavior as a predictor of later criminal behavior significantly over-predicts adult 
criminality (Laub and Sampson 2003). Moreover, there is nothing inherent in the 
attributes or behavior of children or adolescents that enables researchers to accurately 
predict trajectories of antisocial behavior in adulthood prospectively. Despite the 
theoretical appeal of terms such as adolescence-limited and life-course persistent 
behavior, these labels cannot be applied prospectively with any accuracy. 
Second, long-term monitoring of criminal and delinquent behavior reveals that 
even seemingly persistent offenders abandon crime eventually. To explain these patterns, 
Laub and Sampson (2003; Sampson and Laub 1993) reasoned that at different times in 
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their lives individuals experienced “turning points” that could help direct them from 
criminal pathways to more conventional ways of life. The “age-graded” nature of these 
changes helped explain why so many people ceased offending in late adolescence and 
adulthood (Laub and Sampson 2003). However, many of these changes were experienced 
at later points in life and when they did occur they frequently resulted in lasting 
behavioral change. Of these changes, marriage emerged as the most significant (Laub and 
Sampson 2003; see also Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998, Warr 1998). Marriage helped 
individuals abandon crime because it represented a form of attachment. In similar 
respects to the role played by attachment in social bonding theory (Hirschi 1969), these 
authors argued that married individuals had more “social capital” and were more 
“bonded” to society and as such, were less likely to commit crime. Marriage also 
included a rational component; that is, marital bonds were described as a form of 
investment that would be jeopardized by criminal behavior (Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 
1998). 
At the same time, Laub and Sampson (1995, 2003) were aware that there was 
considerable continuity in offending, but as they point out, this continuity stops well short 
of life-course persistence. To explain this continuity, they examined the impact that prior 
offending could have on subsequent life opportunities. In particular, they reasoned that 
criminal offending could reduce opportunities for change in later life as a result of a 
process of “cumulative disadvantage”. The reasoning behind this process was similar to 
the concept of “knifing away opportunities” described by Moffitt (1993); that is, changes 
in the life-course can increase as well as decrease subsequent opportunities. The most 
important of these, as noted by Laub and Sampson (1993, 1995) concerned the effect of 
imprisonment on life opportunities. As they note, imprisonment can significantly reduce 
opportunities for change and this is most likely to occur as a result of the loss of 
employment that results from long-periods of imprisonment (Laub and Sampson 1995). 
Recent research on the effects of police and judicial intervention of crime has 
demonstrated that much of the effect of judicial intervention is mediated by the impact of 
intervention on prospects for employment (Bernburg and Krohn 2003). However, even 
seemingly persistent offenders desist from crime (Laub and Sampson 2003). 
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 Rational-Choice Theory 
The key premise of the rational choice perspective, as applied to the study of 
desistance, is that the decision to abandon crime results from a change in the perceived 
balance of its costs and benefits; specifically, desisting offenders choose to desist because 
the costs of crime exceed its benefits. Thus, a related and implicit premise of the rational-
choice explanation for desistance is that behavioral change follows the decision to 
disengage from crime. From the perspective of rational-choice theory, desisting offenders 
are viewed as “reasoning decision-makers” (Cornish and Clarke 1986, p. 13) who come 
to the realization, albeit belatedly, that crime is an ineffective means of maximizing their 
interests. There is considerable evidence in support of this perspective and the argument 
that the decision to give up crime is based on a change in the perceived costs or benefits 
of criminal activity (Shover and Thompson 1992).  
For many researchers, changes in the perceived costs and benefits of crime are 
precipitated by external “shocks” (Cusson and Pinsonneault 1986). The idea that 
exogenous shocks can trigger changes in the thinking or cost benefit calculus of active 
offenders has a long-history in criminology. As Sutherland (1937, p. 182) noted “it is 
generally necessary for the thief to suffer some shock or jolt before he will face the future 
seriously”. Examples of these incidents include the death of an accomplice, a significant 
betrayal by criminal associates, or an injury or accident sustained in the course of 
committing crime (Cusson and Pinsonneault 1986, Maruna 1997). As one reforming 
offender noted, “The last one [car] I stole I rolled on the motorway and it scared the 
living daylights out of me, and since then I haven’t bothered … since then I just sought of 
not interested in theft, bugger it” (Liebrich 1993, p. 221).  
At the same time, many offenders experience a more gradual shift in the 
perceived benefits of crime through a process of “delayed deterrence” (Cusson and 
Pinsonneault 1986). Rather than an abrupt event that precipitates change, delayed 
deterrence is defined as “the gradual wearing down of the criminal drive caused by the 
accumulation of punishments” (Cusson and Pinsonneault 1986).  For Cusson and 
Pinsonneault (1986), delayed deterrence could manifest itself in four ways: first, a higher 
estimate of the cumulative probability of punishment; second, an awareness of the 
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mounting difficulties of imprisonment; third, the realization that the accumulation of 
convictions can lead to drastic increases in the severity of criminal sentences; and fourth, 
a pervasive spread of fear throughout the life of the individual (Cusson and Pinsonneault 
1986). As offenders age, these accumulated losses sustained over years in prison may 
even take on greater significance. As one 45-year-old parolee noted, “I guess you get to 
the point where you think, well, … you’re getting old, you’re getting ready to die and 
you’ve never really lived or something” (Shover 1983, p. 211).  
Although imprisonment is one of the most obvious costs of crime, it is important 
to note that the costs of crime extend well beyond the costs imposed by the threat of 
formal sanctions. Crime can lead to physical injury and betrayal, the loss of friends and 
valued family relationships, as well as a host of other hardships than can weigh just as 
heavily on the individual as the pains of imprisonment. As one respondent noted to 
Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph (2002), “I’m through … I’m really, really, really 
tired of that life. I don’t want it no more man”. These experiences are often heightened 
when offenders are forced to consider the alternative lives that they might have led. As 
Laub and Sampson (2003) note, many of the long-term offenders who they interviewed 
professed profound regret for their lives they had not lived and the opportunities that they 
had wasted. Others may become more cognizant that the benefits of crime are limited 
such that even if the costs of crime have not changed, the perceived benefits no longer 
justify their involvement. For example, Shover and Thomson (1992) observed that 
expectations of the rewards of crime were an important predictor of desistance among a 
sample of ex-offenders. Irrespective of their losses, therefore, over time, many 
individuals become gradually aware that the costs of crime exceed its benefits.  
Of course, changes in the perceived cost-benefit calculus of crime need not wait 
for age and can occur in response to specific events in the lives of individuals. Life-
course transitions such as marriage, parenthood, employment, or military service could 
promote desistance, from the standpoint of rational-choice theory, if such changes can 
add to the costs of crime or lower its perceived benefits. In similar respects to one of the 
key mechanisms of social control theory, this is especially likely to occur if such changes 
provide active offenders with a stake in conformity; that is, if the event increases the 
likely costs of engagement in crime. Thus, as one desisting offender remarked to 
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Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph (2002), “having a baby … changed a whole lot of 
me. I know I had a responsibility and I mean if I did this wrong, they would come and 
take him”. For her, becoming a parent raised her stakes in conformity thereby providing 
her with a forceful incentive to abandon crime.  
Despite some apparent similarities to other perspectives, however, rational-choice 
explanations of desistance are distinguished by their emphasis on the decision-making 
process and in particular, on the decision to desist from crime. According to the rational-
choice perspective, therefore, most of the important work of the desistance process is 
done once the offender decides to abandon crime. That said, as many qualitative studies 
of desistance have made clear, the initial decision to abandon crime is only part of the 
overall desistance process. Life history narratives show that many offenders try to give up 
crime unsuccessfully many times before they eventually succeed in doing so (e.g. Maruna 
1997).  As the stories of such false-starters suggest, success in staying away from crime 
may depend not only on the decision to quit crime, but also on the ability of a person to 
stick to that decision each day thereafter. At the same time, there is some evidence that 
some offenders manage to avoid crime without ever having intended to do so (Laub and 
Sampson 2003, Shover 1983). Thus, if we are to understand desistance, we need to 
understand how an individual can sustain a commitment to abandon antisocial behavior 
(even in the absence of a deliberate decision to do so).  
 
 
Differential Association and Social Learning Theory 
The basic proposition of social learning theory is that crime is learned behavior 
(Akers 1998). According to the theory, crime is learned through differential association 
with other individuals who provide the social context in which the opportunities to 
imitate criminal and delinquent behavior are acquired, the definitions favorable to crime 
are learned, and differential reinforcement of behavior takes place. Exposure to different 
values, norms, and attitudes of others can have an impact on individual behavior through 
the acquisition of such attitudes (Burgess and Akers 1966, Akers 1998, Matsueda 1982). 
In addition to providing the context in which individuals can learn the definitions that 
support criminal behavior, differential association also provides opportunities to imitate 
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criminal and delinquent behavior. Once imitation occurs, however, it becomes less 
important to the explanation of crime for, after the point of initiation, differential 
reinforcement takes over as the driving force of the social learning process (Akers 1998). 
Hence, direct association and interaction with others who are engaged in criminal 
behavior are the principal means through which crime is learned to the extent that people 
are more likely to commit crime if they associate with others who are already involved in 
crime (Warr and Stafford 1991; Warr 1993). 
Given the importance of differential association to social learning theory, a key 
mechanism by which desistance is likely to occur is through changes in the types of 
people with whom an offender associates. As individuals spend less time in the company 
of their friends, especially in the company of friends who are already involved in crime, 
they are less likely to be involved in crime. Thus, Warr (1993) demonstrated that changes 
in peer association in late adolescence and early adulthood are associated with changes in 
criminal and delinquent behavior over time. He observed that time spent with friends, 
loyalty to friends, and exposure to delinquent peers, all declined considerably over time 
and that these changes were associated with reductions in criminal behavior. In fact, “the 
association between age and crime is substantially weakened and, for some offenses, 
disappears entirely” when controlling for differential association (Warr 1993, p. 35). 
It is important to note that changes in peer association do not occur entirely by 
default, but are precipitated, at least to some degree, by the life-course transitions that 
punctuate late adolescence and early adulthood. For example, Warr (1998) observed that 
married individuals spent considerably less time in the company of their friends and were 
much less likely to have friends who were involved in crime and delinquency and, 
therefore, were themselves less likely to be involved in crime. Thus, from the standpoint 
of social learning theory, life-course transitions such as marriage may promote desistance 
primarily by reducing and individual’s associations with antisocial influences. 
 
 
Theories of Cognitive Transformation and Identity Change 
In similar respects to rational-choice explanations for desistance, the cognitive 
transformation approach maintains that people give up crime because they choose to do 
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so. Desistance is considered to be dependent on the offender having made a conscious 
choice to move away from crime. However, in contrast to the rational-choice perspective, 
the decision to quit crime is not in and of itself sufficient to understand desistance. The 
cognitive transformation approach emphasizes a series of psychological changes that act 
as precursors to and guarantors of the desistance process. Some of these changes reflect 
changes in attitudes, beliefs, and objectives, including the acceptability and justifiability 
of criminal and delinquent behavior. Others transformations might reflect perceptual 
changes, such as a shift in the way the individual sees or defines him or herself.  
Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph (2002) identify four types of cognitive 
transformation. First, successful desistance begins with openness to change. Unless a 
person is looking for the means to move away from crime, she or he is unlikely to 
recognize the opportunities that may arise. It is important to note that preparedness to 
change is not necessarily the same thing as having made the decision to abandon crime. 
Frustration with the costs of crime may be sufficient to ready an individual for change 
even if she or he has not actually decided to pursue a non-deviant way of life (Giordano, 
Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002). Second, in order to disengage from crime successfully, 
individuals need to be open to the opportunities for change that may arise in their lives, 
including life-events such as marriage. Openness to such “hooks for change” is distinct 
from openness to change itself (Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002). A person can 
be prepared to change or willing to do so because she or he recognizes that the costs of 
crime have come to exceed its benefits, but she or he may still not see the prospect of a 
romantic relationship as an opportunity to disengage from crime. Differences between 
individuals in their openness to potential life-course transitions can lead to widely 
divergent outcomes. Hence, as a young drug-dealer remarked to Hagedorn (1994, p. 209), 
“I’m not going to go by the slow way … working at some chicken job … [only to] get 
fired when I come in high or drunk … or miss a day or something because I got high 
smoking weed, drinking beer”. Although some people might see a minimum job as an 
opportunity to earn a living and get out of crime, others are likely to avoid such chances, 
seeing neither as incompatible with their continued involvement in crime or as 
opportunities to initiate some fundamental changes in their lives. 
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Third, desistance is more likely to occur if the desisting offender can begin to 
envision or create an alternative identity that is based on convention and the repudiation 
of crime and deviance. Identity change is the distinguishing characteristic of the cognitive 
transformation approach and is a central theme in a great deal of desistance research, 
especially in those studies based on the life history narratives of reforming offenders. For 
example, Maruna (2001, p. 7) argues that “in order to desist from crime, ex-offenders 
need to develop a coherent, prosocial identity for themselves”. This requires, among 
other things, that they can develop “a coherent and credible self-story to explain … how 
their checkered pasts could have led to their new, reformed identities” (Maruna 2001, p. 
8). In fact, in light of the perceived importance of identity change, as I noted earlier, 
Maruna and Farrall (2004) consider it a necessary precondition of the definition of 
desistance. 
Fourth, successful desistance also requires that these changes in personal identity 
must also be accompanied by a fundamental shift in how the desisting offender views 
criminal behavior. Given that much of the motivation to engage in crime may stem from 
the seductions of crime or its “sneaky thrills” (Katz 1988), Giordano, Cernkovich, and 
Rudolph (2002) argue that if an individual is to give up on crime she or he needs to see 
criminal behavior as being undesirable and incompatible with his or her newly acquired 
pro-social identity. Thus, “the desistance process can be seen as relatively complete when 
the actor no longer sees these same behaviors as positive, viable, or even personally 
relevant” (Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002, p. 1002).  
It is important to note, however, that although identify change may require the 
complete repudiation of crime desisting offenders often build their refashioned identities 
around their wayward experiences. As Maruna (2001) notes, the establishment of a new 
conventional identity often requires a personal story or narrative that enables the 
reforming offender to reconcile his or her past and present selves. In some cases, the 
dissonance created by identity change is overcome by the development of an 
intergenerational script; that is, a story that sees prior involvement in crime as a stage that 
one had to endure in order to be in the position to help others (Maruna 2001). In these 
cases, in particular, the establishment of a new identity does not require the total 
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abandonment of a delinquent or criminal self-concept; indeed, the old self becomes a 
critical aspect of the new (Maruna 2001; see also Brown 1991). 
The cognitive transformation approach recognizes that key life-events such as 
marriage, employment, or military service may play a prominent role in the desistance 
process. However, in contrast to other theoretical perspectives which acknowledge the 
effects of exogenous events on the individual, the cognitive transformation emphasizes 
the causal significance of social-psychological change and the “upfront work 
accomplished by the actors themselves”. Events in the life-course such as marriage are 
thought to influence criminal and delinquent behavior only in so far as the individual is 
attentive to the opportunities afforded by those events and their consequences for their 
lives and actions. Thus, Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph (2002) acknowledge that 
marriage might help instigate desistance and provide the social support necessary for the 
individual to continue to desist from crime even in the face of adversity. That said, 
according to the cognitive transformation approach, events such as marriage are most 
likely to affect desistance if offenders are open to the prospect of reform, likely to see 
their marriages as opportunities to change, and if their marriages promote identity 
transformation and fundamental shifts in the way they think about crime. 
 
 
Conclusions 
As the definition of desistance and the theoretical perspectives offered to explain 
it suggest, it is unlikely that offenders immediately terminate crime in response to getting 
married or experiencing any other significant or propitious life event. Desistance seems 
to occur gradually. The process may or may not begin with the decision to quit crime, but 
it continues everyday that the reforming offender maintains his or her commitment to a 
conventional way of life. For some, the process of maintaining a state of non-offending 
may be easier than it is for others. Differences in the likelihood of completing the 
desistance project may be due to constitutional differences, differences in the etiology of 
offending, or the degree to which one is aided by attachments to conventional others. 
Clearly, there is no shortage of explanations for how and why people abandon crime. 
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Whatever the explanation, as the preceding discussion indicates, life-course 
transitions such as marriage can play a part in the desistance process for a host of reasons. 
Given that the various explanations of the desistance process offer distinctive 
perspectives on why such events might be associated with disengagement from crime, 
studying those transitions, in greater detail, may tell us more about the desistance process 
and ultimately help us adjudicate between these competing theoretical perspectives. To 
that end, in the next chapter, I propose a method of measuring desistance based on 
observed changes in self-reported criminal and delinquent behavior. In Chapter 4, I then 
examine the association between these changes and two seemingly-related life-course 
transitions — marriage and unmarried cohabitation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
In this chapter, I consider some of the methodological issues surrounding the 
empirical study of desistance and its relationship to cohabitation and marriage. Its 
purpose is to explore some themes that are common to the three empirical studies that 
comprise Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Measurement and analytical issues that are specific to 
each of the empirical studies will be explored in those chapters. Given the complexities 
and difficulties of defining desistance, as outlined in Chapter 2, I begin by discussing 
some key aspects of its measurement. I then describe the National Youth Survey (NYS) 
— the data used for the analyses reported in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 — and the ways in 
which those data are used to measure desistance from crime and learn more about its 
connection to marriage and cohabitation. Despite some limitations common to many 
longitudinal studies, the NYS provides a good opportunity to explore the themes 
developed in the remaining chapters: the empirical links between cohabitation and 
marriage and desistance from crime; the theoretical mechanisms that underpin those 
links; and the degree to which they vary between men and women. The chapter closes 
with a discussion of one of the main threats to the validity of research concerning the 
effects of life-course transitions on desistance from crime: the problem of self-selection. 
Although self-selection represents a particular challenge to research on crime and family 
relationships in adulthood, I discuss some analytical methods than can be used to 
minimize, if not eliminate, such threats.  
 
 
The Measurement of Desistance 
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, trying to study the developmental nature of 
desistance raises a number of important challenges. The first of these problems, the 
indeterminacy of desistance, can be overcome, if not resolved completely, by specifying 
specific periods of time in which desistance may be observed. The second problem, 
however, the need to identify alternative manifestations of the desistance process (other 
than the termination of offending), is somewhat more intractable. As noted in Chapter 2, 
there is little direct evidence, that observable changes in criminal behavior, other than the 
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transition from a state of offending to one of non-offending, are either necessary or 
sufficient indicators that an individual is desisting from crime. Thus, the only universally 
applicable outward expression of desistance is the termination of offending.  
Heterogeneity in desistance implies that abstinence from crime should be its 
preeminent indicator. Other changes, such as reductions in the number of or types of 
offenses committed, might signify that an individual is moving away from crime and so 
might be used to help researchers observe developmental processes that, in some cases, 
result in the termination of offending. Nonetheless, they should never replace the non-
observance of offending as the defining characteristic of desistance. The first criterion for 
measuring desistance, therefore, is that it enables researchers to observe individuals who 
change from committing one or more offenses to committing none. Other measures may 
be used to supplement our understanding of desistance, in so far as they tell us how 
termination might take place, but they should not be used in the place of indicators that 
aim, above all, to distinguish the inactive offender from his or her active past.  
Of course, as I also explained in Chapter 2, desistance represents more than mere 
changes in offending. Desistance also denotes the process by which a durable, if not 
permanent, change in criminal behavior takes place. This combination of two seemingly 
irreconcilable features ― change and continuity ― complicates the measurement of 
desistance considerably. Most statistical models that are used to study desistance focus 
exclusively on the former and as a result, neglect the importance of studying how initial 
changes in behavior become fixed as durable patterns of conduct (Farrington and West 
1995, Sampson and Laub 1993, Maume, Ousey and Beaver 2005). Given that many 
desisting offenders make several unsuccessful attempts to change and that countless 
others succeed only by struggling to overcome obstacles on the road to reform (Maruna 
1997, 2001, Sommers, Baskin, and Fagan 1994, Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 
2002), the ability to abstain from crime over time may be as important to understanding 
desistance as an initial temporal break in an ongoing pattern of antisocial behavior. As 
Mulvey et al (2004, p. 222) suggest, “any measurement of desistance should be able to 
demonstrate … [that] antisocial behavior has remained below a certain low level for 
some reasonable period of time” (Mulvey et al 2004, p. 222). Hence, the second criterion 
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for measuring desistance should be that it enables researchers to observe a change of 
some meaningful duration. 
Given the need to satisfy both of these criteria, one approach to measuring 
desistance might be to develop a single indicator of which offenders had desisted from 
crime and which had not. According to this scheme, individuals are be classified as 
having desisted if they were involved in crime prior to some point in time, but had 
abstained from it for some specified period of time after that point. This approach, which 
I use in Chapter 5 to study the theoretical underpinnings of the links between adult family 
relationships and desistance, aims to improve our understanding of desistance by 
comparing individuals who desist to those who do not. Although it is based, in principle, 
on the observance of between-individual differences, it differs from most conventional 
applications of that method that are concerned with examining cross-sectional 
differences. Instead, this approach is focused primarily on differences in the likelihood 
that individuals will abandon crime. Thus, change of some specified duration, is the 
dependent variable. 
Despite its simplicity, in terms of providing a single indicator of an exceptionally 
complicated concept, the above approach has one chief limitation: it is exceedingly 
sensitive to the timing of the observations. Even minor changes in either the instant at 
which the behavior of the individual is first examined, for evidence of prior offending, or 
the moment at which his or her behavior is re-examined for evidence of abstinence or 
recidivism, could have dramatic effects on who is classified as having desisted from 
crime. For example, the initial observation period, if fixed too late in the lifespan, could 
miss a number of formerly active offenders who had already desisted from crime. In 
similar respects, if the second point of measurement follows the first too closely it may 
lead to the exclusion of many individuals who will desist from crime at some later stage.  
The alternative approach, adopted in Chapter 4, avoids the need for a separate 
indicator of desistance by invoking analytical methods that can be used to assess both 
changes in offending and the continuity of non-offending simultaneously. These 
hierarchical or multilevel models divide the cross-sectional and time-series variations in 
criminal behavior that can be observed in a given sample into two distinct components ― 
individual changes in behavior over time and enduring behavioral differences between 
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individuals. These two components can then be regressed on time-varying and time-
stable correlates. Thus, such hierarchical or multilevel models are ideal for assessing the 
effects of life-course transitions on both the likelihood of experiencing changes in 
criminal behavior and the maintenance of non-offending over time. 
 
 
The National Youth Survey 
Either of these approaches, if used to study desistance and its links to adult family 
relationships, requires fairly comprehensive information on a sample of offenders over 
time. Aside from the obvious need for information about their marriages and involvement 
in unmarried cohabiting relationships, in addition to information regarding the possible 
mechanisms by which the formation of such relationships may contribute to desistance, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, at the very least, the project also requires some indication of 
whether those individuals were involved in a reasonably comprehensive range of offenses 
at various points in time over a reasonably prolonged period. Although several data 
sources may fulfill some of those requirements, the National Youth Survey (NYS) is 
unique as a publicly-available source of information that meets all of these needs. 
The NYS is a longitudinal survey of crime and delinquency based on a national 
probability sample of 1,725 respondents, who were born between 1959 and 1965. 
Respondents were interviewed annually from 1977 through to 1981 and then again in 
1984 and 1987. On each occasion, they were asked about their personal and family 
backgrounds in addition to extensive information about their attitudes, beliefs, peer and 
intimate relationships, and their experiences in the preceding year. Of critical importance 
is the fact that respondents were asked also about their participation in an extensive range 
of delinquent acts and criminal offences including, though not limited to, assault, 
burglary, theft, and robbery (Elliot and Ageton 1980). The combination of a longitudinal 
research design and such detailed information on a range of topics, including 
involvement in crime, provides an ideal opportunity to assess the links between adult 
family relationships and desistance. 
Of course, in similar respects to other longitudinal studies, the National Youth 
Survey has its limitations: first, since it is based on a national, probability sample, the 
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NYS includes only a small percentage of serious, high-level criminal offenders 
(Cernkovich, Giordano, and Pugh 1985); and second, its restricted age-range naturally 
focuses attention on desistance in adolescence and early adulthood. In part, the latter of 
these problems is exacerbated by changes to the survey instrument which have, in effect, 
narrowed the focus of this dissertation, even further, to the last four publicly-available 
waves of the survey. Thus, Chapters 4 and 6 are based on the responses of 1626 
respondents who had participated in a least one of the last four publicly-available waves 
(i.e. 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1986). Participants were aged between 15 and 21 in 1979 and 
between 22 and 28 in 1986. Chapter 5 concentrates on a subset of those respondents ― a 
subset of those who participated in both 1980 and 19831. These respondents were aged 
between 19 and 25 in 1983. 
Prior research has confirmed that the sample of respondents who participated in 
the initial survey was representative of American 11 to 17 year-olds in 1976 (Elliott and 
Huizinga 1983). As with any longitudinal study, the NYS experiences some attrition over 
the years (Brame and Piquero 2003). Nonetheless, drop-out rates at each wave of the 
NYS are not substantial. Eighty percent of the original 1725 respondents and 85 percent 
of the 1626 respondents who participated in at least one of the last four waves responded 
to the 1986 survey. Moreover, as others have noted with respect to these data, the “loss 
[of respondents] by age, sex, ethnicity, class, place of residence, and reported 
delinquency did not substantially influence the underlying distributions on these 
variables” (Elliott et al 1989, p. 3). Of the 1626 respondents whose responses provide the 
basis for the analyses presented in Chapter 4, 53 percent were male. Fifteen percent were 
African-American, 4 percent Hispanic, and 79 percent were European-American. 
The main consequence of sample attrition over the seven publicly-available waves 
of the NYS is that it contributes, to some degree, to an apparent decline in self-reported 
criminal and delinquent behavior over time (Brame and Piquero 2003, see Lauritsen 1998 
and Thornberry 1989 for alternative explanations for the decline). Thus, even though 
                                                 
1 Respondents were interviewed again in 1989, 1992, 1998, and 2002, but these data have 
not been released for public use. In May 2006, I requested permission to the 1989 and 
1992 waves of the data. However, at the time of writing, access had not been granted.  
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correlations among variables in the NYS are not likely to be affected significantly by 
sample attrition, failure to account for sample attrition could lead to an overestimation in 
the rate of desistance. Since this dissertation is not concerned with estimating the 
prevalence of desistance and is focused, instead, on explaining inter-individual changes 
in criminal behavior, the problems posed by sample attrition can be overcome merely by 
restricting attention to observable changes in behavior. 
For some readers, the resulting emphasis on the ways in which the formation of 
their own family relationships can help enable adolescents and young adults to disengage 
from relatively low-level offending may be problematic. After all, some commentators 
have argued that there is little to be gained by studying delinquency in the adolescent 
period or studying low level offending among the adolescent population (Laub and 
Sampson 2003, Bottoms et al 2004). They suggest that, instead, researchers need to focus 
on the later stages of the life-course and also, presumably, on changes in behavior among 
those individuals who have extensive criminal histories. Notwithstanding these concerns, 
it is important to note that desistance from crime is most prevalent in late adolescence 
and young adulthood (Nagin and Land 1993, Nagin, Farrington, and Moffit 1995, 
Bushway et al 2003). The overwhelming majority of people who were involved in crime 
at some point in their lives desisted from further criminal involvement as they neared the 
end of their teenage years and entered the period of early adulthood. Looking at 
desistance at a much later period might be fruitful for understanding what factors are 
related to the desistance of more serious persistent offenders, but it tells us little about the 
majority of desisting offenders, the vast majority of whom were involved only in low 
levels of crime as adolescents. In any case, except for a very small number of long-term 
studies of criminal behavior (e.g. Farrington and West 1990, Laub and Sampson 2003), 
most studies of desistance are not able to monitor offenders for sufficiently long periods 
of time to be confident that desistance had taken place.  
 
 
The Measurement of Crime and Delinquency 
For the purposes of measuring desistance from crime, I developed a dichotomous 
indicator of self-reported criminal participation. Respondents were coded 1 if they had 
 46
reported committing one or more of a range of criminal offenses in the previous calendar 
year and 0 otherwise. The offenses covered by the measure included drug sales, felony 
assault, felony theft, minor assault, minor theft, prostitution, and robbery. These measures 
were modeled on scales developed by Elliot, Huizinga, and Menard (1989) and were 
based on items that were included consistently in the seven publicly-available waves of 
the NYS. Together, they provide a comprehensive assessment of the degree to which 
respondents were involved in crime throughout the observation period. The survey items 
that comprised these offense-specific categories are shown in Table 3.1. 
The same offenses covered by the dichotomous indicator of criminal prevalence 
were also used to develop two other indicators of criminal and delinquent behavior: first, 
an index of offense diversity; and second, an individual measure of the number of 
offenses that they reported committing. To estimate the diversity of offending I counted 
the total number of different types of offenses; specifically, I dichotomized the individual 
offense items within each offense-specific category and summed these for each 
respondent. To measure the level of offending committed by each individual, I counted 
the total number of times in the previous calendar year that respondents had reported 
committing the individual offenses that constituted the dichotomous crime indicator. As 
noted earlier, since reductions in the number or types of offenses committed may or may 
not result in desistence, these alternative measures are intended only to supplement the 
principal measure of criminal participation: the dichotomous indicator described above. 
To that end, the two auxiliary measures were used to replicate the analyses reported in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Results of these analyses are consistent with those reported below. 
Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of respondents, within each age group, who 
reported committing one or more offenses in 1979, 1980, 1983, and 1986. Overall, Figure 
3.1 shows significant declines in the prevalence of criminal and delinquent behavior in 
the sample as respondents moved through adolescence and into early adulthood. 
Admittedly, the graph also provides some evidence of a general decline in criminal 
prevalence in each survey year — a pattern observed in prior studies (Thornberry 1989; 
Lauritsen 1998) that could be due, to some extent, to attrition in the NYS sample (Brame 
and Piquero 2003; see also Cernkovich, Giordano and Pugh 1985). Nonetheless, the age 
differences in criminal prevalence within a single survey wave at a time and the overall 
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patterns of decline shown by the four lines in Figure 3.1 are consistent with the shape of 
the general age-crime curve, noted in Chapter 1, and observed in countless other studies. 
Figure 3.2 shows the same information presented in a way that enables readers to 
observe changes in the prevalence of criminal behavior among each cohort in the NYS. 
Each line, in Figure 3.2, shows the proportion of respondents in a given birth cohort who 
reported committing one or more offenses in each of the four waves of the survey. The 
graph provides further evidence of an overall decline in criminal prevalence among 
respondents to the NYS. These patterns, perhaps indicating substantial desistance, are 
most apparent for two of the three youngest cohorts: those born in 1963 and 1964. 
Indeed, more than half of respondents born in those years reporting committing offenses 
in 1979 when they were aged 16 and 15 respectively. By 1986, aged 22 and 23, less than 
a third of them were reporting criminal involvement. At the same time, Figure 3.2 also 
indicates considerable heterogeneity in rates of decline. In fact, as can be seen, among the 
three oldest cohorts ― those born in 1959, 1960, and 1961― the percentage of 
respondents reporting one or more offenses actually increased, albeit slightly, from 1983 
to 1986, having declined steadily from the levels recorded in 1979.  For others, criminal 
prevalence appeared to stabilize at some point after some initial drops. 
 Given these patterns, the National Youth Survey provides a useful basis for 
studying the effects of adult family relationships on desistance from crime. First, even if 
the trends revealed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 reveal, to some extent, the effects of sample 
attrition, these graphs provide substantial prima facie evidence that a significant number 
of respondents desisted from crime between the years 1979 and 1986. Moreover, the 
reasonably high levels of prevalence observed across the seven birth cohorts and the 
considerable variability observed in their rates of change imply that there is significant 
variation in the distribution of the dependent variable to warrant its use in the analyses 
that follow. Before doing so, however, it may be useful to describe briefly the measures 
of cohabitation and marriage used in Chapters 4, 5, 6. 
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The Measurement of Cohabitation and Marriage 
Marital status (cohabitation and marriage) is measured in terms of the living 
arrangements of respondents in the years immediately preceding each survey interview. 
Specifically, I classified respondents as married only if they were living with their 
spouses and if they had lived together for the majority of the previous year (coded 1 if 
married, otherwise 0). In similar respects, those respondents who reported living with an 
intimate partner (i.e. boyfriend or girlfriend) with whom they were not married for the 
majority of the previous year were classified as cohabiting (coded 1 if cohabiting, 
otherwise 0). This method potentially includes same-sex relationships, which in prior 
studies have often been excluded deliberately (e.g. Simons et al 2002).  
Not surprisingly, the prevalence of marriage among NYS respondents increased 
significantly between 1979 and 1986. In 1979, only 5 percent of respondents were 
classified as married and living with their spouses. By 1986, the percentage of married 
respondents had increased to 39 percent. Changes in the prevalence of cohabitation were 
less dramatic. Less than 2 percent of respondents, in 1979, reported living with their 
unmarried partners. Despite some increase in its popularity, only 7 percent of respondents 
were classified as being in a cohabiting relationship at the end of the observation period.  
Despite its relative unpopularity, as I indicate in Chapter 4, it is still possible to discern 
statistically significant relationships between cohabitation and criminal participation. 
Notwithstanding the small numbers of respondents in cohabiting relationships, therefore, 
these data can still be used to evaluate the links between cohabitation, marriage, and 
criminal desistance. 
 
 
Cohabitation, Marriage and Self-Selection 
As noted in Chapter 2, not everyone agrees that life-course transitions, such as 
marriage, help promote desistance from crime. In perhaps the most extreme refutation of 
the notion that lasting changes in criminal and delinquent behavior occur in response to 
developments in the life-course, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argued that the empirical 
relationships between crime, marriage, and other romantic relationships are spurious. 
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They argued that the same characteristic that influences criminal propensity and behavior 
— their concept of self-control — also shapes the likelihood that an individual will 
marry, establish a relationship, as well as the types of people with whom he or she is 
likely to establish such a relationship (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Thus, Gottfredson 
and Hirschi (1990, p. 141) claimed that “individual differences in the likelihood of crime 
tend to persist across the life course; there is no drastic reshuffling of the criminal and 
non-criminal populations based on unpredictable, situational events”. 
Self-control could be expected to affect the formation and maintenance of adult 
family relationships in a number of ways. For one thing, individuals who have low self-
control are believed to live in the moment and give only limited consideration to their 
futures. Marriage, on the other hand, involves a life-long commitment that implies some 
concern for the years ahead. As such, it could be argued that individuals with low self-
control are less inclined to marry and relative to marriage, are perhaps more likely to find 
themselves in cohabiting relationships. Second, there is some reason to suspect that self-
control might affect the ability of couples to maintain stable and satisfying relationships. 
Different aspects of self-control, including impulsivity, lack of conscientiousness, self-
centeredness, and petulance, have been implicated as predictors of relationship instability 
(Caspi, Elder, and Bem 1987, Kelly and Conley 1987, Kurdeck 1993, Tucker, Kressin, 
and Spiro 1998). Thus, the probability of being married or being in a cohabiting 
relationship at any given point in time may be a function, in part, of an individual’s level 
of self-control, independently of the chances of having entered such a relationship.  
Finally, it is likely that self-control also affect the characteristics of interpersonal 
relationships, especially the strength of emotional bonds ― a key moderator of the link 
between marriage and desistance. For example, self-control has been shown to affect 
attachment style; that is, individuals lacking self-regulation are more inclined to exhibit 
avoidant and anxious-ambivalent attachment styles than secure attachment (Tagney, 
Baumeister, and Boone 2004). Since secure attachment is critical to the establishment and 
maintenance of strong emotional bonds, these results imply that individuals lacking self-
control are significantly less likely to experience the kinds of relationships considered 
necessary to reduce criminal involvement. Indeed, “many of the disrupted patterns of 
communication and behavior exchange … noted in disturbed couples may be seen as the 
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outgrowths of the personality characteristics of the partner” (Kelly and Conley 1987, p. 
36; Tagney, Baumeister, and Boone 2004). Thus, much as Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990) might have predicted, those who are most likely to form the kinds of relationships 
that are believed to promote disengagement from crime may be the very people who are 
least likely to be involved in crime — those individuals who are high in self-control. 
Of course, self-control is one of a number of factors that may influence an 
individual’s prospects for marriage and cohabitation in addition to the likely 
characteristics of his or her relationship. For example, these events may also be affected 
by the attributes of his or her family-of-origin including, though not limited to, his or her 
family structure, the stability and successfulness of his or her parent’s marriage, and the 
strength of and durability, even into adulthood, of parent-child attachment (Kelly and 
Conley 1987, Glenn and Kramer 1987, Greenberg and Nay 1982, Holman, Larson and 
Harmer 1984). The overall point, therefore, is not that Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) are 
necessarily correct in their assertion that self-control can account for the widely-
acknowledged connections between marriage and crime, but that the occurrence of 
marriage is not randomly determined. Thus, estimates of its effects on crime that fail to 
take account of these selection processes are likely to be biased and incorrect.  
The problem of bias arises because, in most cases, such models violate the 
assumption of zero covariance between the independent variables and the error term. 
Importantly, this can occur even if indicators of the exogenous factors are included in the 
original model since in the absence of perfect measurement of the independent variables, 
there may be some unobserved factors that are correlated with the independent and 
dependent variables. More likely, however, such bias results from the failure to control 
for other unobserved factors that affect both the transitions of interest ― in this case 
marriage or cohabitation ― and involvement in crime. 
To some extent, hierarchical or multilevel statistical models, similar to those 
described briefly earlier, can be used to overcome these problems (Horney, Osgood, and 
Marshal 1995; Brame, Bushway, and Paternoster 1999; Laub and Sampson 2003). To 
that end, for the key independent variables of interest, each respondent is assigned his or 
her mean score as calculated over the entire period of the study. In addition, an 
individual-specific, time-varying change score is also calculated as the difference 
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between each time-varying score in each time period and his or her individual-specific 
mean. Thus, in the case of marriage, measured using a dichotomous indicator as 
described above, the first independent variable would generally correspond to the 
proportion of the study period in which the individual had been married and the second 
independent variable would be the difference between this score and his or her time-
specific marriage score (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995; Laub and Sampson 2003; 
Sampson, Laub, and Wimer 2006). In so far as the time-varying change score is 
necessarily uncorrelated with any observed or unobserved time-stable characteristics — 
each individual’s mean deviation score is equal to zero — estimates of the effects of 
marriage on changes in criminal behavior are unbiased by the exclusion of unobserved, 
time-stable differences between individuals. This approach offers a robust and reasonably 
popular method of dealing with the problem of persistent, unobserved heterogeneity 
(Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995, Brame, Paternoster, and Bushway 1999). 
It should be noted, however, that the use of hierarchical or multilevel models does 
not overcome the problem of unobserved heterogeneity completely. First, as I discussed 
earlier, given the need to study desistance as an ongoing process of maintenance, the 
effects of time spent in marriage or cohabitation on enduring differences between 
individuals in terms of their criminal and delinquent behavior are also of interest. 
Nonetheless, in the hierarchical or multilevel modeling solution, outlined above, such 
between-individual estimators are still subject to bias caused by the omission of time-
stable characteristics. Second, the within-individual estimators, which would be used to 
estimate the marriage and cohabitation on inter-individual changes in criminal behavior, 
are still subject to biases resulting from unobserved, time-varying factors. Of course, no 
study using observational data is able to definitively rule out the possibility that 
unobserved factors may account, in some small way, for the results it obtains.   
 
 
Conclusions 
The need to measure desistance as an ongoing dynamic process and to relate that 
process to life-course transitions, such as the development of adult family relationships, 
presents a considerable challenge. Most statistical methods can readily relate changes in 
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one life domain to changes in another, but those same methods do not necessarily lend 
themselves to correlating change and stability. To some extent, these problems can be 
overcome through the use of analytical methods and approaches that examine the 
correlates of within-individual change independently of the correlates of between-
individual differences in offending. They can also be resolved by developing direct 
indicators of desistance that incorporate change and continuity into its measurement. 
Both approaches are adopted in this dissertation and in the analyses to follow. 
Of course, the most important function of any indicator of desistance or any 
analytical method used to understand its development is that it can distinguish between 
states of offending and non-offending; that is, moments in which the individual is 
involved in crime and stages, subsequent to that involvement, in which his or her 
participation in crime and delinquency is not merely low, but negligible. Thus, changes in 
the number of or type of offenses committed should not be the key determinant of 
desistance. Instead, desistance should be measured in terms of the abandonment of crime, 
for some reasonable period of time, by individuals who had previously engaged in it. 
With measures and methods that are faithful to the definition of the concept, as outlined 
in Chapter 2, I begin the task of clarifying the role of adult family relationships in the 
desistance process. To that end, in the next chapter, I examine the empirical links 
between cohabitation and marriage and the extent to which both kinds of adult family 
relationships can contribute to desistance from crime.  
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Table 3.1 Offenses Included in Dichotomous Indicator of Crime and Delinquency 
 
Offense-Type Offense 
Drug Sales Sold marijuana 
 Sold hard drugs 
Felony Assault Attacked someone 
 Been in gang fights 
 Sexual assault 
Felony Theft Stolen motor vehicle 
 Stolen something worth more than $50 
 Bought stolen goods 
 Broke into building or vehicle 
Minor Assault Hit parent 
Minor Theft Stolen something worth less than $5 
 Stolen money from family 
 Taken vehicle without the owners permission 
 Avoided paying for things 
 Stolen things $5 to $50 
Prostitution Been paid to have sex with someone 
Robbery Used force on students 
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of Respondents in Each Age Group Reporting One or More 
Offenses, By Year of Interview 
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Figure 3.2: Changes in Criminal Prevalence by Year of Birth, 1979-1986 
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CHAPTER 4 
As noted in Chapter 1, the empirical links between desistance and transformative 
life events, such as marriage, are well known (Sampson and Laub 1993, Farrington and 
West 1995, Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995, Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998, Laub 
and Sampson 2003, Sampson, Laub, and Wimer 2006), but the evidence that analogous 
life changes, such as entering a cohabiting relationship, can also facilitate changes in 
criminal behavior is less conclusive (Laub and Sampson 2003; Laub, Sampson, and 
Wimer 2006). Despite the fact that some qualitative studies have observed that 
cohabitation can promote disengagement from crime, most quantitative research on the 
subject indicates that these relationships fail to advance desistance (e,g. Yamaguchi and 
Kandel 1985; Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995; Warr 1998). In fact, cohabitation may 
even encourage individual involvement in crime (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995).  
One plausible explanation for these discrepant results is that cohabitation and 
marriage are not as similar as they may appear. There are some notable differences 
between the two types of relationships and these differences could manifest themselves in 
ways that affect the causes of crime. As a result, cohabitation may not expose individuals 
to the kinds of experiences that make desistance more likely. An alternative explanation 
is that cohabitation operates in much the same way as marriage, but its effects on crime 
have been overlooked because researchers have failed to take account of the factors that 
moderate its impact. There is ample evidence that the effect of marriage on crime is not 
categorical and that it depends on an array of individual and relationship characteristics, 
including the strength of emotional attachments between partners (Sampson and Laub 
1993; Laub, Nagin and Sampson 1998; Laub and Sampson 2003). The same might also 
be true of cohabitation.  
To date, there has not been a single published study that has examined the extent 
to which the effects of cohabitation on crime depend on the characteristics of the 
relationship. In the case of cohabitation, this may be a particular problem because levels 
of quality appear to differ across the two types of relationships. In particular, people in 
cohabiting relationships report less relationship satisfaction, stability, commitment, and 
more negative interactions than married couples (Nock 1995, Brown and Booth 1996) 
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Failure to take account of the conditioning influence of relationship quality, therefore, 
may give the impression that cohabitation does not reduce crime because in most cases 
― when attachment and commitment are low ― it does not. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to address these shortcomings. I do so by 
investigating the degree to which relationship characteristics moderate the links between 
cohabitation, marriage, and crime. Specifically, I test two hypotheses: first, that the 
experience of entering and maintaining high-quality cohabiting and marital relationships 
is associated with reductions in criminal behavior; and second, that high-quality 
cohabiting and marital relationships affect crime in similar ways. 
This research is important for a number of reasons. First, marriage rates have 
declined tremendously within the last thirty years, but much of that decline has been 
offset by increases in the popularity of non-marital cohabitation (Bumpass and Sweet 
1989; Bumpass and Lu 1999; Casper and Cohen 2000). In fact, among some age groups, 
cohabitation is now more common than marriage (Smock 2000). Whether cohabitation is 
actually replacing marriage or merely delaying it, it is worth knowing whether 
cohabitation is capable of promoting desistance to the same degree as marriage. Second, 
there are significant racial and ethnic differences in the roles of cohabitation and 
matrimony in the United States (Lichter et al 1992, Raley 1996). Thus, the degree to 
which cohabitation can help constrain crime may have important implications for our 
understanding of racial and ethnic differences in crime. Third, differences in the effects 
of distinct social roles and relationships on crime have important implications for our 
theoretical understanding of desistance. By identifying which types of social relationships 
are most likely to promote desistance and which ones do not, researchers can begin 
isolating the reasons for those differences and begin to develop a richer and more 
nuanced understanding of the desistance process. 
 
 
Marriage and Crime 
There is now a considerable body of research showing that marriage is negatively 
related to involvement in crime. Not only are married individuals less likely to commit 
crime than their single counterparts (Farrington and West 1995; Warr 1998; King, 
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Massoglia, and MacMillan 2007), but the experiences of entering marriage and staying 
married are also associated with reductions in offending even among individuals with a 
history of wrong-doing (Sampson and Laub 1993; Horney, Osgood and Marshall 1995; 
Laub and Sampson 2003). These positive benefits of marriage have been observed in the 
short-term (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995) and over decades or even scores of 
years (Laub and Sampson 2003). Furthermore, these associations have been observed 
across time and place in both qualitative and quantitative studies (Meisenhelder 1977; 
Gibbens 1984; Shover 1983; Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002; Blockland and 
Nieuwbeerta 2005). In fact, the evidence that marriage actually causes these changes in 
criminal conduct is about as strong as is possible using observational data (Sampson, 
Laub, and Wimer 2006) and the empirical association between marriage and desistance is 
one of the most robust findings of research in life-course criminology. 
Different theories provide different explanations for these patterns, but the 
research points to at least four ways in which marriage may suppress involvement in 
crime. Perhaps the most frequently cited explanation for the empirical association 
between marriage and crime concerns the role of marriage as an agent of informal social 
control (Laub and Sampson 2001, Sampson and Laub 1993). From that perspective, 
“strong attachment to a spouse … combined with close emotional ties creates a social 
bond or interdependence between individuals” (Sampson and Laub 1993, p. 140) that 
raises the likely costs of crime for the individual concerned (Laub and Sampson 2003, 
Farrington and West 1995, Laub, Nagin and Sampson 1998). 
Marriage can lead also to dramatic changes in personal lifestyle that lower the 
likelihood of crime. It can alter daily routines in ways that significantly reduce the 
opportunities to commit crime (Osgood and Lee 1993, Osgood et al 1996), most notably 
by reducing the amount of time that partners spend away from their homes. Moreover, 
marriage can also transform existing social networks in ways that reduce the likelihood 
that an individual will participate in crime. Married persons spend considerably less time 
in the company of their friends and are less inclined to have friends who are engaged in 
crime (Warr 1998). Thus, marriage may remove a key cause of crime from their lives.  
Marriage can also bring an individual under the supervision and direct control of 
his or her spouse (Gibbens 1984; Laub and Sampson 2003). Many wives keenly monitor 
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the conduct of their husbands in an effort to curtail their risky health behaviors; indeed, 
the direct social control that spouses can exert over one another may explain much of the 
association between marriage and a range of physical and mental health outcomes 
(Umberson 1992). It is not surprising therefore that many spouses deliberately try to 
prevent their partners from engaging in crime or other antisocial activities that may 
increase their risks of involvement in crime (Laub and Sampson 2003).  
Marriage also carries with it a number of social expectations regarding the roles 
and responsibilities of each partner and the assumption of these roles can have important 
ramifications for the ways that individuals think about themselves. In particular, marriage 
can lead to changes in identity (Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002). Provided that 
the married individual recognizes that crime is incompatible with these roles or newly-
acquired identities, marriage can help promote successful desistance from crime 
(Yamaguchi and Kandel 1985a, 1985b). 
Of course, getting married, in and of itself, does not guarantee desistance. The 
effects of marriage on crime are likely to depend on an array of individual and 
relationship characteristics as well as the actions taken by the individuals involved (Laub 
and Sampson 2003; Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2001). For example, marriage 
only appears to reduce antisocial behavior among those who are married and living 
together (Farrington and West 1995; Horney, Osgood and Marshall 1995; Warr 1998). 
Separation may even lead to increases in crime (Farrington and West 1995; Horney, 
Osgood and Marshall 1995).  
Perhaps the most widely-acknowledged factor that can account for differences in 
the effects of marriage is the quality of the marital relationship. In studies that control for 
the characteristics of the marriage, only those marriages that are marked by strong 
emotional attachment and commitment appear to prevent crime (Sampson and Laub 
1993). Thus, Laub and Sampson (2003, p. 44) noted that “if the marriage is … 
characterized by weak or non-existent attachment, continued offending will occur” (see 
also Sampson and Laub 1993; Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998). Indeed, “marriage alone 
may even increase crime” if it is dysfunctional (Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998, p. 234). 
One point worth emphasizing is that attachment is often treated as a mediator in 
the causal chain that links marriage to desistance; that is marital status is assumed to 
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influence relationship quality which in turn alters the likelihood that the individual will 
engage in crime (Sampson and Laub 1993). A more reasonable interpretation, however, 
is that relationship quality moderates the impact of marriage on crime. From that 
perspective, crime is less likely to occur if the marriage is good. If the marriage is bad or 
is characterized by minimal emotional bonds between the husband and wife, then crime is 
likely to continue to occur.  
This is likely for several reasons. First, the evidence that relationship status 
influences quality is not nearly as strong as the evidence that relationship quality 
influences marital status (Booth and Brown 1996; Brown 2001). Even if there are 
reciprocal links between attachment and marriage, in the sense that couples develop 
stronger emotional ties as a result of being married (Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998), 
attachment mediates the links between marriage and crime no more than marriage 
mediates the links between attachment and crime. Second, there are several mechanisms 
through which marriage is hypothesized to constrain crime (Laub and Sampson 2003), 
but each of these mechanisms is most likely to be effective in high-quality marital 
relationships. For example, direct supervision and monitoring is unlikely to be successful 
if neither spouse has invested emotionally in the other. In relationships marked by low 
levels of attachment, wives have very little incentive to spend time and energy 
monitoring the behavior of their husbands. Third, the idea that relationship quality 
moderates the effects of marriage on crime is more consistent with the terminology and 
the language used to describe the relevance of marital attachment in the literature. For 
example, as Laub and Sampson (2003, p. 44) note “if the marriage is … characterized by 
weak or non-existent attachment, continued offending will occur”. Thus, in the absence 
of a high-quality relationship the effect of marriage on crime appears to be negligible. 
 
 
Cohabitation and Crime 
Given the robustness of these findings, it stands to reason that analogous social 
relationships that expose individuals to similar social processes should also be precursors 
to successful desistance. Of these, cohabitation seems a likely candidate because, akin to 
marriage, it represents an intimate personal relationship marked by co-residence. From 
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the standpoint of desistance, intimacy in interpersonal relationships is important because 
it provides a basis for the development of emotional ties and mutual interdependence 
between partners. Co-residence is important because it leads to more opportunities for 
supervision and control, is likely to help change daily routines, and can distinguish the 
relationship from other forms of romantic association. Indeed, prior research has noted 
that, in the absence of co-residence, marriage does not affect involvement in crime 
(Farrington and West 1995; Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995; Warr 1998). 
Some studies have, not surprisingly, illustrated the potential for non-marital 
cohabitation to serve as a catalyst for successful desistance (Shover 1983; Hughes 1998; 
Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002; Gadd and Farrall 2004). These studies, many 
of which were based on in-depth interviews with desisting offenders, indicate that in 
some cases, cohabitation leads to significant psychological and behavioral changes that 
ultimately result in disengagement from crime. For example, as one offender explained to 
Shover (1983, p. 213), “I started living with this woman … and my life suddenly changed 
… I was contented … I cared about her … That was it. [I stopped committing crime]”. In 
most cases, cohabitation appeared to operate in similar ways to marriage; specifically, 
cohabiting relationships gave offenders a reason to abandon crime, placed them under the 
supervision of partners who would not tolerate their continued involvement in crime and 
even provided them with the intellectual and emotional support required to maintain a 
conventional life in the face of adversity and seemingly omnipotent criminal temptations 
(Hughes 1998; Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002). 
As is the case with marriage, this research agenda also suggested that the mere 
existence of a relationship is not sufficient to encourage desistance. Many of the subjects 
in these studies had had other boyfriends and girlfriends in the past, some of whom they 
had lived with, but these relationships had been inconsequential for their involvement in 
crime (Hughes 1998; Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002). The critical difference, 
it seems, between those relationships that resulted in behavioral change and those that did 
not, concerned the characteristics of the relationship and the individuals involved (Shover 
1983; Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002; Hughes 1998). In particular, the degree 
to which individuals were open to change, the strength of emotional ties between them 
and their partners, and the extent to which their partners were opposed to their 
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involvement in crime were critical in determining the likelihood that the relationship 
would lead to desistance (Shover 1983; Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002; 
Hughes 1998; Gadd and Farrall 2004). Of these, the extent of attachment between 
partners and the emotional investments that they made in one another were especially 
important. As one reformed offender remarked to Hughes (1997, p. 149), “my girlfriend 
showed me that she did care … She totally changed my life around”. 
Although the results of these studies lend some credence to the notion that 
cohabitation also fosters desistance, it is not clear whether the cases reported in these 
studies represent isolated examples or manifestations of broader population trends. The 
problem is that qualitative studies may reveal eccentricities that are not reflected in the 
general population precisely because they are so focused on the specifics of individual 
cases. Thus, in some cases, desisting offenders might attribute their successful departures 
from criminal pasts to their de facto spouses, but those situations might be very rare. 
Instead, for most offenders, cohabitation may have no effect on criminal involvement. 
The difficulty of making broad generalizations about the impact of cohabitation 
on desistance, based on the results of in-depth interviews with limited numbers of 
offenders, may also have been exacerbated by the fact that none of these studies sought to 
draw attention specifically to the impact of cohabitation on crime as distinct from the 
effects of intimate family relationships in general. In fact, in most of them, the terms 
cohabitation and marriage were used interchangeably as if both types of relationships can 
promote desistance and any differences between them were entirely artificial (Shover 
1983; Hughes 1998; Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002). While this lack of 
analytical precision may reflect a perception that the type of intimate relationship is not 
as consequential to desistance as the mere existence or characteristics of the relationship, 
it also makes it more difficult to draw any definitive conclusions regarding the crime-
suppressing benefits of cohabitation on the basis of these results alone. 
In any case, the results of large-scale quantitative analyses give little reason to 
think that cohabitation, in the absence of marriage, can contribute to desistance. To be 
sure, very few studies have tried to assess the independent effects of cohabitation on 
crime and many that have failed to distinguish it from other types of intimate 
relationships (e.g. Simons, Stewart, Gordon, Conger, and Elder 2000). Nonetheless, of 
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those studies that have examined the links between cohabitation and crime, only one has 
indicated that the experience of entering or being in a cohabitating relationship is 
associated with reductions in crime (Sampson, Laub, and Wimer 2006). In that study, 
Sampson, Laub, and Wimer (2006) observed that being in a cohabiting relationship was 
associated with reductions in criminal behavior and these effects were independent of 
time-stable differences in the likelihood of being in a cohabiting relationship. 
Nonetheless, these results are contradicted by a number of studies indicating that 
cohabitation does not foster desistance (e.g. Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995). For 
example, Osgood, Horney, and Marshall (1995) investigated the impact of cohabitation 
on short-term changes in crime. They noted that short-term changes in marital status were 
associated with changes in criminal and delinquent behavior. Whereas marriage had a 
negative effect on crime, however, such that those people who married committed less 
crime than they had in the past, the opposite held for cohabiters. Relative to being 
married or single, entering a cohabiting relationship was associated with an increase in 
the expected rate of offending (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995). 
The quantitative research concerning the impact of cohabitation on analogous 
behaviors appears to undermine the claim that cohabitation promotes desistance even 
further. Some studies find evidence that both cohabitation and marriage are associated 
with reductions in alcohol consumption (e.g. Duncan, Wilkerson, and England 2003), but 
others suggest that cohabitation is positively associated with alcohol abuse (Horwitz and 
White 1998). It seems that cohabiters are more likely to report using marijuana and other 
controlled substances (Yamaguchi and Kandel 1985a, 1985b; Warr 1998), although this 
probably reflects the failure of cohabitation to promote desistance rather than the direct 
effect of cohabitation on marijuana consumption (Yamaguchi and Kandel 1985a, 1985b). 
In similar respects, several cross-sectional studies have observed that domestic violence 
is more prevalent within cohabiting relationships than in marriages (Stets and Straus 
1991, Wilson, Daly, and Wright 1993, Wilson, Johnson, and Daly 1995, Brownridge and 
Halli 2002). Even if these differences are due to selection effects (Kenney and 
McLanahan 2006) they challenge the hypothesis that cohabitation fosters desistance.  
Whereas the qualitative literature indicates that cohabitation may help promote 
desistance, therefore, on balance, the quantitative literature suggests otherwise. Even if 
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marriage has an important preventative effect on crime, cohabitation does not. There are 
perhaps two explanations for why cohabitation may have failed to emerge as significant 
predictors of desistance from crime. First, marriage and cohabitation may be qualitatively 
distinct states; that is, marriage and cohabitation may be far less similar than they appear 
and the differences between them may affect individual participation in crime in different 
ways. Second, both relationships may have the capacity to affect criminal involvement, 
but their effects may differ across the population. Depending on the distribution of the 
factors that moderate the links between adult family relationships and crime, in prior 
research, these differences may have reduced the average effects of cohabitation and 
parenthood. Thus, in statistical analyses, the effects of cohabitation on crime may often 
be obscured, whereas in studies based on in-depth interviews or life-history narratives, in 
which researchers are focused on specific examples rather than aggregate trends, the 
effects of cohabitation on desistance may be plain to see. 
 
 
Cohabitation and Marriage 
Despite their apparent similarities, cohabitation and marriage are believed to 
differ in at least two important respects. First, cohabitation and marriage differ in terms of 
their legal standing (Nock 1995). Marriage constitutes a legally-binding set of obligations 
between individuals. By contrast, in most jurisdictions, cohabitation represents little more 
than an informal living arrangement, the terms of which are defined by the couple 
involved (Nock 1995). Differences in their respective legal statuses ensure that the costs 
of exiting a marital relationship are far more significant than the costs of ending of 
cohabiting relationship (Nock 1995). This difference, in turn, is thought to lead to the 
lower levels of commitment and relationship stability observed among the partners of 
cohabiting relationships (Teachman, Thomas, and Paasch 1991; Nock 1995; Stets and 
Straus 1991).  
Second, cohabitation and marriage are also thought to differ in terms of the social 
norms that regulate them (Nock 1995). To some extent, these differences are thought to 
arise from the relative novelty of cohabitation. In that sense, it seems likely that the social 
mores regulating cohabiting relationships are less clearly defined than they are in 
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marriage. This lack of clearly-defined norms is reflected allegedly, for example, in the 
lack of an established vocabulary for cohabiting relationships and in less clearly-defined 
standards of conduct (Nock 1995). It is just as plausible, however, that social norms 
regulating conduct in cohabiting relationships have emerged, but that these are distinct 
from the behavioral standards that govern marriage. For example, Duncan, Wilkerson, 
and England (2003) speculated that the expectations that cohabiters have of their partners 
are different from the expectations that married people have of their husbands and wives 
and that these different expectations are then manifested in different standards of 
behavior. In any case, the point is that if marriage and cohabitation differ in terms of the 
social meanings and expectations that surround them, behavioral differences between 
married and cohabiting couples should emerge (Nock 1995). 
Even if there are differences between marriage and cohabitation, in terms of their 
respective legal standings or the norms that govern them, however, from the standpoint of 
desistance, these differences matter only in so far as they affect the causes of crime. In 
order to demonstrate that marriage and cohabitation differ and that as a result of these 
differences cohabitation does not promote desistance to the same degree as marriage, it 
would be necessary to show that the two relationships differ in ways that are specifically 
relevant to the causes of crime and desistance. For example, it would be necessary to 
demonstrate that whereas marriage leads people to spend less time with their friends, as a 
result of normative or legal differences between the two relationships, cohabitation has 
not such effect on social network change. Alternatively, one might need to show how 
differences in the norms that govern cohabitation reduce the likelihood that couples in 
cohabiting relationships will supervise and control each other’s behavior. 
There is little direct evidence, however, that marriage and cohabitation differ in 
ways that relate to the perceived mechanisms of desistance. For example, the deleterious 
effects of marriage on social networks apply to other forms of intimate relationship, 
including cohabitation. Indeed, dating couples appear to have less contact with friends 
than those who are not romantically involved (Johnson and Leslie 1982; Surra 1985; 
Fischer et al 1989). Moreover, as these relationships escalate in seriousness, the 
individuals within them report more contact with the friends of their partners (Milardo 
1982). Given that these research findings apply to couples in unmarried relationships, 
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patterns of peer association cannot account for differences in the ability of cohabitation 
and marriage to promote desistance from crime. 
Whatever the legal or normative differences between cohabitation and marriage, 
trying to explain the failure of cohabitation to predict desistance by investigating possible 
differences between marriage and cohabitation may be premature. There is ample 
evidence that the effect of marriage on crime is not categorical and that it depends on an 
array of individual and relationship characteristics, including the strength of emotional 
attachment between spouses (Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998; Laub and Sampson 2003; 
Maume, Ousey, and Beaver 2005). And, as indicated in those qualitative studies that have 
highlighted the links between cohabitation and desistance, the same also appears to be 
true of cohabitation (e.g. Hughes 1998). In these studies, the importance of relationship 
quality is especially evident in the stories relayed by the respondents themselves. These 
studies suggest that under specific circumstances — namely, in relationships 
characterized by strong emotional ties — both cohabitation and marriage have the 
capacity to help steer offenders away from their lives of crime. The critical concern then 
is whether those conditions are satisfied. 
Thus, an alternative explanation for why cohabitation does not appear to promote 
desistance is that it operates in much the same way as marriage, but its effects on crime 
have been overlooked because researchers have failed to take account of the factors that 
moderate its effects. To date, there has not been a single published study that has 
examined the extent to which the effects of cohabitation on crime depend on the 
characteristics of the relationship. This is a considerable oversight because one difference 
that researchers have consistently observed between cohabiting and marital relationships 
concerns the quality of those relationships (Nock 1995, Brown and Booth 1996; Brown 
2003). People in cohabiting relationships report less relationship satisfaction, stability, 
commitment, more negative interactions than married couples (Nock 1995, Brown and 
Booth 1996). As a result, in studies that fail to take account of the conditioning influence 
of relationship quality, cohabitation appears to have no effect on desistance when, 
instead, it could just be that in most cases, levels of attachment are too low for the 
relationship to have an impact on individual involvement in crime. 
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
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 Hypothesis 4.1: Individuals in high-quality relationships, whether married or cohabiting, 
will commit less crime than those who are not married or cohabiting. 
Hypothesis 4.2: Those who enter high-quality relationships, whether married or 
cohabiting, will commit less crime than when not married or cohabiting. 
Hypothesis 4.3: Those individuals in high-quality cohabiting relationships will commit as 
much crime as those in high-quality marriages (between-individual) 
Hypothesis 4.4: Those entering high-quality cohabiting relationships will commit less 
crime, relative to when they were not cohabiting, as those in high-quality marriages, 
relative to when they were not married. 
 
It is important to note that the lower levels of relationship quality frequently 
observed among cohabiting couples are due, at least in part, to the processes influencing 
selection into and out of cohabitation as opposed to the experience of being in such 
relationships. Only 5 percent of cohabiting relationships endure for longer than five 
years; hence, most cohabiting relationships end in marriage or separation (Booth and 
Brown 1996). Of course, these patterns of selection out of cohabitation and into marriage 
are not random. Since most high-quality cohabiting relationships eventually become 
marriages, relationship quality among those couples who are intending to marry is 
comparable to that of married couples (Booth and Brown 1996). For those same couples, 
however, failure to marry is an important predictor of relationship instability (Brown 
2003). Thus, as time goes by, unmarried men and women who expect to marry their 
partners report lower levels of confidence in the prognosis of their relationships. Overall, 
these patterns indicate that: first, relationship quality may play an important role in 
determining whether couples will marry or continue to cohabit; and second, as a result of 
this selection process, at any given time, a greater proportion of married than cohabiting 
couples will be in high-quality relationships. 
Even if researchers can take account of the moderating effects of relationship 
quality, therefore, it is likely that the number of people in high-quality cohabiting 
relationships may be very small; so small, in fact, as to make it difficult to discern the 
effects of cohabitation on crime. More importantly, if relationship quality influences the 
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likelihood of cohabitation and marriage, then failure to model the process of selection 
into cohabitation could result in biased estimates of the causal effects of cohabitation on 
crime. Although resolution of these problems is beyond the scope of this chapter, they 
should be taken into account when interpreting the results of the analyses. 
 
 
Data and Method 
To test the above hypotheses, I analyzed the results of the National Youth Survey 
pertaining to the 1,626 respondents who, as described in Chapter 3, who had participated 
in a least one of the last four publicly-available waves (i.e. 1979, 1980, 1983, and 1986). 
As described in Chapter 3, I measured desistance using a dichotomous indicator of self-
reported criminal participation in one or more of the following offenses: drug sales, 
felony assault, felony theft, minor assault, minor theft, prostitution, and robbery. Thus, 
respondents were coded 1 if they had reported committing one or more of those offenses 
in the previous calendar year and 0 otherwise. 
Marital status (cohabitation and marriage) was measured in terms of the living 
arrangements of respondents in the year before the survey was conducted, as explained in 
Chapter 3. Specifically, I classified respondents as married only if they were living with 
their spouses and if they had lived together for the majority of the previous year (coded 1 
if married, otherwise 0). In similar respects, those who reported living with an intimate 
partner to whom they were not married for the majority of the previous year were 
classified as cohabiting (coded 1 if cohabiting, otherwise 0).  
One disadvantage of relying on the living arrangements of respondents to measure 
marital status is that people whose relationships may have ended could still be classified 
as married or cohabiting. This is potentially a more significant problem for assessing the 
independent effects of cohabitation on crime because a sizeable proportion of cohabiting 
relationships are likely to end in marriage. To ensure that my classification method did 
not significantly alter the results of the analysis, I replicated all analyses using auxiliary 
measures of marriage and cohabitation. Respondents who lived with an unmarried partner 
at any point in the previous year were coded as cohabiting, irrespective of whether they 
married at a later stage, whereas married respondents were coded as such if they were 
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married at some point in the year but had not lived with an unmarried partner, any point, 
in the previous calendar year. The substantive conclusions of these analyses are the same 
as those reported below. 
Each respondent to the 1979 and 1980 surveys, who reported being in either a 
cohabiting or marital relationship, was asked a series of questions about the nature of his 
or her relationship. Respondents were asked to indicate on a three-point scale how well 
they felt they were doing in terms of having a partner who was very affectionate and who 
shared a lot of their interests and activities (i.e. not well at all, OK, or very well). Using a 
five-point response scale, they were asked also if they felt their partners cared about 
them; whether their partners were willing to listen if they had a problem (i.e. strongly 
agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree); how important 
they considered the activities they had done with their spouses or partners (i.e. not 
important, not too important, somewhat important, pretty important, or very important) 
and about how much influence they believed that their partners had over them (i.e. very 
little, not too much, some, quite a bit, and a great deal). To aid comparison, all responses 
were coded so that high scores indicated more intimate and supportive relationships and 
the items based on five-point scales were collapsed into three categories according to 
each respondent’s percentile ranking on each item. 
Together these items comprise prima facie indicators of several important aspects 
of relationship quality, as perceived by the respondent, including affection and warmth, 
support, involvement, and influence. In confirmatory factor analyses, conducted within 
each of the two survey years, these items loaded on a single factor. Average factor 
loadings were 0.68 and 0.70 in 1979 and 1980 respectively (alpha=0.82 and 0.86). From 
these items, I created a composite indicator of relationship quality by averaging 
respondent scores across the seven items. High scores indicate relationships that are 
characterized by higher levels of affection, support, involvement, and influence. 
Respondents who were either married or cohabiting in the 1983 and in 1986 
surveys were also asked about the quality their relationships. Specifically, they were 
asked to indicate how much warmth and affection they received from their partners and 
how much support and encouragement their partners had provided them. These items are 
comparable, though not identical, to those used to measure affection and support in the 
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earlier survey waves. As had occurred in 1979 and 1980, respondents were also asked to 
indicate how important they considered the activities they had done with their spouses or 
partners and about how much influence they believed that their partners had over them. 
In 1983 and 1986, respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they and their 
partners shared similar interests and activities. Exploratory factor analyses indicated that 
these items loaded on a single factor in the two survey years (i.e. average factor loadings 
were 0.77 in each year). In order to compare relationship quality levels in 1979 and 1980 
to those in 1983 and 1986, each of these items was collapsed into a three-point scale 
based on each respondent’s percentile ranking. These items were then combined by 
averaging respondent scores across the five items to create a 3-item measure of 
relationship quality, with high scores indicating the presence of a high-quality romantic 
relationship (alpha=0.82 and 0.83 in 1983 and 1986 respectively). 
Since relationship quality is not observed for respondents who were not in a 
cohabiting or marital relationship, it is not possible to examine how quality moderates the 
effects of marriage and cohabitation on crime using multiplicative interaction terms. To 
get around this problem, I combined measures of marital status and relationship quality 
and classified respondents according to whether they were in a low-quality, medium-
quality, and high-quality marriage or cohabiting relationship. First, all partnered 
respondents were classified as being in low-quality, medium-quality, or high-quality 
relationship according to their percentile scores on the continuous measure of relationship 
quality. Second, these three mutually exclusive categories were used to create six 
dichotomous indicators according to the marital status of the respondent: low-quality 
marriage; medium-quality marriage; high-quality marriage; low-quality cohabiting; 
medium-quality cohabiting; or high-quality cohabiting relationship. I also replicated the 
analyses reported below using alternative measures of marital status and relationship 
quality that incorporated either a selection of the relationship quality items described 
above or an expanded number of items. Since the results of these analyses confirm those 
reported below, it is unlikely that the findings of this chapter are sensitive to the 
measurement of relationship quality or the ways respondents were classified as being in 
low-, medium-, or high-quality relationships. 
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To test the four hypotheses, outlined earlier, I estimated a series of multilevel 
models in which time-periods were nested within individuals. The level-1 model is 
intended to account for individual changes in criminal behavior across the four waves of 
the survey (1979, 1980, 1983, and 1986). By contrast, the level-2 model is intended to 
explain time-stable differences in levels of offending between individual respondents. 
These models were estimated using logistic regression with random effects. 
The level-2 or between-individual models included, as independent variables, 
measures of marriage and cohabitation in addition to sex (coded 1 if male, 0 otherwise) 
and two dichotomous indicators of ethnicity ― Black and Hispanic. The indicators of 
marital status were entered as person-averages. For example, in the baseline models, I 
calculated each respondent’s average score on the two dichotomous indicators of 
cohabitation and marriage in 1979, 1980, 1983, and 1986. In the extended analyses, I 
calculated each person’s average score for each of the six dichotomous indicators of 
marital and cohabiting relationship quality across the four survey years. Thus, the results 
of the level-2 models yield some assessment of the links between the proportion of time 
spent in these relationships and between-individual differences in the likelihood of 
committing one or more offenses (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995). 
The level-1 models were intended to estimate the effects of cohabitation and 
marriage on within-individual changes in criminal offending. For each respondent, I 
calculated the difference between his or her time-varying indicator of marital status (or 
marital status and relationship quality) and his or her average score and included these 
deviation scores as independent predictors in the model. This approach provides 
estimates of the effects of cohabitation on involvement in crime that are unbiased by 
time-stable differences in individual characteristics (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995, 
Brame, Bushway, and Paternoster 1999). In addition, the level-1 model includes controls 
for the effects of age — age and age-squared. 
I conducted two different multilevel analyses ― a baseline and extended analysis. 
In the baseline model, the effects of cohabitation and marriage were assessed without 
regard for the characteristics of either relationship. As a result, it assesses the overall 
relationships between cohabitation, marriage and crime. Since it utilizes comparable 
analytical methods and measurement strategies to earlier studies (Horney, Osgood, and 
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Marshall 1995; Sampson, Laub, and Wimer 2006), the results of the baseline analysis can 
be used to compare the overall effects of cohabitation across different samples. In the 
extended analysis, I included the indicators of the quality of cohabiting and marital 
relationships to assess the role of relationship quality in moderating their effects on 
crime. In particular, the results of the extended models provide a direct assessment of the 
impact of being in a high-quality marital or cohabiting relationship on within-individual 
changes in criminal and delinquent behavior. 
 
 
Results 
Table 4.1 presents the results of the baseline model. Turning to the results of the 
time-stable predictors of criminal behavior, as can be seen, marriage is significantly 
related to between-individual differences in offending. Those persons who were married 
in all waves of the survey were, on balance, significantly less likely to commit an offense 
than respondents who were single in 1979, 1980, 1983 and 1986. In fact, they were 
roughly one-and-a-half-times more likely to abstain from crime than their single 
counterparts. By contrast, the amount of time respondents spent in cohabiting 
relationships appeared to have the opposite effect on between-individual differences in 
offending. Those respondents who were in cohabiting relationships for the full duration 
of the survey period were eight times as likely as those who never cohabited to commit 
an offense. Although these results could be due, in part, to unobserved differences in 
individual characteristics, the between-individual model results certainly do not provide 
any basis for inferring that cohabitation contributes to desistance from crime.  
Of course, the more important test of the effects of cohabitation on crime 
concerns its effects on within-individual changes in criminal and delinquent behavior. 
These results too, however, provide little support for the idea that cohabitation can 
facilitate desistance. As can be seen, in the years in which respondents were in 
cohabitating relationships, they were not less likely to commit an offense than they were 
at times when they were not in cohabiting relationships. By contrast, the results of the 
baseline model of within-individual change provide further evidence that marriage is 
negatively associated with involvement in crime. Married respondents were significantly 
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less likely to report committing an offense in the years in which they were married. In 
fact, married respondents were roughly thirty-percent more likely to abstain from crime 
when they were married than when they were either single or cohabiting. 
Overall, the results of the baseline model are consistent with previous research 
indicating that marriage can have a preventative effect on crime (Farrington and West 
1995; Osgood, Horney and Marshall 1995; Warr 1998; Laub and Sampson 2003; Maume, 
Ousey, and Beaver 2005; Sampson, Laub, and Wimer 2006). They are also as consistent 
with the results of earlier quantitative studies, investigating the effects of cohabitation on 
crime, as is possible considering the contradictory findings of those studies (Horney, 
Osgood, and Marshall 1995; Warr 1998; Sampson, Laub, and Wimer 2006). Although 
some researchers have claimed that cohabitation can increase in crime for certain 
offenses (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall (1995), Sampson, Laub, and Wimer (2006) 
suggested that it has the opposite effect; that is, people in cohabiting relationships 
committed less crime while they were cohabiting than they did at other stages of their 
lives. The results obtained from the baseline model in Table 4.1 lie somewhere between 
these two extremes: they suggest that cohabitation neither increases nor reduces 
involvement in crime. Although people who spend more time in cohabiting relationships 
are more likely to be involved in crime, individuals entering those relationships are no 
more likely to commit crime while they are in cohabiting relationships than at other 
times. 
Table 4.1 also contains the results of the extended model that included the 
combined indicators of marital status and relationship quality. These results indicate 
clearly that relationship quality moderates the links between marriage and crime in terms 
of between-individual and within-individual differences. Respondents in low-quality 
marriages were not less likely to be involved in crime than their single counterparts; 
indeed, those who were in low-quality relationships in all four surveys were almost twice 
as likely to have committed an offense in that period as the single or more happily-
married respondents. Those who spent the years 1979, 1980, 1983, and 1986 in medium-
quality or high-quality marriages, however, were significantly less involved in crime 
throughout the study period. Those in medium-quality relationships were approximately 
two times less likely to commit an offense than respondents who were single throughout 
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the same period, while those respondents who were in high-quality marriages in all four 
years were seven times less likely to be involved in crime.  
In similar respects to the results of the baseline model, Table 4.1 also indicates 
that cohabiters are more likely to be involved in crime. Individuals in low-quality 
cohabiting relationships were significantly more likely to be involved in crime than single 
persons. Interestingly, the same applied to those who spent more time in high-quality 
cohabiting relationships: they were almost fifteen times as likely as the other respondents 
to report committing one or more offenses. Whether these results are due to time-stable 
differences between the individuals in cohabiting and marital relationships, on the basis 
of the between-individual results shown in Table 4.1, there is little evidence to infer that 
cohabitation promotes desistance from crime, irrespective of relationship quality. 
As for the effects of marriage on changes in criminal and delinquent behavior, the 
results of the within-individual model provide clear evidence that relationship quality 
moderates the impact of marriage on crime. Respondents in low-quality marriages were 
just as likely to commit an offense while they were in such relationships as they did when 
they were not. However, those in medium-quality and high-quality marriages experienced 
significant reductions in their involvement in crime. In fact, respondents in medium-
quality and high-quality marriages were almost two times as likely to desist from crime 
while they were in those relationships as they were at other times. Considering that these 
results relate to individual changes in criminal behavior over a seven-year period, such 
reductions are of considerable substantive significance. 
Once again, however, the results indicate that cohabitation fails to deter 
involvement in crime, even among people in medium or high-quality relationships. Table 
4.1 indicates that irrespective of the standard of the relationship, cohabitation had a 
negligible impact on within-individual changes in criminal and delinquent behavior. In 
fact, experiencing a high-quality cohabiting relationship appears not to influence criminal 
involvement any more than enduring a low-quality relationship does. People whose 
relationships were characterized by higher than average levels of warmth and affection 
and whose partners are more intensely involved in their lives were not less likely to 
commit crime while they were in those relationships than they at other times. In similar 
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respects, those whose partners were relatively callous and indifferent committed about 
the same number of offenses as they had when they were single. 
Overall, these results provide only partial support for the first and second 
hypotheses that the experience of entering and maintaining high-quality cohabiting and 
marital relationships is associated with reductions in criminal behavior. The results 
presented in Table 4.1 indicate that relationship quality is an important moderating 
influence, but only with respect to marriage. Whereas medium and high-quality 
marriages can promote desistance, cohabitation does not seem to deter people from 
committing crime irrespective of how good their relationships may be. It should be noted 
that these differences are statistically significant; that is, even though medium-quality and 
high-quality marriages affect crime to roughly the same degree, in terms of their effects 
on crime, high-quality and medium-quality marriages would appear to be very different 
from high-quality and medium-quality cohabiting relationships. As such, Table 4.1 
provides even less support for the third and fourth hypotheses that high-quality 
cohabiting and marital relationships affect crime in similar ways. It would appear that, 
even among good relationships, not all relationships are equal in their abilities to deflect 
people away from crime. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Despite considerable evidence that marriage can foster desistance from crime, 
there is little evidence to support the claim that analogous family relationships can have 
the same kinds of effects. This especially seems to be the case with respect to 
cohabitation, which has often been described as being the most marriage-like institution. 
Some studies based on interviews with small numbers of offenders have observed a role 
for cohabitation in the desistance process, but the results of studies based on the analysis 
of large-scale surveys offer little support for the hypothesis that the crime-suppressing 
benefits of marriage also apply to unmarried cohabiting relationships. The contradictory 
results obtained from these empirical literatures presents an intriguing challenge to 
desistance researchers. Why should two complementary approaches to research yield 
such divergent results and how should scholars reconcile these findings? Does 
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cohabitation in the absence of marriage have the capacity to promote desistance and if so 
can it do so as effectively as marriage?  
In broad terms, there are two possible explanations for why some types of family 
relationships may be more likely to affect desistance than others. First, it may be that 
many seemingly analogous social relationships are not as similar as they appear. In other 
words, despite some ostensible similarities, cohabitation and marriage could be 
fundamentally different social institutions. Second, it is possible that similarities between 
the effects of different adult family relationships are obscured by variations in their 
effects across the population. In particular, in light of the stated importance of attachment 
in explaining the links between marriage and desistance, it is plausible that the effects of 
cohabitation are contingent on the quality of cohabiting relationships. If so, researchers 
may have overlooked its impact on crime by studying its average relationship to crime or 
its average effect on individual changes in criminal behavior. 
The results presented in this chapter offer very little support for the second of 
these two explanations. Although relationship quality moderates the effects of marriage, 
it has little impact on the relationship between cohabitation and crime. Irrespective of the 
level of attachment between partners, the experience of entering and maintaining a 
cohabitating relationship has no effect on an individual’s involvement in crime. In fact, 
the only evidence that cohabitation has any implications for criminal and delinquent 
behavior is the finding that people who remain in cohabiting relationships for longer 
periods of time are more likely than others to be involved in crime and delinquency. 
At the same time, the results presented in this chapter provide further support for 
the notion that the effects of marriage on crime are not categorical. Instead, as others 
have noted, the likely benefits of marriage are confined to those in good or very good 
relationships. Indeed, in so far as these results can be considered indicative of a causal 
relationship between marriage and crime, they imply that getting married is only likely to 
prevent crime if the relationship is in excellent or very good shape. 
It should be noted, however, that marriage and cohabitation are not randomly 
occurring states. They are, instead, interdependent social relationships that reflect a series 
of conscious and unconscious choices that individuals have made. For many people, at 
certain points in their lives, marriage and cohabitation are viewed as alternatives to one 
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another. Although several factors may influence the decision to marry, it is likely that 
relationship quality plays an important part in the marriage calculus. People are more 
likely to marry if their relationships are good; that is, if they are characterized by such 
things as affection, intimacy, support, involvement, and commitment. There is also some 
evidence that relationship quality declines over time (Stafford, Kline, and Rankin 2004). 
Within cohabiting relationships, much of the decline in relationship quality appears to be 
attributable to couples that fail to marry in spite of the desire of at least one partner to do 
so (Brown 2003). At any point in time, therefore, a greater proportion of married people 
are likely to be in high-quality relationships than in cohabiting relationships.  
Depending on the number of people in each relationship type, this could mean 
that the numbers of respondents in high-quality cohabiting relationships in each year of 
the NYS were too small to enable me to discern the effects of cohabitation on crime. Of 
greater concern, however, is the possibility that estimates of the effects of marriage and 
cohabitation, shown in Table 4.1, are biased due to the absence of one or more time-
varying confounders (e.g. relationship quality) that raise the probability of marriage, 
while lowering the likelihood of crime and cohabitation (Hernan, Brumback, and Robins 
2000; Robins, Hernan, and Brumback 2000). Merely including measures of these 
confounders in the mode does not resolve the problem of bias (Robins, Hernan, and 
Brumback 2000); instead, its resolution requires a procedure that can account for the 
processes of selection into and out of cohabitation and marriage.  
Since the use of such methods is beyond the scope of this dissertation, readers 
should be cautious in drawing definitive conclusions from the analyses presented in this 
chapter. It is possible that due to broad differences in the quality of cohabiting and 
marital relationships, I have underestimated the effects of entering a high-quality 
cohabiting relationship on desistance. At the same time, the consistency and clarity of the 
results reported in Table 4.1 should not be overlooked. Irrespective of the quality of the 
relationship, individuals who spend more time in cohabiting relationships are more likely 
to be involved in crime. In fact, even cohabiters in high-quality partnerships are 
significantly more inclined to commit crime. That even those in good cohabiting 
relationships are more involved in crime suggests that: first, the numbers of respondents 
in high-quality cohabiting relationships is not too small to discern its relationship to 
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crime; and second, irrespective of whether being in a cohabiting relationship actually 
causes a person to commit more crime, it does not cause him or her to desist from crime. 
It appears, therefore, that there is something about marriage and its effects on 
crime that is unique and that does not apply to other seemingly analogous relationships. 
There are some important differences between marriage and cohabitation. Marriage and 
cohabitation are legally dissimilar and many commentators argue that the two types of 
relationship differ in other important respects (Nock 1995; Rindfuss and VandenHeuval 
1990; Thomson and Colella 1992). Aside from aggregate differences between the 
personal characteristics of married people and cohabiters (Thomas and Colella 1992; 
Brown and Booth 1996), the two groups may also differ in terms of the meanings that 
they ascribe to their relationships and the expectations that they place on one another. 
Further studies should concentrate, therefore, on examining such differences and how 
they alter the social processes that operate within the two types of partnership.  
More importantly, however, if such research can illuminate how the social 
processes operating in successful crime-suppressing relationships differ from those in less 
consequential partnerships, it could provide the means to understand, more fully, why 
marriage or any other seemingly beneficial social relationships can help foster desistance 
from crime. It is to this broader issue and the task of explaining why marriage promotes 
desistance that I turn in the next chapter.  
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Table 4.1: Logistic Regression (with Random Effects) Desistance on Marriage and 
Cohabitation, 1979-1986 
 
 Model 1 (Baseline) Model 2 (Extended) 
 
Constant 3.84*** 3.78*** 
(1.19) (1.20) 
Within-Individual   
Age -0.43*** -0.42*** 
(0.12) (0.12) 
Age2 0.01** 
(0.00) 
0.01** 
(0.00) 
Cohabitation (δ) 0.01 
(0.22) 
― 
Low-Quality ― -0.23 
(0.31) 
Medium-Quality ― 0.43 
(0.39) 
High-Quality ― 0.15 
(0.41) 
Marriage (δ) -0.27* 
(0.15) 
― 
Low-Quality ― 0.20 
(0.20) 
Medium-Quality ― -0.56** 
(0.21) 
High-Quality ― -0.52** 
(0.24) 
Between-Individual   
Male 1.72*** 
(0.12) 
1.75** 
(0.12) 
Black -0.14 
(0.16) 
-0.12 
(0.16) 
Hispanic 0.36 0.36 
(0.30) (0.30) 
Cohabitation 2.08*** 
(0.52) 
― 
Low-Quality ― 1.99** 
(0.73) 
Medium-Quality ― 1.58 
(1.11) 
High-Quality ― 2.69** 
(1.12) 
Marriage -0.53** 
(0.23) 
― 
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Table 4.1 − continued. 
 
 Model 1 (Baseline) Model 2 (Extended) 
 
Low-Quality ― 0.68* 
(0.36) 
Medium-Quality ― -0.76* 
(0.44) 
High-Quality ― -2.03*** 
(0.46) 
   
ρ 1.81 1.80 
σ 0.50 0.50 
N (observations) 5916 5916 
N (cases) 1626 1626 
Log likelihood -3338.3 -3321.02 
** p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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CHAPTER 5 
As noted in Chapter 4, marriage is believed to suppress involvement in crime for 
at least four reasons: first, marriage helps establish informal social control of the 
individual; second, it promotes changes in his or her lifestyle which can help reduce his 
or her exposure to delinquent peers; third, marriage can subject the individual to direct 
social control; and third, it can help to transform his or her personal identity. Each of 
these explanations finds its origins in one of the six theoretical explanations of desistance, 
outlined in Chapter 2, and in three of those theories in particular: first, social control 
theory; second, social learning theory; and third, the theory of cognitive transformations. 
For example, the contention that adult family relationships foster desistance by 
strengthening the bonds between an individual and conventional society is clearly derived 
from social control theory and in particular, the age-graded theory of social control.  
In most cases, the evidence that these mechanisms mediate the links between 
marriage and desistance comes from the results of in-depth interviews with desisting 
offenders (e.g. Laub and Sampson 2003; Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002). 
These methods, though invaluable in terms of describing the kinds of changes that might 
accompany marriage and how they can promote disengagement from crime, provide little 
insight into which mechanisms operate most commonly. Moreover, only rarely have 
these explanations or the theories that describe how they operate been evaluated 
empirically. For the most part, researchers have opted, instead, to assess a single 
explanation or a single theoretical perspective at a time (e.g. Sampson and Laub 1993; 
Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998; Warr 1998; Simmons et al 2002; Giordano, 
Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002). As a result, most prior investigations that have sought to 
explain why marriage fosters desistance have failed to exclude rival hypotheses or 
ascertain their applicability across the population.  
Those studies that have attempted to exclude rival explanations have been limited 
in the number of theories they could examine, looking at most at two theories at a time 
(e.g. Maume, Ousey, and Beaver 2005). More importantly, these studies have also 
exaggerated some of the differences between the theories of desistance, especially in 
terms of the predictions they make about marriage and crime, and so have often 
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overlooked important similarities in their empirical predictions (Warr 1998; Giordano, 
Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002; Laub and Sampson 2003; Maume, Ousey, and Beaver 
2005). As a result, prior research has, at times, claimed empirical support for one theory 
of another even when the evidence supported multiple interpretations. Others have 
chosen to subsume diverse perspectives into a single theoretical viewpoint. For example, 
Laub and Sampson (2003) argue that the distinct processes that link marriage to crime 
are, to a large extent, different manifestations of informal social control at the same time 
as acknowledging that marriage can affect criminal involvement through other means. 
Whatever the advantages of this approach to theoretical integration, it is difficult to see 
how one could claim to understand the links between marriage and desistance without 
knowing which of the numerous individual and social changes that can accompany 
marriage are most critical to helping an individual to move away from crime. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the various mechanisms by which 
marriage is thought to promote desistance in order to determine which of these 
mechanisms plays the more prominent role in facilitating behavioral change. More 
broadly, in doing so, I aim to provide some insights into which of the many theories of 
desistance provides the most empirically plausible explanation of why marriage leads to 
the abandonment of crime. Not all of the desistance theories can be considered. For one 
thing, not all of them provide clear indications as to why life-course transitions such as 
marriage should promote behavioral change. Instead, I focus on the three theories in 
which life-course transitions and marriage, in particular, feature most prominently: social 
control, social learning, and cognitive transformation theories. 
It is important to note that, at times, the processes described by these theories do 
overlap. A key step towards evaluating them, therefore, is to identify those empirical 
predictions that are common to all perspectives as well as those that are unique to each. 
As result of some identical empirical predictions and certain difficulties in measuring key 
concepts, at times, I am not able to test these theories definitively against one another. 
Nevertheless, even identifying these areas of overlap can extend our understanding of 
desistance. It helps ensure that key theories and the mechanisms they illuminate are not 
rejected, or others accepted, on the basis of evidence that supports multiple perspectives.  
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 Marriage and Social Control 
One of the most frequently cited explanations for the empirical association 
between marriage and crime concerns the role of marriage in establishing the informal 
social control of the individual (Sampson and Laub 1993; Laub and Sampson 2003). This 
perspective, based on the age-graded theory of social control, contends that “strong 
attachment to a spouse … combined with close emotional ties creates a social bond or 
interdependence between individuals that, all else being equal, should lead to a reduction 
in deviant behavior” (Sampson and Laub 2003, p.140). Close emotional ties do so 
primarily by establishing “interdependent systems of obligation and constraints that 
impose significant costs for translating criminal propensities into action” (Sampson and 
Laub 1993, p. 141). Put differently, marriage helps constrain crime because married 
individuals are less willing to incur the disapproval of their spouses or jeopardize the 
relationship through the continuation of their involvement in crime (see also Grasmick 
and Bursik 1990, Nagin and Paternoster 1994, Laub, Nagin and and Sampson 1998).  
Hence, attachment to spouses can help dissuade adults from engaging in crime for the 
same reasons that parent-child attachment constrains juvenile offending ― it makes the 
spouse “psychologically present when the temptation to commit a crime appears” 
(Hirschi 1969, p. 88). 
At the same time, Sampson and Laub (1993) also contend that the investments 
that individuals make in their interpersonal relationships are reciprocal and that such 
reciprocity can play a critical role in initiating changes in the individual’s behavior. These 
authors note that men and women who marry spouses with extensive criminal and 
delinquent pasts often take considerable risks in doing so in light of their checkered 
employment histories, their backgrounds of failed relationships, and their otherwise 
troubled pasts. For many individuals, these demonstrations of confidence and 
commitment may “trigger a return investment” in the relationship even to the point that 
they will desist from crime out of gratitude to their husbands or wives for having taken 
chances on them (especially if others had not been willing to do so) or out of a desire to 
vindicate the confidence that their husbands or wives may have shown in them (Sampson 
and Laub 1993, p. 141). Evidence of such reciprocity in marital relationships and its 
 84
relevance as a catalyst for behavioral change often emerges from in-depth interviews with 
desisting offenders. For example, as an ex-offender told Hughes (1997, p. 149), “my 
girlfriend showed me that she did care … She totally changed my life around [because 
she] showed me there actually are people who care”.  In these cases, conformity may 
result from an unwillingness to disappoint a hopeful partner and a sense of obligation to 
justify his or her confidence as much as the fear of jeopardizing a highly-prized 
relationship.  
As an explanation for why marriage promotes desistance from crime, the age-
graded theory of social control and its associated concepts of “social capital” and mutual 
interdependence clearly emphasize the strength of attachment and emotional ties as being 
critical to the desistance process. As noted in Chapter 4, many studies treat attachment as 
a mediating factor in the causal process described by social control theory; that is, marital 
status influences relationship quality which in turn alters the likelihood that an individual 
will engage in crime. A more reasonable interpretation, however, is that the strength of 
emotional ties between partners moderates the impact of marriage on crime. In other 
words, crime is less likely to occur if the marriage is good. By contrast, if the marriage is 
bad or is characterized by minimal emotional bonds between the husband and wife, then 
crime is likely to continue to occur. This is likely for two reasons in particular. First, the 
evidence that relationship status influences quality is not nearly as strong as the evidence 
that relationship quality influences marital status (Brown2003). In fact, Laub, Nagin, and 
Sampson’s (1998) assertion that couples develop stronger emotional ties over time as a 
result of being married is inconsistent with the results of a sizeable body of research that 
shows that relationship quality actually declines in marriage over time (e.g. Stafford, 
Kline, and Rankin 2004). Second, as noted in Chapter 4, the idea that relationship quality 
moderates the effects of marriage on crime is more consistent with the terminology and 
language used to describe the relevance of marital attachment in the literature. For 
example, Laub and Sampson (2003, p. 44) note that “if the marriage is … characterized 
by weak or non-existent attachment, continued offending will occur” — a statement that 
very clearly conveys a conditional relationship. Moreover, the stronger the emotional 
bonds that characterize the relationship, the greater the expected benefits of marriage in 
 85
terms of changes in offending and the continuity of pro-social behavior (Sampson and 
Laub 1993, 2005). 
To some extent, social control theorists, including the proponents of the age-
graded theory of social control, have downplayed the importance of the characteristics or 
dispositions of the people to whom an individual is bonded in favor of emphasizing the 
strength of the relationship (Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002).  In fact, in their 
initial investigations, Sampson and Laub (1993) claimed that marital attachment was 
more important than any other relationship characteristic because “strong marital 
attachment inhibits crime and deviance regardless of that spouse’s own deviant behavior” 
(Sampson and Laub 2005, p. 169). This position has led some researchers to differentiate 
the age-graded theory of social control from other theoretical perspectives, including 
social learning theory, and to criticize it as giving insufficient consideration to the social 
orientations of partners (Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002). There is, after all, 
some empirical evidence that challenges the claim that attachment is more important than 
the social orientations of partners (e.g. Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002; 
Simmons et al 2002; Maume, Ousey, and Beaver 2005; Laub, Sampson, and Wimer 
2006). If a person develops a loving and supportive relationship with an antisocial 
spouse, she or he is unlikely to abandon crime; instead, the most likely scenario is that the 
individual will continue to engage in crime and may even become more embroiled in a 
criminal lifestyle. As one of Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph’s (2002, p. 1048) 
respondents remarked, in describing her experiences in an attached relationship, “We 
used to do a lot of drugs together … that was the basis of our relationship”.  
Whatever its proponents may have written about the social orientation of partners, 
from the standpoint of social control theory it would be theoretically inconsistent to argue 
the social orientations of others are not crucial to the explanation of desistance. Social 
control theory holds that attachment makes the individual cognizant of and responsive to 
how his or her actions may affect the other party to the relationship and the kinds of 
reactions that such behavior may elicit. Within this framework, people refrain from 
committing crime as a result of marriage because they understand that their partners will 
disapprove of such transgressions and so they become wary that their continued 
involvement in crime will affect their partner or the relationship adversely. In the context 
 86
of juvenile delinquency, this implies that attachment matters only in so far as some 
“thought is given to parental reaction” (Hirschi 1969, p. 88). In similar respects, in 
marriage, the relevance of strong interpersonal attachment and emotional ties depends on 
the degree to which one partner realizes that, as one of Laub and Sampson’s (2003, 
p.135) respondents put it, the other “won’t put up with any baloney”. 
In the absence of a conventional orientation, it should not be assumed that all 
spouses will always react unfavorably should their husbands or wives commit crime. 
High-quality marriages are only likely to promote changes in criminal behavior, if they 
bind the criminal or delinquent individual to a conventional spouse. Irrespective of how 
little emphasis social control theorists may have given to the social orientations of parents 
or partners, therefore, the degree to which an individual becomes attached to 
conventional others is critical to the internal logic of social control theory. The combined 
importance of attachment and social orientation to the integrity of the theory is especially 
important because it suggests that the typical analytical approach adopted by other 
researchers in assessing the age-graded theory of social control is inappropriate. Whereas 
others have tried to assess the relative importance of attachment and social orientation as 
if they were rival explanatory factors (e.g. Sampson and Laub 1993; Simmons et al 
2002), the strength of the relationship and the degree to which the offender’s wife or 
husband approves or disapproves of crime should be seen as factors operating in tandem 
to moderate the impact of marriage on the probability that she or he will desist from 
crime. The combined importance of attachment and the social orientation of the partner 
as moderating factors can be expressed as the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 5.1: Those individuals who enter high-quality marriages to pro-social 
spouses will commit less crime. 
 
It should be noted that even though social control theory is the only theory that 
explains the marital effect in terms of strengthening the individual’s bond to conventional 
society, it is not the only theory that predicts that relationship quality and the social 
orientation of the partner should moderate the effects of marriage on crime. Hypothesis 
5.1, therefore, is not inconsistent with other theoretical perspectives. In particular, social 
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learning theory also implies that among married men and women, high-quality marriage 
to a pro-social spouse should also play a direct role in their desistance from crime. As 
noted in Chapter 2, social learning theory contends that differential association is the 
principal arena in which learning takes place. Although social learning theorists tend to 
emphasize the importance of differential association with delinquent peers to the social 
learning process, the theory also acknowledges that marrying a pro-social spouse should 
provide differential reinforcement in the opposite direction. Those who think that “birds 
of a feather flock together” may dispute the theoretical significance of any empirical 
association between the social orientation of the spouse and the behavior of the individual 
(e.g. Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990), but disputing it merely overlooks the fact that from 
time to time flocks do fly out of formation. In those situations, even criminals can marry 
pro-social individuals and when they do, they can become more likely to abandon crime. 
Whether any social relationship has an effect on individual behavior depends, 
according to social learning theory, on the frequency, priority, durability, and intensity of 
contact (Burgess and Akers 1966; Akers 1998).  Since marriages are likely to lack 
temporal priority relative to association with social influences that support crime, the 
likelihood that marriage to a pro-social spouse will results in the abandonment of 
criminal behavior should be contingent on the frequency of contact between partners and 
on the intensity and the duration of the marital relationship. Thus, social learning theory 
also implies that relationship quality and the social orientation of the spouse will 
moderate the effects of marriage on crime. In empirical terms, therefore, it is difficult to 
distinguish the mechanisms of change implied by social learning theory from those 
suggested by alternative explanations for the effects of marriage on crime.  Adjudicating 
between these competing perspectives will depend, in part, on the relative importance of 
the other mechanisms through which effective marriages might promote desistance. 
 
 
Marriage and Exposure to Criminal Peers 
Marriage can lead also to dramatic changes in an individual’s lifestyle that lower 
the likelihood that she or he will continue to engage in crime. It can alter daily routines in 
ways that significantly reduce the opportunities to commit crime, most notably by 
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reducing the amount of time that partners spend away from their homes (Osgood and Lee 
1993, Osgood et al 1996).  Marriage can also have a profound effect on the individual’s 
social network. In fact, as a result of marriage, many people spend considerably less time 
in the company of their friends and also spend less time with certain people (Kalmijn 
2003). Given the central importance attributed to patterns of peer association in a number 
of criminological theories, such as social learning theory, it is not surprising that the 
tendency for many people to reconfigure their social circles as a result of marriage should 
explain, at least in part, its capacity to instigate behavioral change. 
In a study of the relationship between marriage and desistance, Warr (1998) 
observed that married couples spent less time in the company of their friends than their 
single counterparts. He also noted that married persons were less likely to have friends 
who were themselves actively involved in crime and delinquency (Warr 1998). While 
these differences between single and married respondents could have be due, to some 
degree, to personal characteristics or attributes that preceded the marriage, Warr (1998) 
also presented evidence that changes in marital status predicted social network change. 
Moreover, since the celebrated empirical relationships between marriage and desistance 
disappeared in analyses that controlled for changes in the individual's exposure to friends 
and delinquent peers, Warr (1998) concluded that changes in the individual's social 
networks mediated the effects of marriage on crime. 
These results are consistent with the social learning explanation for desistance 
and, in particular, with an explanation that focuses on differential association as being the 
principal means by which marriage can promote changes in criminal behavior (Warr 
1998). From the standpoint of social learning theory, changes in patterns of peer 
association can have a profound impact on criminal behavior if it reduces the process 
through which criminal behavior is learned. Specifically, social learning theory would 
predict that it is differential association with delinquent peers that leads an individual to 
imitate their behavior and learn attitudes and techniques that support crime. It is also 
within such groups that crime and delinquency are socially reinforced (Warr and Stafford 
1991; Akers 1998). Although Warr (1998) did not really explain why changes in the 
amount of time that married men and women spent with their friends (as distinct from the 
time they spent with delinquent friends) should also have lead to their desistance, his 
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conclusion that changes in exposure to delinquent peers mediated the relationship 
between marriage and crime is consistent with the social learning explanation. 
It should be noted that Warr (1998) did not explain why marriage should lead an 
individual to abandon systematically those friends who were actively engaged in crime. 
Perhaps readers were supposed to infer that anything that leads an individual to spend 
less time with his or her friends should, in the case of those involved in crime and 
delinquency, necessarily mean less time spent in the company of delinquent friends and 
to the subsequent atrophy of these relationships. In any case, the reasons why marriage 
can lead to such dramatic changes in the nature and composition of an individual’s social 
networks are important. They are critical to the task of clarifying the role of marriage in 
the desistance process both in terms of explaining how and why it affects crime and in 
terms of specifying the circumstances in which it is most likely to alter patterns of peer 
relations and thereby promote disengagement from crime. 
There is considerable evidence that, as a result of marriage, married persons 
experience significant changes in their social networks. Even though married persons 
have more friends than their single counterparts (Moore 1990), couples that have been 
married longer tend to have smaller friendship circles (Fischer and Oliker 1983). 
Longitudinal research studies indicate that these differences are the result of a process of 
network change that accompanies the formation of intimate relationships. In addition to 
experiencing decreases in both the number of friends and the amount of contact that they 
have with them, married couples also appear to increasingly encounter overlap in their 
friendship circles. As a result, married couples spend less time socializing with their old 
friends, are likely to share any remaining time they spend with friends in the company of 
their own partners, and are more likely to count the friends of their spouses as their own 
(Kalmijn 2003). 
Two explanations have been offered to account for these changes: first, the 
competition hypothesis; and second, the balance hypothesis (Johnson and Leslie 1982; 
Kalmijn 2003). Proponents of the competition hypothesis maintain that friends and 
intimate partners perform similar functions and as such, are likely to compete for the time 
and attention of the individual (Johnson and Leslie 1982). The more serious the 
relationship, the more likely it is that the individual will choose to spend time with his or 
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her partner at the expense of others. Some couples may try to resolve these pressures by 
spending time with both partners and friends simultaneously, but in so far as competition 
among social networks is also likely to lead to competition among friends for the 
couple’s attention, this is unlikely to resolve the problem. The end results are: first, most 
couples experience declines in their aggregate number of friends; second, each partner 
tends to spend less time in the company of his or her specific friends; and third, the time 
the couple spends with others will be shared with mutual friends (Kalmijn 2003). 
The second explanation, the balance hypothesis, posits that antipathy between one 
partner and the friends of the other in an intimate relationship is likely to create internal 
tensions in the relationship that require an effective resolution (Parks, Stan, and Eggert 
1983). Needless to say, individuals in such a position have the choice of abandoning the 
intimate relationship. They also have the choice of changing the nature of the discordant 
one. Those individuals who dislike their spouse’s friends may try to learn to tolerate 
them, therefore, or they may compel their partners to discontinue the contested 
friendships (Parks, Stan, and Eggert 1983). The fact that couples may resolve these kinds 
of conflicts in a variety of ways suggests that the effects of marriage on social networks 
are not categorical. The balance hypothesis implies, in particular, that married couples are 
most likely to experience changes in their friendships circles only if spouse and friends 
do not get along. In such cases, one partner may be told: “Your friends or me”, as one of 
Laub and Sampson’s (2003, p. 136) respondents heard from his wife.   
Each of these explanations implies that social networks should change in specific 
ways in response to the formation of marital relationships. More importantly, however, 
the competition and balance hypotheses clearly intimate that marriage should only affect 
friendships in ways that are consequential for the individual’s involvement in crime and 
delinquency if the relationship is characterized by strong attachment to a pro-social 
spouse. Specifically, in the absence of either of these conditions, there is no reason to 
expect that marriage should either lead an individual to abandon his association with 
delinquent friends or to spend less time in their company. 
For one thing, as I noted earlier, competition may lead people to try to see their 
friends in the company of their spouses, but it is least likely to resolve the challenges 
posed by competition if the spouse and friends do not get along. It stands to reason that a 
 91
wife who is strongly opposed to her husband getting involved in crime is unlikely to yield 
to his desire to spend time in the company of his criminal associates. Furthermore, as the 
balance hypothesis dictates, couples that experience considerable conflict between one 
spouse and one or more of the other’s friends are subject to considerable tension within 
the family environment and it is this stress that encourages the individual whose spouse is 
in conflict with his or her friends to abandon one of the incompatible relationships. 
Spouses may disapprove of the friends of their partners for any number of reasons, but 
the only reason why their opprobrium should systematically target the delinquent friends 
of their partners is if they disapprove of what those friends are doing ― namely, 
committing crime.  
The competition and balance hypotheses also imply that marriage should only 
affect the importance and composition of social networks if the relationship is 
characterized by strong marital bonds. The problems implied by competition are less 
likely to arise in relationships in which neither partner is motivated to spend time with the 
other. And, in the absence of attachment and strong emotional commitments between 
partners, any conflicts that might arise between one spouse and the friends of the other 
are apt to be ignored or resolved through the termination of the intimate relationship. 
Men or women in low-quality relationships might just as easily respond to an ultimatum, 
such as “Your friends or me”, by choosing their friends. It follows that marriage to a pro-
social spouse is not a sufficient stimulus for an individual to withdraw from friendships 
with criminal peers. Instead, the likelihood that marriage will restructure the offender’s 
peer relationships in ways that systematically reduce his or her exposure to criminal 
friends is conditional on the social orientation of the spouse and the quality of the marital 
relationship. This can be expressed as the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 5.2: Those individuals who enter high-quality marriages to pro-social 
spouses will have fewer friends who commit less crime. Among active offenders, those 
individuals who reduce their exposure to delinquent friends will be less likely to commit 
crime. 
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It should be noted, however, that negative correlations between marriage and 
exposure to delinquent peers and between criminal peer exposure and crime “does not 
mean that social learning explanations are necessarily correct; rather, peer relations are 
important in structuring routine activities and opportunities for crime over the life course” 
(Laub and Sampson 2003, p. 38). Marriage to a conventional partner could just as easily 
affect the individual’s involvement in crime and delinquency because it exposes him or 
her to increased supervision and control and, in doing so, restricts his or her opportunities 
to commit crime. In other words, the empirical implications of the social learning 
explanation for the relationship between marriage and desistance are not inconsistent 
with alternative theoretical perspectives. Introducing attachment as a moderating factor 
does not help distinguish between these competing explanations because, as I have 
already noted, social learning theory presupposes a strong emotional bond between 
partners. For the same reason, acknowledging that the effects of marriage on exposure to 
delinquent peers are conditional on the social orientation of the spouse also fails to 
distinguish the mechanism described by social learning theory from that presumed by 
other explanations. 
One notable and useful exception to these overlapping predictions concerns the 
potentially mediating role of the individual’s attitudes toward crime. In contrast to social 
control theory, social learning theory predicts that exposure to criminal friends affects the 
individual’s involvement in crime, in part, because she or he is likely to acquire, from 
those friends, attitudes that are favorable towards crime. That is not to say that attitudinal 
change is the only means or even the primary mechanism through which individuals learn 
criminal behavior — exposure to delinquent peers appears to affect involvement in crime 
independently of its effects on attitudinal change (Warr and Stafford 1991). Nonetheless, 
it is the acknowledgement that attitudinal change is an integral part of crime causation 
that distinguishes the social learning explanation from other theoretical perspectives and 
from social control theory in particular (Hirschi 1969, Jensen 1972; Kornhauser 1978; 
Matsueda 1982). Just as the role of attitudes as a mediating factor in delinquency 
causation has been used by other researchers as the “basis for empirically testing the 
comparative efficacy of the two theories” (Matsueda 1982, p. 490), it can also be used to 
evaluate competing explanations of the effects of marriage on desistance. This means that 
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if part of the impact of changes in exposure to delinquent peers on crime is mediated by 
changes in the individual's attitudes towards crime, then it is possible to rule out the claim 
that marriage fosters desistance entirely through its suppression of criminal opportunities. 
Thus, hypothesis 5.2 can be supplemented with the following testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5.3: Those individuals who reduce their exposure to delinquent friends will 
become less supportive of crime. Among active offenders, those individuals who become 
less supportive of crime will be less likely to commit crime. 
 
 
Marriage and Direct Social Control 
Marriage can also bring an individual under the supervision and direct control of 
his or her spouse (Gibbens 1984; Laub and Sampson 2003). Many wives keenly monitor 
the conduct of their husbands in an effort to curtail their risky health behaviors and the 
direct social control that spouses can exert over one another is believed to help explain 
much of the association between marriage and a range of physical and mental health 
outcomes (Umberson 1992). It is not surprising therefore that many spouses deliberately 
try to prevent their partners from engaging in crime or engaging in other antisocial 
activities that may increase their risks of criminal involvement (Laub and Sampson 
2003).  
In some cases, men and women may intervene in the lives of their partners 
specifically to preclude them from engaging in crime. For example, as the wife of one 
desisting offender explained to Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph (2002, p. 1046), 
“[His friends] know not to bring it [stolen property] here... and they know we won't have 
any of that. I don't want them bringing nothing hot to my house”.  In other cases, 
however, the overall objective of conformity may be achieved less directly by 
circumscribing the individual’s opportunities to engage in crime. This can occur as wives 
and husbands try to restrict the amount of time that their spouses spend going out, 
preclude them from spending time with certain friends (who are deemed to be bad 
influences), or monitor and control their drinking (Gibbons 1984; Laub and Sampson 
2003). In fact, often spouses exert the greatest amount of control on the partners’ 
 94
relationships with others; that is, men and women may control the behavior of their 
partners by restricting the amount of time that they can spend socializing with their 
friends or by seeking to change the types of people with whom they spend their time. As 
another one of Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph's (2002, p.1049) respondents noted, 
“I don't let her go out and drink with her fat little girlfriends no more”.  
This implies, of course, that the link between marriage and crime should be 
mediated also by changes in lifestyle, especially reductions in an individual's exposure to 
delinquent friends. More broadly, however, as an explanation for why marriage fosters 
desistance, the concept of direct social control implies that the empirical relationship 
between marriage and crime should be mediated, at least in part, by the amount of control 
that the partner attempts to impose and the degree to which the individual is subject to it.   
The amount of control that spouses impose on their partners and the success that 
they have in doing so is likely to depend on a number of factors including the perceived 
propensity of the other partner to engage in crime. Both the extent and success of control 
should also depend, however, on the level of attachment between partners and the extent 
to which the controlling spouse disapproves of crime. In relationships marked by low 
levels of attachment, wives have very little incentive to spend time and energy 
monitoring the behavior of their husbands. The same principle has been applied to 
parental supervision of children: parents who are unattached to their children have few 
incentives to monitor and control their behavior (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). At the 
same time, the men and women who are subjected to direct social control at home have 
little incentive to tolerate it or abide by it if they are not attached to their partners. And 
for essentially the same reasons why only marriage to pro-social spouses is likely to 
result in the loss of criminal and delinquent friendships, spouses are most likely to 
intervene in the lives of their partners in ways that constrain their opportunities to commit 
crime if they disapprove of such behavior. Accordingly, only marriages to pro-social 
partners that are characterized by a high degree of attachment should promote the kind of 
social control that can lead to an individual’s disengagement from crime. Hence, another 
hypothesis: 
 
 95
 Hypothesis 5.4: Those individuals who enter high-quality marriages to pro-social 
spouses will be exposed to increases in direct social control. Among active offenders, 
those individuals who are exposed to increases in direct social control will be less likely 
to commit crime. 
 
As an explanation for why marriage encourages desistance, the concept of direct 
social control arises from social control theory; it implies that, in the absence of the 
constraints imposed by husbands or wives, most offenders would continue to commit 
crime2. However, the expectation that the link between marriage and crime should be 
mediated partly by changes in an individual's exposure to delinquent friends is also 
consistent with social learning theory. This is especially important because it suggests 
that demonstrating that increased supervision and monitoring can promote disengagement 
from crime is not sufficient proof of the social control theory version of desistance. Even 
if marriage promotes social network change solely because one spouse deliberately seeks 
to engender it, if the link between direct social control and desistance is mediated, in part, 
by changes in patterns of peer association, social learning theory cannot be excluded.  
The critical difference between these competing perspectives, of course, concerns 
the influence that social and pro-social friends have on the individual’s behavior. Since 
social control theory assumes that the motivation to commit crime is always present, its 
explanation for the effects of marriage on crime focuses on sources of constraint; hence, 
changes in delinquent peer exposure reduce opportunities to engage in crime among 
criminally-prone individuals. By contrast, social learning theory posits that changes in 
behavior result from interruption to the social learning process; specifically, the removal 
of the individual from social situations in which criminal behavior is reinforced and his or 
                                                 
2 Initially, Sampson and Laub (1993, p. 141) were skeptical of the potential of marriage 
to promote change among adult offenders by subjecting them to increased controls, 
noting that “it is unrealistic to expect that adults with a criminal background ... can be 
wholly transformed by institutions ... or that such institutions are even capable of 
imposing direct controls like surveillance”. However, they observed first-hand evidence 
to the contrary as several successfully desisting offenders described the very active roles 
that their wives had taken in reforming them (Laub and Sampson 2003). 
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her increased exposure to situations in which conventional behavior can be imitated and 
socially reinforced. However, as noted earlier, the empirical implications of these two 
perspectives are very similar and, as such, it may not be possible to decide between them.  
 
 
Marriage and Individual Identity 
Marriage may also facilitate desistance by helping offenders change how that they 
think about themselves. As noted in Chapter 2, changes in self-perception are considered 
important precursors of successful desistance and feature prominently in a number of 
theories of desistance, especially the theory of cognitive transformation (e.g. Giordano, 
Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002). These perspectives are distinguished by their common 
belief that desistance is considerably more likely to occur if desisting offenders cease to 
think about themselves as criminals or delinquents and can, instead, redefine themselves 
as conventional, law-abiding individuals. Although any number of life-changes might 
initiate changes in self-perception, life-history narratives also suggest that for many 
offenders the abandonment of criminal or deviant identities are often helped by marriage 
(Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002).  
These changes in self-perception are considered important for a number of 
reasons. Pro-social identities can provide organizing concepts that enable desisting 
offenders to help make sense of their lives, including how to reconcile their criminal 
histories with their conventional futures (Maruna 2001; Giordano, Cernkovich and 
Rudolph 2002). The assumption of a “new or refashioned identity can [also] act as a 
cognitive filter in decision-making” (Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002, p. 1001). 
In that sense, identity change can help alter how desisting offenders think about crime 
and the extent to which they are prepared to act on criminal opportunities that may arise.  
The cognitive transformation approach contends that changes in identity are most 
likely to foster desistance if they are accompanied by fundamental shifts in the perceived 
viability and legitimacy of criminal behavior. As Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 
(2002, p. 1001) note, the assumption of a pro-social identity is most likely to help sustain 
desistance if it leads the desisting offender to consider it “inappropriate for ‘someone like 
me’ to do ‘something like that’”. To give up on crime, in other words, requires that the 
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offender sees crime as being undesirable and incompatible with his or her newly acquired 
pro-social identity and “the desistance process can be seen as relatively complete when 
the actor no longer sees these same behaviors as positive, viable, or even personally 
relevant” (Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002, p. 1002). Thus, the empirical 
implication of the cognitive transformation theory is that changes in personal identity 
affect crime through their effects on the individual’s attitudes.  
More particularly, the principal means by which marriage can contribute to 
changes in self-concept that can, in turn, support or encourage the individual’s movement 
away from crime is through role socialization (Yamaguchi and Kandel 1985a, 1985b). 
Role socialization occurs when people adopt attitudes and modes of behavior that are 
known to be compatible with their newly acquired roles as husbands or wives. Marriage 
carries a number of social expectations regarding the roles and responsibilities that 
husbands and wives should assume, just as other life-course transitions are governed by 
normative expectations that define behavior that is considered appropriate to those 
positions (Nock 1995). In the case of marriage, normative behavioral expectations can 
include, among other things, some commitment to living within the confines of the law 
(Yamaguchi and Kandel 1985b). 
 In theoretical terms, role socialization is considered a typical response to role 
conflict or role incompatibilities; that is, situations in which “the demands of a social role 
are incompatible with a pattern of behavior” (Yamaguchi and Kandel 1985a, p. 1286). 
These conflicts can be resolved in one of two ways: first, by abandoning the role or 
delaying entry into it; or second, by “relinquishing the incompatible behavior or 
preventing its appearance” (Yamaguchi and Kandel 1985a, p. 1287). Given that 
involvement in crime contravenes the normative expectations that govern marital roles, 
active offenders who marry are likely to experience role conflict and accordingly are 
likely to abandon crime so as to minimize such internal conflicts (Yamaguchi and Kandel 
1985a, 1985b). Thus, according to the theory, marriage encourages desistance because 
active offenders realize that their involvement in crime contravenes their roles as 
husbands or wives.  
As an explanation for the link between marriage and desistance, the concept of 
role socialization is based on a number of assumptions that may, in the context of active 
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offenders, seem inappropriate. The theoretical mechanism described above presumes that 
everyone is necessarily inclined to minimize role incompatibility if it occurs (Goode 
1960). Since it requires married offenders to recognize that their behavior is incompatible 
with their marital responsibilities, it presumes also that an individual is cognizant of the 
social norms and behavioral expectations that govern marriage. Such recognition may not 
come naturally to all people, however, especially those who, as children in their own 
families, may have observed their mothers and fathers as criminal or delinquent husbands 
and wives. More importantly, the fundamental assumption of role socialization is 
normative consensus: it presumes that people respect and respond to the social norms 
pertaining to specific roles. Almost by definition, however, active offenders have shown 
little compunction about violating a number of conventional social norms.  
That is not to say that marriage cannot promote desistance through role 
socialization, but it might suggest that, other individuals need to take more of an active 
role, as far as offenders are concerned, if marriage is to contribute to behavioral change. 
Despite the expectation that people abandon inappropriate behaviors, purely in response 
to assuming the identity of a husband or wife, it seems more likely that they do so with 
the aid of their partners. Thus, as Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph (2002) note, 
partners can provide positive role models for how to live a conventional life and how to 
live in a manner that is consistent with a given social role. In addition, spouses can 
provide some positive reinforcement for desisting offenders who have adopted pro-social 
identities and in doing so can help make their self-concept seem more credible.  
Whether spouses are able to affect such changes and whether they are likely to 
lead to desistance surely depends on the nature of the relationship and the partners 
involved. Spouses who condone crime are not likely to be exemplars of how to live a 
conventional life. And, just as active offenders should not be expected to acknowledge or 
respond to conventional social norms regarding marriage it seems implausible that in the 
absence of a conventional orientation spouses are able to provide the impetus required for 
effective role socialization to take place. At the same time, as I have argued already, 
spouses are most likely to influence the behavior of their partners when they are strongly 
attached to them and so it also follows that marriage is more likely to support the 
adoption of a conventional identity and the abandonment of a delinquent identity if the 
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emotional ties between partners are intense. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5.5: Those individuals who enter high-quality marriages to pro-social 
spouses will be more likely to adopt pro-social identities. Among active offenders, those 
individuals who adopt pro-social identities will be less likely to commit crime. 
 
The concept of role socialization implies that marriage entails a broader 
transformation of personal meaning and purpose. Thus, in assuming the roles of husbands 
and wives, married people abandon behaviors that are deemed inconsistent with those 
roles and adopt new behaviors that are considered critical to that role. If correct, married 
offenders should not only desist from crime, they should also become more conventional 
in terms of their attitudes, aspirations, and objectives. Of course, as stated earlier, these 
changes cannot be expected to take place automatically as a result of marriage; instead, 
the effect of marriage on conventional aspirations and desistance is likely to be 
contingent, once again, on the social orientation of the spouse and the quality of the 
marital relationship. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5.6: Those individuals who enter high-quality marriages to pro-social 
spouses will place greater emphasis on conventional goals and aspirations. Among active 
offenders, those individuals who place greater emphasis on conventional goals 
aspirations will be less likely to commit crime. 
  
The six hypotheses listed above are intended to evaluate the four specific 
mechanisms through which married is thought to foster criminal desistance. They are also 
expected to provide some clarification as to which of the three theories of desistance 
offers the most accurate description of how and why these mechanisms operate. From the 
preceding discussion it should be apparent that, as far as the relationship between 
marriage and desistance is concerned, the major theories of desistance make a number of 
overlapping predictions. Nonetheless, it is possible to isolate a number of key empirical 
questions, the answers to which can be used to help adjudicate between these competing 
perspectives at the same time as improving our understanding of the mechanisms that 
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link marriage to desistance from crime. These can provide critical tests of those theories.  
First, are the effects of marriage on crime contingent on the social orientation of 
the spouse and the quality of the marital relationship? In Chapter 4, I observed strong 
support for the contention that only strongly attached marriages promote desistance. 
Despite the claims of some researchers, that when applied to study the links between 
marriage and desistance the major theories differ in terms of the relative importance they 
place on social orientations and marital attachment, all three theories and all four 
mechanisms imply that both relationship characteristics should moderate the marriage 
effect. Hence, some insight can be gained simultaneously into the empirical viability of 
the three theories — social control, social learning theory, and the theory of cognitive 
transformations — by examining that basic proposition.  
Second, taking into account the conditional nature of the marital effect, does 
marriage have a direct effect on desistance controlling for its effects on patterns of 
delinquent association, the individual’s social orientation, and his or her personal 
identity? Evidence of a direct marital effect is consistent with the explanations offered by 
social control theory and social learning theory. Although it is most often associated with 
social control theory, finding evidence of a direct (conditional) marital effect would 
imply that neither the argument that marriage fosters change by establishing bonds of 
interdependence between partners or the contention that marriage exposes offenders to 
the imitation and differential reinforcement of pro-social behavior can be excluded.  
Third, do changes in patterns of peer association mediate the effects of marriage 
on crime?  If so, are the effects of changes in peers on crime, partially mediated by 
changes in the individual's attitudes towards it? Even though social learning theory 
predicts that much of the impact that criminal peers will have on an individual’s behavior 
should occur through the differential reinforcement that they provide, even if changes in 
patterns of peer association mediate the effects of marriage on crime that does not mean 
that the social learning interpretation is correct. Changes in the social networks of 
individuals could promote desistance merely by reducing the opportunities available to 
the individual to commit crime. Hence, it would only be possible to exclude an 
explanation that focuses on changes in criminal opportunities, as in the case of the social 
control theory interpretation of how marriage constrains crime through direct social 
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control, if the links between peer associations and crime were mediated entirely by 
attitudinal change. 
Fourth, does attitudinal change mediate the links between establishing a high-
quality marriage to a pro-social spouse and if so, is that relationship explained by changes 
in identity, including increased interest in conventional goals and aspirations? Both social 
control theory and the theory of cognitive transformations emphasize the importance of 
attitudinal change; that is, both theories imply that marriage leads an individual to adopt a 
more pro-social orientation. However, these two perspectives differ significantly in terms 
of the kinds of changes that precipitate attitudinal change. In the case of social learning 
theory, a high-quality marriage to a conventional spouse should have a direct effect on 
attitudinal change. It should also have an indirect effect, as just noted, that is mediated by 
changes in the individual’s exposure to criminal friends. By contrast, the theory of 
cognitive transformations and related perspectives emphasize the combination of identity 
and attitudinal change. Thus, changes in self-concept should mediate any links between 
the realignment of the individual’s attitudes toward crime and desistance.  
 
 
Data and Method 
To test the above hypotheses, I analyzed the results of the National Youth Survey 
for a sub-sample of the 1,626 respondents used in Chapter 4. Analyses were based on 
responses to the 1980 and 1983 surveys and were restricted to respondents who had 
reported committing one or more offenses in 1980 and had been neither married or 
cohabiting at the time that survey had been conducted. The resulting sample represents 
those respondents who committed one or more drug sale, felony assault, felony theft, 
minor assault, minor theft, prostitution, robbery or public disorder offenses and had not 
lived the majority of the previous year with a spouse or partner. This yielded a total 
sample of 550 respondents aged between 18 and 24 in 1983.  
These analyses provide an opportunity to examine the effects of changes in 
marital status on changes in criminal and delinquent behavior between 1980 and 1983 as 
a large proportion of respondents were making the transition from adolescence into early 
adulthood. I examined also the effects of changes in marital status on criminal behavior 
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between 1983 and 1986. The results of these analyses confirm the patterns reported 
below. The main reason for restricting the analyses to the final stages of the publicly-
available survey is that survey items pertaining to the social orientations of partners were 
only introduced to the survey in 1983. As such, by focusing on changes in marital status 
from 1980 to 1983, I can examine the proposition that the effects of those changes are 
conditional on the social orientation of the spouse.  
Given that the analyses are restricted to a sample of active offenders, to measure 
desistance, I used the indicator of crime described in Chapter 3 to measure desistance. 
Thus, respondents who reported committing one of more offenses in 1983 (coded 1 if 
committed an offense, otherwise 0) did not desist from crime, whereas those who 
reported committing no offenses can be classified as having desisted, albeit in the short-
term. And, since the sample is also confined to respondents who were not married in 
1980, I measured changes in marital status in much the same way. Hence, those who 
were coded as married or cohabitating in 1983 represent respondents who entered marital 
or cohabiting relationships between the completion of the 1980 and 1983 surveys3. 
To measure relationship quality, I used the list of relationship quality items that 
were included in the 1983 survey as described in Chapter 4. Respondents were asked to 
indicate how much warmth and affection they received from their partners, how much 
support and encouragement their partners had provided them, how important they 
considered the activities they had done with their spouses or partners, and about how 
much influence they believed that their partners had over them. In addition, they were 
asked how much they and their partners shared similar interest and activities. These items 
were combined by averaging respondent scores across the five items. Respondent scores 
ranged from 1 to 5 with high scores indicating the presence of relationships marked by 
                                                 
3 This approach could underestimate the impact of marriage on crime because it excludes 
those married respondents who had been cohabiting in the previous survey. Alternatively, 
it might overstate the effects of marriage if, contrary to the results obtained in Chapter 4, 
high-quality cohabitating relationships actually can promote desistance. In any case, as 
the results of Table 5.1 indicate, there is considerable correspondence between the 
estimated impact of changes in marital status obtained in these analyses and those 
reported in Chapter 4 based on a larger and less restricted sample of respondents. 
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attachment and emotional ties. 
Respondents were asked how they thought their spouses or partners would react if 
they were to steal something worth less than $5, sell hard drugs, use marijuana, steal 
something worth more than $50, hit someone, destroy property, or break into a vehicle. 
Their answers were recoded on a 5-point scale that ranged from strongly approve to 
strongly disapprove with neither approve nor disapprove in the middle. Exploratory 
factor analyses, conducted with all respondents who were living with or married to a 
spouse or partner, indicated that these seven items loaded on a single factor, with average 
loadings of 0.78 (alpha=0.87). These items were averaged to create an index of spousal 
approval for criminal and delinquent behavior, with high scores indicating respondents 
who believed that their spouses were more supportive of crime. 
As noted in Chapter 4, information on relationship characteristics, including the 
attitudes of spouses, is not observed for respondents who were not married or cohabiting. 
Accordingly, to examine how these attributes moderate the effects of marriage on crime, 
I combined measures of marital status, relationship quality, and the social orientations of 
spouses. In similar respects to Chapter 4, all partnered respondents were classified as 
being in low-quality or high-quality relationships based on their percentile rankings on 
the relationship score. I then did the same thing for the social orientations of spouses; that 
is, I classified each respondent’s spouse as having anti-social or pro-social attitudes based 
on the respondent’s percentile ranking. These two sets of categorical indicators were 
combined with marital status to create dichotomous indicators of relationship quality and 
spousal social orientation for both married and cohabiting relationships.  
To ascertain the degree to which respondents considered crime to be an 
acceptable means to achieve their objectives, I constructed a summary measure of their 
attitudes to the same offenses that were used to measure the social orientations of 
spouses. Exploratory factor analyses indicated that these measures probably summarize 
two reasonably distinct dimensions of criminal attitudes: attitudes to illegal service or 
public order offences and attitudes to crimes of a more serious nature. Nonetheless, 
confirmatory factor analyses suggest that these items could be combined with average 
factor loadings of 0.73 in 1980 and 0.72 in 1983 (alpha = 0.80 and 0.81 respectively). 
Changes in attitudes toward crime, in general, are more likely to result in successful 
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desistance than piecemeal shifts in attitudes to specific offences or types of offences. 
Moreover, the more comprehensive the measure of criminal attitudes, the more likely it is 
to help differentiate those morally inflexible respondents from those for whom the 
iniquitousness of crime is a contextually dependent variable. These items were then 
averaged to create a summary measure of criminal and delinquent attitudes with high 
scores indicating respondents holding attitudes that were more favorable to crime. So as 
to capture attitudinal change, I calculated the difference between each respondent’s 
attitudinal scores in 1980 and 1983. Thus, positive values indicate an increase in support 
for crime. 
For each respondent, I calculated the average number of their friends who, 
according to the respondent, had stolen something worth less than $5, sold hard drugs, 
used marijuana, stolen something worth more than $50, hit someone, destroyed property, 
or broken into a vehicle. These are the same offenses covered by the measures of 
delinquent attitudes and the social orientations of spouses. Again, exploratory factor 
analyses supported the inclusion of these items in a single measure with average factor 
loadings of 0.71 in 1980 and 0.70 in 1983 (alpha=0.75 and 0.77 respectively). Scores 
ranged from 1 to 5. This scale, which provides an indicator of exposure to delinquent 
peers, is coded so that high scores indicate respondents with a large number of friends 
who are actively involved in crime. As with the measure of attitudinal change, to observe 
changes in exposure to delinquent peers I merely subtracted the earlier score from the 
most recent so that positive values indicate an increase in the average number of criminal 
or delinquent friends. 
The NYS does not include measures of the degree to which an individual thinks 
of himself or herself as being a criminal or a delinquent. However, the survey does 
include indicators of how respondent feel they are perceived by others including, in 1980 
and 1983, how they think they are seen by their parents. Measures of the reflected 
appraisals of parents and other significant others are used often as indicators of an 
individual's own identity. Certainly, in the tradition of symbolic interactionism, if others 
consider the individual to be a criminal or delinquent, then, according to most accounts, 
the individual will also see himself or herself in the same way (Matsueda 1992; Heimer 
and Matsueda 1994). Other factors might ameliorate the effects of negative reflected 
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appraisals even by parents or close acquaintances on an individual's own sense of 
identity, but whatever the conceptual distinction between the impressions that other 
people form of an individual and his or her own self-perception (e.g. Lofland 1969), in 
the empirical literature, such distinctions are rarely made. 
Hence, in an effort to empirically evaluate the theory of cognitive transformations 
and its explanation for why marriage might promote changes in criminal behavior, it 
seems reasonable to use the reflected appraisals of others as a proxy for an individual's 
own identity. To that end, I used several survey items which asked respondents how 
much they thought that their parents would agree that they were bad people, that they 
broke rules, got into trouble, and did things against the law. The original response 
categories ranged from strongly agree to strongly disagree. In exploratory factor analyses, 
these items loaded on a common factor, with average loadings of 0.75 and 0.78 in 1980 
and 1983 (alpha = 0.85 and 0.87). Accordingly, I averaged the four items to create a 
summary measure of criminal or delinquent identity, with high scores indicating a 
delinquent appraisal. Changes in the measure were recorded the same way as the other 
indicators: I took the difference between the 1980 and 1983 scores. Negative values 
denote some movement away from a delinquent identity and toward a pro-social one.  
Support for conventional goals and aspirations were measured using a single 
indicator of how much importance respondents placed on having a good job or career. 
Responses were scored using a 3-point scale ranging from not important to very 
important. Change in conventional aspirations was measured using a dichotomous 
indicator, based on the difference between each respondent’s 1983 and 1980 scores 
(coded 1 if respondents placed greater emphasis on conventional careers goals than they 
had previously and 0 otherwise). 
It should be noted that the NYS did not include any indicators that could be used 
to directly test the effects of spousal supervision and control on desistance and as a result 
it is not possible to evaluate all four mechanisms described earlier. Nonetheless, the 
remaining measures provide the opportunity to test the theoretical premises that are 
thought to underpin the effects of supervision and control in addition to the other social 
processes that are thought to link marriage and desistance. The analyses presented here 
were conducted using logistic regression and ordinary least squares regression analysis, 
 106
with desistance as the dependent variable in most analyses. 
 
 
Results 
Table 5.1 shows the estimated effects of marriage and cohabitation on changes in 
self-reported criminal behavior between the 1980 and 1983 waves of the survey. Model 
1, shown in the first column, shows the estimated impact of marital status conditional on 
relationship quality. Despite the restricted time-range of these analyses, these results 
confirm the patterns observed in Chapter 4. Entry into marriage is associated with 
disengagement from crime, but only for those individuals who enter marriages that are 
characterized by attachment and strong emotional bonds. Specifically, only those active 
offenders who entered medium-quality and high-quality marriages were more likely to 
desist from crime. Once again, the results also suggest that cohabitation has no such 
effect even if the quality of the relationship is taken into account. 
Table 5.1 also presents results regarding the likely effects of marrying a spouse 
who condones criminal and delinquent behavior. Model 2 shows the interaction between 
marital status and the social orientation of the spouse or cohabiting partner. As can be 
seen, these results also suggest that the effects of marriage are conditional upon the 
characteristics of the relationship. In particular, individuals appear likely to desist from 
crime only in response to marriages to pro-social partners. Table 5.1 indicates that active 
offenders who have recently been married are approximately two times less likely to 
commit an offence than unmarried offenders, provided they believe that their spouses 
would strongly disapprove of them committing crime. By contrast, those individuals who 
marry partners who are unopposed to crime or only moderately opposed to it are just as 
likely to continue offending as their single counterparts. 
These results, taken together, are consistent with the three theoretical perspectives 
outlined earlier, but they offer little information about the relative importance of 
relationship quality and the social orientations of partners. The relative importance of the 
two could be important, however, because despite my suggestions that all three theories 
imply that the effects of marriage should be contingent on both relationship quality and 
the social orientation of the other partner, several commentators have argued otherwise 
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(e.g. Sampson and Laub 1993; Laub and Sampson 2003; Giordano, Cernkovich and 
Rudolph 2002). Accordingly, Model 3 in Table 5.1 provides an assessment of the 
interaction between marital status, relationship quality, and social orientations.  
In contrast to the claims made by these researchers, the results of Model 3 suggest 
that the effects of marriage on crime are conditional on both the quality of the 
relationship and the social orientation of the partner. Marriage is only likely to foster 
desistance from crime if it embroils the individual in a high-quality relationship with a 
pro-social spouse. Active offenders who failed to establish good relationships were just 
as likely to continue to commit crime as their single counterparts even if they believed 
that their spouses would disapprove of their antisocial behavior. Similarly, those 
respondents who managed to establish good marriages were not more likely to desist 
from crime than unmarried offenders if they believed that their spouses would condone 
their continued involvement in crime. Together, these results provide a counterpoint to 
Sampson and Laub’s (1993) claim that attachment matters more than the deviance of the 
spouse and to Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph's (2002, p. 1049) contention that 
“marriage can be conventionalizing in its effects even in the absence of high attachment”. 
More particularly, these results indicate that the theoretical explanations typically 
offered for the impact of marriage on crime are incomplete. That is not to say that social 
control theory, social learning theory, and the theory of cognitive transformations cannot 
account for the relationship between marriage and desistance, but it does suggest that the 
ways in which these theories are typically applied by other researchers are inadequate. As 
I have noted already, each of these theories, if taken to its logical conclusion, implies that 
marriage should only lead to desistance if it is accompanied by strong emotional ties to 
conventional spouses. Given the likelihood that the effects of adult family relationships 
on crime are conditional on both these characteristics, failure to take account of these 
contingencies is likely to lead to the inaccurate assessment of the explanatory capacity of 
each theory. Of course, the proper evaluation of these theories also requires a reasonably 
thorough investigation of the mechanisms through which each presupposes that marriage 
promotes desistance.  
Table 5.2 shows the estimated impact of entering a high-quality marriage to a pro-
social spouse on crime, controlling for changes in exposure to delinquent peers, the 
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respondent’s attitudes toward crime, self-perception and conventional aspirations. As can 
be seen, taking account of changes in an individual's exposure to delinquent peers 
reduces the estimated impact of marriage on the likelihood that she or he will desist from 
crime. Those respondents who had fewer criminal friends in 1983 than in 1980 were 
significantly more likely to desist from crime and these changes account for 
approximately 21 percent of the estimated impact of marriage. In other words, a 
substantial part of the estimated effect of marrying and establishing a high-quality 
relationship with a pro-social spouse is due to its impact on changes in the individual's 
social network. Nonetheless, it is also apparent that changes in patterns of peer 
association do not entirely mediate the effects of marriage. Even after controlling for 
possible decreases in the number of friends who have committed crime, getting married 
retains its direct impact upon the likelihood that an individual will desist from crime. 
The introduction of attitude change to the model reduces the estimated impact of 
social network change and, to a much lesser extent, marriage. Taking account of changes 
in the perceived acceptability of criminal and delinquent behavior leads to a significant 
reduction in the estimated effects of changes in delinquent peer association on desistance. 
This could suggest, as social learning theorists might expect, that changes in differential 
association raise the likelihood of desistance, in part, by increasing the likelihood of 
attitudinal change. The slight reduction in the estimated impact of marriage is also 
consistent with social learning theory and its prediction that a high-quality marriage to 
conventional spouse should expose the individual to a learning environment that is more 
conducive to legal obedience. Nonetheless, individuals who adopted attitudes that were 
less favorable toward crime were not significantly more likely to desist once the effects 
of changes in patterns of delinquent association were taken into account. This could 
indicate that attitude change provokes changes in patterns of peer association — an 
interpretation that cannot be excluded because of the contemporaneous measurement of 
the two variables. However, it more probably indicates that having criminal friends has a 
direct effect on criminal behavior above and beyond its effects on attitudinal change. 
These results are not inconsistent with social learning theory. As noted 
previously, social learning theory predicts that much of the impact of associating with 
criminal peers occurs not through the transmission of delinquent values and attitudes but, 
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instead, through the imitation and differential reinforcement of criminal behavior.  Hence, 
although social learning theorists would expect to see some evidence that changes in peer 
association might predict changes in an individual's own attitudes towards crime, they 
would not expect that attitudinal change would be the sole mechanism through which 
changes in patterns of criminal associations could lead to desistance.  
The problem, however, as I have also noted, is that social learning theory is not 
the only theoretical perspective that predicts a direct correspondence between the 
behavior of the individual and the behavior of his or her friends. The results obtained in 
Table 5.2 are entirely consistent with the explanations offered by social control theorists 
and others who might emphasize the importance of opportunity to desistance (e.g. Laub 
and Sampson 2003; Osgood and Lee 1996). It is entirely plausible, considering these 
results, that marriage helps foster desistance because spouses control the behavior of their 
partners, including the people with whom they associate, and that these changes in peer 
association affect their involvement in crime primarily by reducing their opportunities to 
become embroiled in it. Despite some apparent correspondence between changes in 
delinquent peer exposure and attitudinal shifts, the results presented in Table 5.3 do not 
offer any direct evidence in support of the social learning explanation that could not also 
be interpreted as evidence in support of a rival theoretical perspective. 
Model 4 introduces the measure of changes in delinquent identity to the analysis. 
As can be seen, taking account of changes in the reflected appraisals of others also 
reduces the estimated impact of marriage on desistance. This result is consistent with the 
expectations of the theory of cognitive transformations and, in particular, its prediction 
that marriage can help some offenders to develop pro-social identities. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that changes in the reflected appraisals of significant others account for 
less than 10 percent of the estimated impact of marriage on desistance from crime. 
Irrespective of how marriage might affect the ways that offenders think they are 
perceived by others, it continues to promote disengagement from crime through other 
means. Taking into account changes in the individual's delinquent identity also leads to a 
small reduction in the estimated impact of changes in exposure to delinquent peers, which 
could suggest that some of the impact of social network change is mediated by changes in 
the reflected appraisals of significant others. Whatever role that changes in self-concept 
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might play in mediating the links between marriage, social network change and crime, 
however, changes in delinquent identity do not exert a significant direct effect on the 
probability of re-offending among the sample of active offenders. 
The introduction of the indicator of changes in conventional goals shown in the 
last column of Table 5.2 appears to have no effect on the estimated impact of marriage or 
its exposure to delinquent peers. This seems to suggest that the links between marriage 
and desistance cannot be attributed to the effects of role socialization as expected by 
theories that emphasize the importance of identity change. In contrast to Hypothesis 5.6, 
there is no evidence that marriage reduces an individual’s involvement in crime by 
encouraging him or her to place greater importance on conventional goals and 
aspirations. Accordingly, it seems very unlikely that marriage leads to desistance because 
offenders who develop successful marriages to pro-social spouses are more inclined to 
avoid the incompatibility of crime and their newly acquired roles as husbands or wives. 
Of course, theories that emphasize the role of identity change in desistance place 
considerable importance on how these shifts affect an individual's attitudes towards 
crime.  As a result, indicators of identity change should not distinguish desisting 
offenders from re-offenders once attitudinal changes have been taken into account. 
However, whether changes in the reflected appraisals of others or the individual’s interest 
in conventional goals are able to predict desistance independently of their effects on 
changes in his or her social orientations is not the problem; rather, the problem is that 
attitudinal change fails to distinguish those offenders who re-offend from those who show 
signs of moving away from crime. Overall, therefore, the results presented in Table 5.2 
provide very little support for the theory of cognitive transformations and its explanation 
for the celebrated impact of marriage on desistance from crime. 
Table 5.3 provides some clarification of these findings and the other results 
shown in Table 5.2. It shows the estimated impact of marriage on changes in the 
perceived appropriateness of crime. As can be seen, active offenders who married and 
established high-quality relationships with pro-social spouses did become less supportive 
of criminal and delinquent behavior. Although the degree of attitudinal change associated 
with marriage was not especially large, it is consistent with the theoretical expectations of 
the social learning and cognitive transformation theories.  
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The introduction of changes in exposure to delinquent peers, shown in Model 2, 
suggests that these changes are due primarily to the effects of marriage on patterns of 
peer association. Taking changes in each respondent’s social network into consideration 
leads to a reduction in the estimated impact of marriage on crime to the point that 
marriage can no longer be used to distinguish changes in the perceived appropriateness of 
crime and delinquency. In other words, as individuals marry pro-social partners and 
establish more loving and supportive relationships, they encounter significant changes in 
terms of the types of people with whom they associate. These changes appear to shift 
people away from the social networks that are, on balance, more tolerant of crime into 
those that are likely to protest their involvement in crime. As a result, consistent with a 
social learning explanation for desistance, marriage increases the offender’s chances of 
acquiring a set of attitudes favorable to social conformity. Notwithstanding these 
patterns, as noted earlier in reference to Table 5.2, it is changes in exposure to delinquent 
peers rather than changes in the social orientation of the individual that is the more 
important predictor of behavioral change — a finding that is consistent with both the 
social control and social learning theory explanations of the marital effect. 
Table 5.3 offers some evidence that changes in an individual's identity following 
marriage are associated with attitudinal change. As can be seen, Model 3 in Table 5.3 
also indicates that active offenders who felt that their parents were less likely to see them 
as law-breakers were less supportive of crime and delinquency in 1983 than they had 
been in 1980. To some extent, these changes could have lead to changes in patterns of 
peer association, although it is just as likely that these changes in self-perception result, in 
part, from reductions in an individual's exposure to delinquent friends. As individuals 
change their social networks perhaps others begin to see them in a different light. In any 
case, the fact that attitudinal change failed to significantly predict desistance, 
independently of patterns of delinquent peer association, undermines the viability of 
cognitive transformation theories relative to social control and social learning theories. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Prior research on the relationship between marriage and desistance has identified 
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a number of mechanisms through which entry into marriage is believed to promote 
disengagement from crime. These mechanisms include: the development of social bonds 
and emotional interdependence; significant lifestyle changes including reductions in 
exposure to delinquent peers; direct supervision and control by one spouse over the other; 
and shifts in self-perception that include the adoption of a pro-social identity. In addition, 
each of these mechanisms is associated, to some extent, with one of three theories of 
desistance: social control theories; social learning theory; and the theory of cognitive 
transformations. Despite some similarities in the empirical implications of these theories, 
each offers a markedly different interpretation of why marriage should promote changes 
in criminal and delinquent behavior.  
Nevertheless, these explanations, as they relate to the links between marriage and 
desistance, have rarely been evaluated properly. When they have been assessed, the 
studies that did so tended to focus on a single mechanism or theory at a time (Sampson 
and Laub 1993; Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998; Laub and Sampson 2003). More 
importantly, even when these studies evaluated more than one theory simultaneously, 
they often overlooked important similarities in their predictions and consequently, 
claimed support for a particular mechanism or theoretical perspective even when the 
evidence supported multiple interpretations (Warr 1998; Maume, Ousey, and Beaver 
2005). That is not to say that others have not made deliberate attempts to distinguish 
between the empirical implications of competing perspectives. However, even these 
efforts have been limited, as researchers are exaggerated minor differences between the 
various theories of desistance (e.g. Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002). The 
overall result has been that little is actually known, as opposed to postulated, as to why 
marriage is able to promote lasting behavioral change.  
 The purpose of this chapter has been to move beyond theoretical conjectures in 
order to evaluate empirically three theories of desistance as explanations for why 
marriage affects involvement in crime: social control theory, social learning theory, and 
the theory of cognitive transformation. In doing so, I have sought to examine the 
theoretical mechanisms implied by each of these theories to the degree that available data 
have permitted and to test these against one another so as to identify the processes that 
are most relevant to understanding why marriage promotes desistance from crime. At the 
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same time, I have endeavored to isolate the empirical predictions that are unique to each 
perspective as well as those that are common to all. 
One of the most important results of this analysis has been the observation that the 
impact of marriage on desistance is conditional on the quality of the relationship and the 
social orientation of the partner. Despite the fact that several researchers have argued for 
the relative importance of one of these conditions over the other, as I have suggested in 
this chapter, all three theoretical perspectives imply a jointly conditional hypothesis; 
specifically, in the absence of either attachment or a pro-social orientation on the part of 
the other partner, the anticipated impact of marriage on desistance should be negligible. 
The results of the analysis provide clear confirmation of this expectation. Both the quality 
of the relationship and the social orientation of the spouse are critical factors in 
explaining the links between marriage and desistance. 
In terms of the actual mechanism through which marriage affects desistance, the 
results of these analyses are consistent with the proposition that marriage promotes 
disengagement from crime: first, by establishing the informal social control of the 
individual (Sampson and Laub 1993; Laub and Sampson 2003); and second, by reducing 
an individual's exposure to criminal peers (Warr 1998). In other words, in contrast to the 
claims made by some researchers, the impact of marriage on desistance cannot be 
explained entirely with reference to either its effect on the development of informal social 
control for its impact on social network change (e.g. Sampson and Laub 1993; Warr 
1998). These results are broadly consistent with the expectations of social control theory 
and social learning theories as explanations for the effects of marriage on desistance.  
Given that these theories overlap considerably in terms of their empirical 
implications, it is not always possible to develop definitive tests of these perspectives. 
Nevertheless, the predictions of these two theories do diverge in one important respect. 
Of the two, only social learning theory, anticipates a direct role for attitudinal change in 
the desistance process.  In regard to this difference, the evidence is equivocal. Entering a 
high-quality marriage to a pro-social spouse is associated with a reduction in the 
individual’s support for crime and delinquency and this change accounts for some of the 
effect of marriage on desistance. At the same time, marriage is also likely to reduce an 
individual’s exposure to delinquent friends and this too can promote attitudinal change in 
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a way that accounts for some of the impact of marriage on crime. In other words, there is 
clear support for the social learning explanation of the links between marriage and 
desistance, although changes in exposure to criminal friends have a greater impact on the 
likelihood of desistance than attitudinal change. More importantly, even taking into 
account, all of these developments, marriage continues to have a direct impact on the 
likelihood of desistance. While these results too are consistent with social learning 
theory, they are also anticipated by social control theory. 
By contrast, the results presented here provide little support for the claim that 
marriage fosters desistance through its impact on changes in self-concept and personal 
identity. Even though marriage is associated with changes in reflected appraisals and by 
assumption in how individuals perceive themselves and even though these shifts are 
related to changes in the individual's attitudes, as predicted by the theory, these cognitive 
transformations are not able to distinguish re-offenders from desisting offenders once 
other factors are taken into account. Of course, it is possible that shifts in self-concept can 
promote attitudinal changes and that these can lead people to avoid criminal peers. Given 
the contemporaneous measurement of many of these concepts, I am not able to rule out 
this possibility. To do so, definitively would require further investigation. 
In any case, the analyses presented here move beyond prior research in advancing 
our understanding of what factors most likely mediate the links between marriage and 
crime and why. The next step is to consider whether marriage promotes desistance among 
both men and women and if so, if it does so to the same degree.  
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Table 5.1: Logistic Regression of Desistance on Marriage, 1980-1983 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2  
 
Constant 10.62 9.22 11.28 
(12.34) (12.39) (12.50) 
Age -0.87 -0.74 
(1.19) (1.20) 
-0.94 
(1.21) 
Age² 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Male 1.13*** 
(0.21) 
1.12*** 
(0.21) 
1.13*** 
(0.21) 
Black 0.37 
(0.26) 
0.40 
(0.26) 
0.41 
(0.27) 
Hispanic 0.77 
(0.58) 
0.77 
(0.59) 
0.73 
(0.59) 
Employment -0.10 
(0.24) 
-0.09 
(0.24) 
-0.10 
(0.24) 
College 0.15 
(0.21) 
0.13 
(0.21) 
0.12 
(0.21) 
Left School -0.38* 
(0.22) 
-0.34 
(0.23) 
-0.33 
(0.23) 
   
Marital Status x Relationship Quality   
Low-Quality Marriage 0.15 
(0.40) 
— — 
High-Quality Marriage -0.95** 
(0.48) 
— — 
Low-Quality Cohabitation 0.18 — — 
(0.54) 
High-Quality Cohabitation 0.74 
(0.64) 
— — 
Marital Status x Social Orientation   
Antisocial Spouse — 0.36 
(0.44) 
— 
Pro-social Spouse — -0.98** 
(0.45) 
— 
Antisocial (Cohabiting) Partner — 0.95 
(0.62) 
— 
Pro-social (Cohabiting) Partner — -0.09 
(0.57) 
— 
Marital Status x Relationship Quality x Social Orientation  
Low-Quality Marriage, Antisocial 
Spouse 
— — 0.46. 
(0.52) 
Low-Quality Marriage, Pro-social 
Spouse 
— — -0.26. 
(0.59) 
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Table 5.1 − continued. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
 
Marital Status x Relationship Quality x Social Orientation 
High-Quality Marriage, Antisocial 
Spouse 
— — 0.15 
(0.74) 
High-Quality Marriage, Pro-social 
Spouse 
— — -1.97** 
(0.79) 
Low-Quality Cohabitation, 
Antisocial Partner 
— — 1.01 
(0.86) 
Low-Quality Cohabitation, Pro-
social Partner 
— — -0.57 
(0.77) 
High-Quality Cohabitation, 
Antisocial Partner 
— — 0.88 
(0.88) 
High-Quality Cohabitation, Pro-
social Partner 
— — 0.59 
(0.92) 
   
p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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Table 5.2: Logistic Regression of Desistance on Marriage and Mediators, 1980-1983 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 10.46 7.30 
(12.61) 
7.54 
(12.63) 
7.35 7.78 
(12.39) (12.63) (12.65) 
Age -0.86 
(1.20) 
-0.54 
(1.22) 
-0.56 
(1.22) 
-0.53 
(1.22) 
-0.58 
(1.22) 
Age² 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Male 1.08*** 
(0.20) 
1.11*** 
(0.21) 
1.11*** 
(0.21) 
1.07*** 
(0.21) 
1.09*** 
(0.21) 
Black 0.38 
(0.26) 
0.30 
(0.27) 
0.31 
(0.27) 
0.33 
(0.27) 
0.34 
(0.27) 
Hispanic 0.76 
(0.59) 
0.65 
(0.60) 
0.61 
(0.59) 
0.53 
(0.59) 
0.53 
(0.59) 
Employment -0.07 
(0.24) 
-0.07 
(0.24) 
-0.08 
(0.24) 
-0.05 
(0.25) 
-0.04 
(0.25) 
College 0.12 
(0.20) 
0.09 
(0.21) 
0.07 
(0.21) 
0.08 
(0.21) 
0.08 
(0.21) 
Left School -0.38* 
(0.22) 
-0.42* 
(0.23) 
-0.43* 
(0.23) 
-0.41* 
(0.23) 
-0.41* 
(0.23) 
 
Marriage (High 
Quality, Prosocial 
Spouse) 
-2.03** 
(0.79) 
-1.61** 
(0.81) 
-1.55* 
(0.81) 
-1.43* 
(0.82) 
-1.44* 
(0.82) 
Exposure to 
Delinquent Peers 
— 0.46** 
(0.16) 
0.37** 
(0.18) 
0.33* 
(0.18) 
0.33* 
(0.18) 
Social Orientation — — 0.32 
(0.22) 
0.28 
(0.22) 
0.27 
(0.22) 
Delinquent 
Identity 
— — — 0.30 
(0.20) 
0.31 
(0.20) 
Conventional 
Goals 
— — — — 0.23 
(0.35) 
      
Log likelihood  -337.03 -328.72 -327.66 -326.54 -326.32 
N 544 537 536 536 536 
      
p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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Table 5.3: Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Social Orientation on Marriage 
and Mediators, 1980-1983 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 2.12 -0.41 
(2.52) 
-0.41 
(2.51) 
-0.27 
(2.51) (2.70) 
Age -0.21 0.03 
(0.24) 
0.03 
(0.24) 
0.02 
(0.26) (0.24) 
Age² 0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Male 0.01 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
Black 0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Hispanic 0.22** 
(0.11) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.46) 
Employment 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
College 0.06 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Left School 0.03 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.34) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
Marriage (High 
Quality, Pro-social 
Spouse) 
-0.27** 
(0.13) 
-0.20 
(0.14) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
Exposure to 
Delinquent Peers 
 0.30*** 
(0.03) 
0.27*** 
(0.03) 
0.27*** 
(0.03) 
Delinquent Identity   0.11** 
(0.04) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
Conventional Goals    0.11 
(0.07) 
     
N 544 537 537 537 
Adjusted R² 0.02 0.15 0.17 0.16 
p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, whether marriage is likely to promote desistance 
appears to depend on the type of person the offender marries as well as the nature of their 
relationship. These findings clearly lend some support to the idea that the effects of life-
course transitions are not categorical; instead, they depend a great deal on the kinds of 
experiences that such transitions engender in the lives of the individuals who encounter 
them. To that end, the two preceding chapters help clarify the limits of life-course 
transitions as agents in the desistance process and to some extent, provide more nuanced 
explanations for why many offenders who experience marriage do not desist from crime. 
They also can help improve our understanding of how and why these transitions affect 
criminal behavior by moving beyond simple platitudes about the importance of human 
agency to consider some of the ways in which personal judgment is most likely to matter. 
Of course, even if researchers were to explain why some offenders are more likely 
to develop high-quality marriages to pro-social spouses, the effects of even these types of 
marriages are likely to vary across the population in seemingly unpredictable ways. In the 
context of life-course criminology, it may be tempting once again to assign such 
unexplained variation to human agency and the inherent randomness of human life. 
Needless to say, whether or not marriage will result in behavioral change is likely to 
depend on the meanings that people ascribe to it in addition to any number of 
idiosyncrasies. Nonetheless, even these variations may obscure some underlying order. 
At the very least, the impact of key life experiences might depend on observable 
differences between individuals, especially with respect to differences that are known 
already to be consequential to the study of crime, such as age, sex, ethnicity, and socio-
economic status. To the extent that these characteristics reflect approximate differences in 
the meaning of events, the likelihood of their occurrence, or their links to the causes of 
crime, they may be significant sources of variation in desistance.  
In this chapter, I investigate the extent to which the effects of marriage on 
desistance are contingent on sex. Specifically, I extend the analyses presented in Chapter 
4 to consider the hypothesis that female offenders who marry are less likely to desist 
from crime than are male offenders. Although other socio-demographic characteristics, 
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such as age, ethnicity, or socio-economic status, might condition the impact of life-course 
transitions on desistance from crime, investigating possible sex differences in the effects 
of marriage on criminal behavior is especially important for a number of reasons. For one 
thing, sex is one of the most important correlates of involvement in crime (Steffensmeier 
and Allan 1996; Steffensmeier and Allan 2000), yet its relevance to criminal and 
delinquent behavior remains an underdeveloped area of research, especially in 
comparison to characteristics such as socio-economic status (Chesney-Lind and Sheldon 
2004). This is especially the case with respect to life-course criminology in which an 
over-reliance on male samples has ensured that the role of sex has been completely 
absent from some of the most influential studies in the field (e.g. Sampson and Laub 
1993; Laub and Sampson 2003; Farrington 1998; Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin 1972).  
There are a number of reasons to suspect that the crime-suppressing benefits of 
marriage are confined to men. Furthermore, there is also a growing body of research that 
contends that the onset, escalation, persistence, and desistance of female offending 
requires its own explanations (e.g. Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988). This research agenda 
has highlighted a number distinct pathways through which women are likely to become 
involved in and abandon crime (Chesney-Lind and Sheldon 2004; Uggen and 
Kruttschnitt 1998; Sommers, Baskin, and Fagan 1994; Holtfreter, Reisig, and Morash 
2004). In particular, it points to some transformative life experiences that appear to affect 
involvement in crime disproportionately among women, including sexual victimization in 
childhood and adolescence (Chesney-Lind and Sheldon 2004) and parenthood in 
adulthood (Graham and Bowling 1995; Moore and Hagedorn 1999; Giordano, 
Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002). If, as these studies suggests, men and women engage in 
and desist from crime for different reasons, then the relationship between marriage and 
desistance may not apply to female offenders.  
 
 
Marriage and Crime among Men and Women 
The majority of studies that have documented a link between marriage and 
desistance have observed that association among samples of male offenders (e.g. 
Meisenhelder 1977; Gibbens 1984; Sampson and Laub 1993; Laub and Sampson 2003; 
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Farrington and West 1995). Meanwhile, those studies that have examined the links 
between marriage and crime among men and women, including the analyses reported in 
Chapters 4 and 5 often have treated sex as just another risk or protective factor to be 
controlled in additive models of crime (e.g. Warr 1998). The problem with this approach, 
however, is that it assumes that the factors that predict desistance affect criminal behavior 
among both men and women and to the same degree. And, given that men are far more 
likely to be involved in crime, in the first place, it is likely that those factors that are 
associated with desistance among men, in particular, are those that are most likely to 
emerge from such analyses as significant predictors of change.   
Only two published studies have investigated the degree to which the effects of 
marriage might vary across the sexes. In the first of these studies, in large-scale statistical 
analyses of the relationship between marriage and desistance, marriage failed to predict 
changes in offending among either men or women. Nonetheless, it did emerge as a 
catalyst for desistance in in-depth interviews with a number of female offenders 
(Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002). In fact, Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 
(2002) found considerable overlap between the processes of desistance as described by 
men and women. In their interviews with male offenders, Giordano, Cernkovich and 
Rudolph (2002) noted that many of the same events that featured in the desistance 
narratives of women also emerged in the stories told by these men, although there were 
some minor sex differences in the way respondents described these events and how they 
had affected their involvement in crime. Thus, marriage appeared to promote desistance 
among men and women even though the role that it played in their desistance varied 
slightly between the sexes (Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002). 
These findings are consistent with the results of other studies, based on in-depth 
interviews with female offenders that have confirmed that there is a link between 
marriage and desistance among women. Nonetheless, since these findings apply to small 
numbers of offenders it is difficult to know whether these patterns are indicative of more 
general trends or are confined to a minority of aberrant cases. Moreover, in the absence 
of systematic comparisons across the sexes, these studies can offer little insight as to 
whether marriage can constrain crime to the same degree among women as among men. 
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The second study to have investigated possible sex differences in the effects of 
marriage compared the relationship between marriage and crime for male and female 
respondents to the National Youth Survey ― the study used in this dissertation (King, 
Massoglia, and MacMillan 2007). Despite finding that married men and women were less 
likely to commit crime than single respondents, King, Massoglia, and MacMillan (2007) 
noted that marriage had no effect on crime among women. They concluded that 
“marriage … [is] a more salient institution for males relative to females” (King, 
Massoglia, and MacMillan 2007, p. 57). A particular feature of the analysis presented by 
these authors was their use of propensity score matching to compare respondents with 
comparable probabilities of marriage. By doing so, King, Massoglia, and MacMillan 
(2007) observed that, in addition to sex differences in the average effects of marriage on 
crime, the relationship between marriage and crime was contingent on the individual’s 
propensity to marry. In particular, marriage was associated with reductions in crime only 
among women who were in the medium range of a continuum measuring their likelihood 
of marriage (King, Massoglia, and MacMillan 2007). 
These results do not mean necessarily that the effects of marriage on desistance 
are contingent on sex because they are based entirely on between-individual differences 
in offending (King, Massoglia, and MacMillan 2007). Even though these researchers 
used propensity score matching to minimize the likelihood that they might observe 
spurious links between marriage and crime, propensity score matching is only as 
effective as it is comprehensive4. Unless readers can be confident that all possible 
confounding factors have been controlled, the fact that married women are not less likely 
                                                 
4 Their use of propensity score matching may have even exaggerated the extent of sex 
differences in the relationship between marriage and crime. Given the importance of prior 
offending in their analyses of the propensity for marriage especially among male 
respondents (King, Massoglia, and MacMillan 2007), it is possible that sex differences in 
the links between marriage, crime, and marital propensity merely reflect differences in 
the baseline rates of offending for men and women. In other words, among men who are 
(heavily involved in crime and are therefore) unlikely to marry, marriage distinguishes 
offenders from non-offenders. By contrast, among women who have a low-propensity to 
marry, marriage does not distinguish between offenders and non-offenders to the same 
degree because there is less variation in their rates of offending. 
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than unmarried women to commit crime does not mean, as these authors have assumed, 
that marriage is not causally relevant to women. Thus, although their analyses might 
support the inference that marriage does not promote desistance among men and women, 
they provide no direct evidence that female offenders are less likely to desist from crime 
after they marry. 
 
 
Why Might Marriage Affect Men and Women Differently? 
There are a number of reasons to suspect that the relationship between marriage 
and desistance observed in Chapters 4 and 5 and reported in countless other studies either 
does not apply to women or does not apply to the same degree as it does among men. 
When discussing sex differences in the effects of marriage (or cohabitation), however, it 
is important to distinguish between two types of variability. First, the overall effect of 
marriage on criminal behavior as an outcome may vary across the two sexes in terms of 
either the magnitude or direction of its impact. For example, whereas marriage leads to 
desistance among men, it may not have any discernible impact on the behavior of female 
offenders (or it might even lead to an escalation in crime among women). Alternatively, 
marriage might promote disengagement from crime among women, but to a lesser extent 
than it does among male offenders. Whatever patterns may be observed, sex differences 
in the effects of marriage, so far as they exist, should be discernible as variations in the 
statistical associations between marriage and desistance. 
Second, even if marriage does constrain crime among women, as effectively as it 
does for men, it may do so for different reasons. For instance, marriage may foster 
desistance among men primarily because it exposes them to monitoring and supervision, 
by pro-social spouses, whereas marriage may constrain crime among women by reducing 
their exposure to criminal or delinquent friends. These two sources of difference could be 
interrelated. For instance, different mechanisms could give the impression that one 
relationship is more important for men than women. However, they might also be 
independent of one another. Thus, marriage could be less important for women, in terms 
of the magnitude of its effect, even though it promotes desistance for the same reasons. 
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 The Gender Gap in Crime 
Sex is the most important predictor of involvement in crime; indeed, some 
researchers have suggested that the disproportionate involvement of men in crime and 
delinquency is sufficiently universal to conclude that “everywhere women are less likely 
than men to commit crime” (Steffensmeier and Allan 1996). Although much of the 
research documenting sex differences in offending has been based on cross-sectional 
studies, there is a growing body of research indicating that these patterns are replicated in 
longitudinal research designs. For example, D’Unger, Land, and McCall (1998) noted 
that fewer women than men exhibited patterns of high-rate, chronic and persistent 
offending over time. Moreover, they also observed that even when women and men 
appeared to follow similar patterns of offending over time, in terms of onset, escalation, 
deceleration, and desistance, the women committed crime at much lower rates than the 
men (D’Unger, Land, and McCall 1998).  
The fact that men and women have vastly different probabilities of being involved 
in crime suggests that any development that help promotes disengagement from crime is 
likely to have a more dramatic effect on men than it does on women. Thus, the gender 
gap alone could give the appearance that marriage has differential effects on criminal 
behavior by men and women. The more critical issue, therefore, is not whether the 
estimated change in offending that accompanies marriage is the same for men as it is for 
women; rather, it is how such differences ought to be interpreted. In particular, it seems 
important to know whether sex differences in the likelihood of re-offending among 
married men and women are indicative of meaningful differences in the ability of 
marriage to constrain male and female crime. Given the baseline differences between 
men and women in terms of their probabilities and rates of offending, sex differences in 
the magnitude of the marital effect are hardly noteworthy. The more important test is 
whether or not marriage is associated with behavioral change among both men and 
women. 
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The Gender Gap in Marriage 
It is possible also that sex differences in the likelihood of entering marriage could 
give the appearance that the effects of marriage on crime are greater among men than 
women. This is perhaps especially likely if prior involvement in crime reduces the 
likelihood of entering marriage, a pattern that might affect men disproportionately given 
their higher rates of involvement in crime. Thus, when King, Massoglia, and MacMillan 
(2007) matched respondents according to their propensities to marry, which took account 
of prior levels of offending, they observed a weaker relationship between marriage and 
crime among women than men. At the same time, in so far as there is greater social 
stigma associated with criminal and delinquent behavior among women, these patterns 
could be offset by the greater difficulties encountered by female offenders in finding 
partners (Giordano, Deines, and Cernkovich 2006). In any case, since it is not so much 
marriage as entry into a particular type of marriage that matters, an even more important 
consideration might be the degree to which men and women have varying propensities to 
establish the kinds of relationships that are most likely to promote disengagement from 
crime; specifically, high-quality marriages to pro-social spouses.  
That the likelihood of marrying a pro-social spouse might vary for men and 
women seems especially likely given the considerable differences in rates of offending 
between men and women. Since men are at greater risk than women of being involved in 
crime, the chances that they will meet and marry a pro-social spouse are greater than the 
odds that women will do the same. Notwithstanding any tendency for men and women to 
marry other individuals who are similar to themselves, all other things being equal, “men 
marry ‘up’ and women ‘down’” (Laub and Sampson 2003, p. 45). Irrespective of their 
attachment to their partners, therefore, women might be less likely to marry the kinds of 
men who can help them abandon crime. Nonetheless, whatever the extent of the gender 
gap in crime, criminal behavior is still a relatively rare occurrence even among men and 
as such, even though heterosexual men and women should have vastly different 
probabilities of finding pro-social partners, even female offenders have a reasonably good 
chance of finding a pro-social spouse.  
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Marriage as a Gendered Institution 
One reason to expect that marriage may operate differently for men and women is 
that its meaning may differ for the two sexes. The expression differences in meaning can 
encompass numerous things that are potentially relevant to understanding the links 
between gender, marriage, and crime. It might include the importance that partners give 
to their marriages; differences in the roles and responsibilities that people assume in 
marriage; differences in the ways that people interpret their roles (even if they do not 
differ in their expectations of which roles and responsibilities they might perform); and, 
differences in the norms that govern the behavior of individual partners and regulate their 
interactions with one another or with others outside the relationship dyad. Whatever these 
differences in meaning, in so far as they alter systematically the extent to which men or 
women are exposed to the mechanisms supporting desistance, sex differences in the 
effects of marriage on crime are likely to be observed. Given the results presented in 
Chapter 5, sex differences in the meaning of marriage that affect the establishment of 
social bonds of mutual independence, exposure to deviant peers, or the extent to which 
spouses attempt to control the behavior of their partners are perhaps most likely to 
contribute to sex differences in the likely effects of marriage. 
There is some evidence, in particular, that “women have historically maintained 
closer relationships to the family and have been more likely to derive status from marital 
partners” (Giordano, Deines, and Cernkovich 2006, p. 23). As a result, they may be more 
likely than men to develop strong attachment to their spouses and may even be more 
responsive than male offenders to the emotional ties that they develop with their partners. 
At the same time, other differences in the meanings that men and women attach to 
marriage might affect the mechanisms through which marriage is most likely to lead to 
desistance from crime. Due to apparent sex differences in the functions of friendship 
(Auckett, Ritchie and Mill 1988; Stein et al 1992), for example, marriage may have 
markedly different effects on the social networks of married men and women. In 
particular, at least one study has suggested that since there is greater differentiation in the 
functions performed by intimate partners and close friends among women, marriage is 
likely to have a more deleterious impact on the friendship networks of men (Kalmijn 
2003). And, since one of the key ways in which marriage appears to promote changes in 
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criminal behavior is by reducing an individual’s exposure to delinquent peers, if correct, 
this could suggest that marriage is less likely to foster desistance among women. 
As noted in Chapter 5, another potentially important mediating mechanism in the 
relationship between marriage and crime is the degree of social control that spouses 
exercise over one another. Of all the mechanisms that are hypothesized to mediate the 
links between marriage and crime, direct social control is perhaps most likely to be 
moderated by sex differences in the meaning of marriage. As Laub and Sampson (2003, 
p. 43) note, the men in their study came of age in an era in which “wives... took primary 
control of the planning and management of the household and often acted as informal 
guardians of their husbands’ activities”. Farrington and West (1995, p. 255) observed 
similar cultural mores at work in “the male tradition of turning over the bulk of wages to 
‘the wife’, but keeping back an undisclosed … proportion for spending in the pub”.  
While these studies were attentive primarily to the control that wives exercised over their 
husbands ― they were based on male samples ― their comments are indicative of some 
notable gender differences in the division of marital responsibilities. In fact, in more 
traditional marriages, women may play a much stronger role in monitoring and 
supervision of spouses than do men (Umberson 1992). This could suggest that marriages 
that are characterized by such clear divisions of labor are a much less likely to reduce 
crime and delinquency by females than by males. More broadly, it could imply that 
marriage is less likely to result in desistance among women than among men. 
Of course, it is possible that the norms of expectations that may have given rise to 
gender divisions in the execution of social control may have changed considerably over 
the years. Moreover, even if contemporary popular culture abounds with examples of 
married women who monitor, supervise and mother their husbands, there are sufficient 
examples of men who have directly intervened in the lives of their partners to help 
preclude their involvement in crime (e.g. Giordano. Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002). In 
any case, the degree to which sex differences in supervision and control lead to sex 
differences in the effects of marriage on desistance will depend, ultimately, on how much 
supervision, monitoring and control actually matter to the desistance process. 
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Desistance as a Gendered Process 
The above discussion takes, as its point of departure, the assumption that the 
processes that lead individuals into and away from crime operate in much the same way 
for men and women. From this perspective, whether or not marriage is able to promote 
disengagement from crime depends on the degree to which women are likely to 
experience certain types of marriage or the extent to which marriage is likely to expose 
them to the very mechanisms that engender changes in criminal behavior. There is, 
however, a fundamentally different theoretical perspective that also suggests that the 
effects of marriage on crime are likely to differ significantly for men and women. 
According to this latter viewpoint, the effects of marriage on crime are moderated by sex 
because the causes of crime are different for men and women.  
Given the historically disproportionate emphasis that criminology has given to 
criminal behavior among men, it is hardly surprising that traditional criminological 
theories have been criticized as male-oriented (Simpson 1989; Chesney-Lind and Shelden 
2004). Feminist criminologists have alleged that this overemphasis on male delinquency 
has left traditional criminological theories incapable of explaining female crime and 
delinquency adequately (Chesney-Lind 1997, Chesney-Lind and Sheldon 2004). The 
problem is that traditional theories, such as social control or social learning theory, are 
based on theoretical concepts that “are inscribed so deeply by masculinist (sic) 
experience that this approach will prove too restrictive, or at least misleading” if applied 
to the behavior of women (Daly and Chesney-Lind 1992, p. 519). More importantly, in so 
far as they overlook gender and its “[social construction] from relations of dominance 
and inequality between men and women” (Chesney-Lind and Randal 2004, p. 98), 
traditional criminological theories ignore the very concept that is most critical to 
understanding why women commit crime if and when they do. 
Feminist criminologists, therefore, have sought to draw greater attention to the 
unique experiences of women and the ways in which these experiences, grounded in 
concepts such as gender and patriarchy, affect their involvement in crime and 
delinquency. An important conclusion from this research has been that the pathways 
through which women become embroiled in crime are dissimilar from those followed by 
men. For example, as Chesney-Lind and Faith (2001, p. 299) note, “research consistently 
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documents that victimization is at the heart of much of girls’ and women’s law-breaking 
and that this pattern of gender entrapment … best explains women’s involvement in 
crime” (e.g. McCormack, Janus, and Burgess 1986; Dembo, Dertke, La Voie, Borders, 
Washburn, and Schmeidler 1987)5. While these findings relate to the onset of criminal 
behavior, as long as the causes of crime and delinquency differ for men and women, so 
too may the causes of their desistance. Life-course transitions that promote 
disengagement from crime by removing the factors that encourage the individual to 
commit crime, as in the case of marriage taking offenders away from the delinquent 
peers, are only likely to have such an impact as long as the factors that they remove are 
actually relevant to the individual’s involvement in crime. Even though marriage fosters 
desistance among male offenders, if the reasons why men and women engage in crime 
differ in fundamental ways, it may not have any effect on desistance among the latter. 
There are a number of reasons to suspect, therefore, that marriage may not be as 
important in explaining the desistance of female offenders as that of males and that much 
of the information about the effects of marriage on crime, based as it is on studies of male 
offenders, should not be assumed to apply to women. Some of these arguments relate 
solely to differences in the effects of marriage, whereas others raise more fundamental 
theoretical issues regarding the degree to which the processes by which men and women 
desist from crime are completely dissimilar. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 6.1: Women in high-quality marriages will commit as much crime as men in 
high-quality marriages 
Hypothesis 6.2: Women entering high-quality cohabiting relationships will be as likely to 
desist from crime as men entering high-quality marriages. 
 
                                                 
5 It is possible that feminist criminologists may have exaggerated the exceptionality of 
the predictors of female crime and delinquency. There is some evidence, for example, 
that childhood and adolescent victimization also contributes to criminal involvement 
among men (Dembo, Williams, Schmeidle et al 1992; Dembo, Williams, Wotke et al 
1992; Weeks and Widom 1998; Widom and Ames 1994). 
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As I have already noted, the observation of differences in and of themselves may 
not be especially significant. For example, differences in the estimated effects of 
marriage on crime could be due to differences in baseline rate of offending or because of 
unobserved factors that are especially relevant to desistance for either men or women.  
The more important standard for evaluating sex differences in the impact of marriage on 
crime is whether the relationship between marriage and desistance is conditional on 
gender. In other words, does marriage, promote desistance for both men and women? 
 
Hypothesis 6.3: Individuals in high-quality relationships, whether male or female, will 
commit less crime than single persons 
Hypothesis 6.4: Those who enter high-quality marriages, whether male or female, will 
commit less crime than they did when they were not high-quality marriages. 
 
Irrespective of whether the effects of marriage on desistance are moderated by 
sex, it is important to note that sex differences in the predictors of desistance do not 
necessarily imply that the men and women engage in and desist from crime for different 
reasons. For example, it could be that “the factors that influence delinquent development 
differ for males and females in some contexts, but not others” (Kruttschnitt 1996, p. 141). 
Whether men and women follow different pathways into crime and the degree to which 
these pathways are distinct is an empirical question, but the issue of whether such 
differences are so great as to require fundamentally different theoretical propositions is 
also a theoretical one. Even if the transformative experiences that trigger the termination 
of offending are distinct for men and women, similarities in the underlying processes that 
explain the effects of these transitions implies the need for a gendered, rather than 
gender-specific, theory (Steffensmeier 1996; Steffensmeier and Allan 2000). 
Take parenthood as an example. Previous research has shown that parenthood is 
an especially important factor in the desistance of female offenders (Graham and 
Bowling 1995, Moore and Hagedorn 1999, Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph 2002), 
but it appears not to have much of an effect on male offenders (Krohn, Lizotte, and Perez 
1997). On the one hand, these researchers may have observed genuine sex differences in 
the causes of desistance. On the other hand, it could be that in some contexts, especially 
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in those situations in which people are not likely to experience other transformative life 
events, parenthood plays an especially important part in promoting their desistance. In 
other words, it is not so much that men and women abandon crime for different reasons; 
rather, the events that trigger their desistance may vary in accordance with their access to 
them.  
Conversely, even if marriage is associated with desistance among men and 
women, it should not be assumed that their involvement in crime and their desistance 
from it is not shaped, in some way, by gender. Just as the absence of a strong empirical 
association between marriage and female desistance would not necessarily mean that the 
causes of crime are different for men and women, finding that marriage encourages both 
male and female offenders to give up crime should not be taken to mean that the two 
sexes desist for the same reasons. For one thing, other factors might play an even greater 
role in the desistance stories of women than men and these factors could affect their 
involvement in crime for fundamentally different reasons. Moreover, even those 
transitions that affect desistance among men and women might constrain their behavior 
for different reasons. Only by examining a range of changes that are likely to promote 
desistance at the same time as investigating all the mechanisms that mediate the links 
between those changes and crime would it be possible to resolve the issue of whether 
desistance can best be understood in terms of gender-neutral, gendered, or gender-
specific theories. 
Given the enormous challenges involved in resolving these issues definitively, in 
the analyses that follow my principal concern is to evaluate the hypotheses regarding the 
degree to which sex moderates the effects of marriage on crime. Since so little research 
has examined empirically even this proposition, surely the first step towards developing 
more refined understanding of how gender relates to desistance should be to determine 
whether or not transitions such as marriage have comparable effects on men and women. 
 
 
Data and method 
To test the above hypotheses, I analyzed the results of the last four publicly-
available waves of the National Youth Survey (NYS). All analyses were based on the 
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1625 respondents who had participated in a least one of the last four publicly-available 
waves. To that end, I divided the sample into males and females and replicated the 
analyses, reported in Chapter 4, separately for each sample. For each sex, therefore, I 
estimated a series of multilevel models in which time-periods were nested within 
individuals. As in Chapter 4, the level-1 model is intended to account for individual 
changes in criminal behavior across the four waves of the survey (1979, 1980, 1983, and 
1986), whereas with the level-2 model is intended to explain time-stable differences in 
levels of offending between respondents. The above hypotheses can be evaluated by 
comparing the results from the two samples. Since these analyses are conducted on 
separate samples of men and women, comparison of results obtained from the level-1 
models can be used to assess the hypothesis that gender moderates the impact of marriage 
on changes in criminal behavior. The results obtained from the level-2 models, on the 
other hand, provide an assessment of the degree to which marriage can distinguish 
offenders from non-offenders among women as effectively as it does among men.   
All variables were measured as described in Chapter 4. Specifically, I measured 
crime as involvement in one or more of the following offences: drug sales, felony assault, 
felony theft, minor assault, minor theft, prostitution, robbery and public disorder. 
Marriage and cohabitation were measured using dichotomous indicators of whether the 
respondent reported living with his or her spouse or partner for the majority of previous 
year. To control for ethnic differences in crime, I included two dichotomous indicators of 
Black and Hispanic ethnicity. Other ethnic identities formed the reference category.  
As in Chapter 4, the level-2 or between-individual models included, as 
independent variables, the two dichotomous indicators of ethnicity in addition to marital 
status. Marital status in the between-individual models, as in Chapter 4, is measured as 
each respondent’s average score on the dichotomous indicators of cohabitation and 
marriage over the four waves of the survey. Hence, the results of the level-2 models 
assess the relationship between the proportion of time spent in marriage and cohabitation 
and between-individual differences in the probability of committing one or more offences 
(Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995). By contrast, the level-1 models estimate the 
effects of marriage on within-individual changes in criminal offending. Again, as in 
Chapter 4, I calculated the difference between each respondent’s time-varying indicator 
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of marital status (or marital status and relationship quality) and his or her average score. I 
then included these deviation scores as independent predictors in the model. In addition, 
controls for age were also included in the level-1 models. This approach provides 
estimate of the effects of marriage and cohabitation on involvement in crime that are 
unbiased by time-stable differences in individual characteristics (Horney, Osgood, and 
Marshall 1995, Brame, Bushway, and Paternoster 1999).  
Analyses were conducted using logistic regression analysis. In the baseline 
models, the effects of cohabitation and marriage were assessed without regard for the 
characteristics of either relationship. In the extended analyses, I included indicators of the 
quality of cohabiting and marital relationships to assess the role of relationship quality in 
moderating their effects on crime. In particular, the results of the extended models 
provide a direct assessment of the impact of being in a high-quality relationship on 
within-individual changes in crime separately for men and women. Unfortunately, it was 
not possible to include measures of the social orientations of spouses in these analyses 
because the survey items used to measure their attitudes toward crime were only included 
in the 1983 and 1986 surveys. As a result, the only way to examine possible sex 
differences in the contingent effects of spousal social orientation and relationship quality 
would have been to replicate the analyses presented in Chapter 5 separately for men and 
women. Since those analyses were conducted on a reduced sample, dividing the sample 
further would have reduced its size below acceptable levels (Long 1997). 
 
 
Results 
Table 6.1 presents the results of the two baseline models in which I estimated the 
effects of marriage and cohabitation on between-individual and within-individual 
differences in offending separately for men and women. As can be seen, there are some 
notable differences in the estimated effects of the independent variables in the analyses of 
male and female offending. For example, in the level-1 analyses, the two indicators of 
age (i.e. age and age-squared) have no discernible effects on the likelihood that men will 
commit crime. However, among women, both indicators of age are correlated with 
within-individual changes in offending. These findings intimate that, in contrast to men, 
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the relationship between age and crime among women is curvilinear and mimics the 
aggregate patterns observed in the general population. Whatever the other results might 
suggest about the relationship between marriage and desistance among women, that these 
patterns are not observed among the male sample, but are found in the female sample 
even after for controlling for the effects of marriage, implies that the factors that can fully 
account for patterns of offending among women are not to be found in Table 6.1. The 
factors that explain why women desist from crime may not be the same as those for men. 
These important differences notwithstanding, there appears to be little support for 
the proposition that marriage (or cohabitation) affects criminal involvement among men 
and women in different ways. Table 6.1 indicates that the effects of marriage and 
cohabitation on the likelihood of desistance are not vastly different for men and women. 
Irrespective of the sex of the respondent, neither entering a cohabiting relationship nor 
entering marriage was associated with disengagement from crime. In the case of 
marriage, the coefficient estimates of the effects of marriage on within-individual 
changes in the odds of committing an offense did not differ significantly for men and 
women. More importantly, however, entry into marriage did not have a significant effect 
on desistance among men or women. As for cohabitation, despite differences in the 
magnitude of the coefficients pertaining to the estimated effects of entering a cohabiting 
relationship, the results of Table 6.1 confirm those reported in Chapter 4. Cohabitation 
failed to predict desistance from crime among either the men or women in the sample.  
The similarities in the estimated relationships (or lack thereof) between crime, 
marriage and cohabitation were also observed with respect to between-individual 
differences in crime. Irrespective of sex, those individuals who spent more time in 
cohabiting relationships, on average, were more likely to be involved in crime. Indeed, 
the coefficients corresponding to the estimated impact of cohabitation on between-
individual differences in offending among men and women were not statistically different 
from one another. As for marriage, as can be seen in Table 6.1, respondents who were 
married for a greater proportion of the survey years were not less likely to report 
committing crime in 1979, 1980, 1983, and 1986. That this applied to both men and 
women provides further reinforcement for the absence of genuine sex differences in the 
links between marriage and criminal and delinquent behavior. 
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Of course, the results presented above relate to the categorical effects of marriage 
(or cohabitation) on offending. As indicated in Chapters 4 and 5, however, the effects of 
adult family relationships on crime are contingent on the characteristics of those 
relationships. In so far as the likelihood of entering a high-quality cohabiting relationship 
might vary across the sexes, it is possible that failure to take account of the conditional 
nature of the marital effect may have led me to exaggerate its similarities across the two 
samples. Hence, Table 6.2 presents the results of the extended models, in which I 
estimated the effects of entering and being in low-quality, medium-quality, and high-
quality marriages and cohabiting relationships separately for men and women.  
The results of the level-2 models shown in Table 6.2 provide a slightly different 
impression of the relationships between cohabitation, marriage and crime than that 
reported in Chapter 4. In particular, Table 6.2 indicates that men and women who spent 
longer periods of time in cohabiting relationships are more likely to be involved in crime, 
irrespective the quality of those relationships. Indeed, whereas the results reported earlier 
suggested that only those individuals in low-quality cohabiting relationships were more 
likely to be involved in crime, the level-2 model in Table 6.2 indicates that men and 
women in medium-quality and high-quality cohabiting relationships, respectively, were 
also more likely to commit crime than their single or married counterparts.  
These differences aside, the more pertinent conclusion to be drawn from Table 6.2 
is that the links between marital status and between-individual differences in crime are 
roughly similar for both men and women. For both men and women, spending longer 
periods of time in cohabiting relationships, appears to be associated with an increased 
likelihood of being involved in crime. By contrast, men and women who spent longer 
periods of time in high-quality marriages were significantly less likely to be involved in 
crime. Thus, marriage and high-quality marriage, in particular, can distinguish female 
offenders from non-offenders as successfully as it distinguishes among males. 
In contrast to the level-2 models, the results of the level-1 models do point to 
some apparent differences in the effects of marriage and cohabitation on male and female 
criminal behavior. The first notable difference is that the coefficient estimates pertaining 
to the impact of entry into a high-quality cohabiting relationship or a low-quality 
marriage differ for men and women. In the case of high-quality cohabitation, for men, the 
 136
coefficient is negative, whereas for women it is positive. In the case of low-quality 
marriage, the coefficient estimates differ in magnitude, if not direction. While these 
results could hint at some meaningful sex differences in the effects of these relationships, 
a more appropriate interpretation is that these apparent differences are substantively 
meaningless. Entry into both a high-quality cohabiting relationship and a low-quality 
marriage fail to exert any discernible effects on criminal behavior among either men or 
women. Thus, irrespective of any statistical differences in the direction or magnitude of 
these coefficients, it seems more likely that the effects of high-quality cohabitation and 
low-quality marriage on male and female offenders are the same; namely, that neither 
type of relationship has any effect on the behavior of either men or women. 
The second apparent difference between the level-1 models for the male and 
female samples pertains to the estimated effects of entry into high-quality marriages. 
Table 6.2 suggests that entry into high-quality marriage has a statistically significant 
effect on male offenders; specifically, it leads to a reduction in the probability of them 
committing one or more offences. By contrast, the estimated impact of entering a high-
quality marriage on female offending is not statistically significant. Of all the results 
presented so far, this is the only result that might reasonably indicate that the impact of 
marriage on offending is moderated by sex.  
However, it is important to consider this result in the context of the other findings 
derived from Table 6.2. The results pertaining to the impact of entry into low-quality and 
medium-quality marriages are clearly similar across the two sexes. Whereas low-quality 
marriages do not have a statistically significant effect upon the probability of desistance 
among either male or female offenders, entry into a medium-quality relationship is 
associated with a significant and comparable reduction in the likelihood of committing an 
offence for both male and female respondents. Taken together, these two results would 
suggest that relationship quality moderates the effects of marriage on criminal behavior 
among men and women in a very similar fashion. Sex differences in the estimated effects 
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of entering high-quality marriages, therefore, should not be exaggerated6. More than 
anything, Table 6.2 appears to suggest that marriage can promote disengagement from 
crime in much the same way for women as it does for men provided the relationship is 
characterized by strong attachment and emotional bonds between husband and wife. 
 
 
Conclusions 
As a discipline, criminology has been accused of a kind of intellectual sexism: it 
has often reduced the study of crime to the study of crime committed by men and has 
“ignored, trivialized, or denied” analogous acts by women (Chesney-Lind and Okamoto 
2001, p. 3). The exclusive concentration on male crime and delinquency arose for many 
of the same reasons that criminologists have tended to focus on juvenile crime and 
delinquency instead of studying crime as it develops over the lifespan. Since men are 
overwhelmingly more likely than women to be involved in crime (Steffenseier and Allan 
1996), many criminologists seem to have assumed that there was little point in 
investigating female offenders (Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988; Steffensmeier and Allan 
1996; Chesney-Lind and Sheldon 2004). In recent decades, that view has changed 
considerably as the discipline has begun to pay far greater attention to female crime and 
delinquency (e.g. Adler 1975; Steffensmeier 1980; Steffensmeier and Allan 1996). 
Despite these changes, life-course criminology has lagged behind other fields in 
the discipline. For one thing, several notable and influential studies of criminal and 
delinquent behavior over the lifespan excluded women altogether (e.g. Shover 1986; 
Sampson and Laub 1993; Laub and Sampson 1998; Farrington and West 1995). The end 
result is that much of what is known about criminal behavior over the lifespan including 
the causes of desistance from crime is derived from studying the criminal behavior of 
                                                 
6 Indeed, if there are additional life-course transitions or factors that are especially 
relevant to desistance among women, as I noted earlier in respect of the differences in the 
effects of age on male and female offending, some coefficients estimates across the 
sample may appear to differ as a result of differences in the residual variation of the two 
models (Allison 1999). 
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men. Other studies that have examined the behavior of men and women, have not 
necessarily overcome this problem because they have tended to treat sex as if it were just 
one of a number of explanatory variables (e.g. Warr 1998). Although these studies offer 
some improvement on earlier accounts, they have assumed effectively that the factors 
that lead to crime or desistance, including marriage, are the same for men and women. 
There are a number of reasons to suspect, however, that marriage may not 
promote desistance to the same degree for men and women. Sex differences in rates of 
offending, the propensity to marry, or even the likelihood that men and women will find 
themselves in the kinds of relationships that are most likely to lead to desistance could 
ensure that marriage does not promote desistance to the same degree among women as 
men. In similar respects, sex differences in the meanings that men and women attach to 
marriage might mean that even though marriage promotes disengagement from crime for 
men, its effects among women are less pronounced. Finally, sex differences in the causes 
of criminal and delinquent behavior and consequently in the ways in which women move 
away from crime might also imply that sex moderates the effects of marriage on crime. 
However, the results of the analyses presented in this chapter challenge the 
validity of these claims. Despite some likely differences in the factors that promote 
desistance among men and women, as indicated by sex differences in the relationship 
between age and crime, the evidence shown here is more consistent with the notion that 
marriage promotes disengagement from crime for men and women. Of course, as noted 
in Chapters 4 and 5, the effects of marriage on crime are not categorical; instead, they 
depend considerably on the characteristics of the relationship and in particular, on the 
level of attachment and the strength of emotional ties between partners. In fact, the 
apparent similarities in the ways that relationship characteristics moderate the effects of 
marriage on crime among both men and women lends considerable credence to the 
hypothesis that its crime-suppressing benefits are likely to be enjoyed by both sexes.  
Of course, these results should not be taken to mean that the processes that 
underpin desistance from crime are entirely the same for men and women. Men and 
women may encounter divergent experiences in their lives and the meanings and 
opportunities afforded by these events, including marriage, may vary significantly across 
the two sexes. In addition, as a result of these differences, the reasons why marriage is 
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associated with desistance might vary across the population. Moreover, in light of some 
apparent sex differences in the way criminal behavior varies with age, it is likely that 
there are other factors (or life-course transitions) that are especially relevant to the 
desistance of female offenders. Nonetheless, as far as marriage is concerned, at least one 
pathway out of crime appears to be open to both men and women.  
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Table 6.1: Logistic Regression (with Random Effects) Coefficient Estimates of the 
Effects of Marriage and Cohabitation on Desistance among Men and Women, 1979-
1986 
 
  Men Women Ratio of 
Coefficients 
χ²  
Constant  2.11 8.20*** 0.26 0.17 
(1.66) (1.73) 
Within-Individual     
Age  -0.04 
(0.17) 
-0.92*** 
(0.17) 
0.04 29.91*** 
Age2  0.00 0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12 66808.66*** 
(0.00) 
Cohabitation (δ) -0.03 
(0.34) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
-0.42 20.21*** 
Marriage (δ) -0.29 
(0.22) 
-0.25 
(0.20) 
1.16 0.25 
Between-Individual     
Black  -0.47** 
(0.22) 
0.30 
(0.24) 
-1.57 36.29*** 
Hispanic  0.35 0.40 
(0.39) 
0.87 0.05 
(0.44) 
Cohabitation 2.77*** 
(0.88) 
1.65** 
(0.64) 
1.68 0.18 
Marriage  -0.59 
(0.37) 
-0.46 
(0.29) 
1.27 0.24 
      
Ρ  1.94 
(0.09) 
1.66 
(0.10) 
  
Σ  0.53 
(0.02) 
0.46 
(0.03) 
  
N (observations) 3058 2858   
N (cases)  857 769   
Log likelihood -1811.94 -1508.67   
p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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Table 6.2: Logistic Regression (with Random Effects) Coefficient Estimates of the 
Effects of Marriage and Cohabitation on Desistance among Men and Women, 
Conditional on Relationship Quality 1979-1986 
 
  Men Women Ratio of 
Coefficients 
χ² 
Constant  1.72 
(1.68) 
8.36*** 
(1.74) 
0.21 0.20 
Within-Individual     
Age  0.00 
(0.17) 
-0.93*** 
(0.18) 
0.00 32.31*** 
Age2  0.00 0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.17 70687.93*** 
(0.00) 
Cohabitation (δ)     
Low-Quality -0.38 
(0.45) 
-0.21 
(0.42) 
1.83 0.82 
Medium-Quality 1.24* 
(0.67) 
-0.04 
(0.51) 
-31.21 2.34 
High-Quality -0.80 
(0.74) 
0.63 
(0.49) 
-1.26 4.56** 
Marriage (δ)     
Low-Quality 0.32 
(0.31) 
0.12 
(0.25) 
2.58 3.50* 
Medium-Quality -0.51* 
(0.30) 
-0.59** 
(0.30) 
0.86 0.12 
High-Quality -0.92** 
(0.01) 
-0.18 
(0.32) 
5.21 4.54** 
Between-Individual     
Black  -0.43* 
(0.22) 
0.31 
(0.24) 
-1.41 36.70*** 
Hispanic  0.32 0.39 
(0.39) 
0.80 0.14 
(0.44) 
Cohabitation  ―   
Low-Quality 3.27** 
(1.32) 
2.46** 
(1.03) 
1.33 0.03 
Medium-Quality 4.09** 
(1.93) 
0.33 
(1.43) 
12.27 0.22 
High-Quality 2.26 
(2.41) 
2.71** 
(1.25) 
0.83 0.00 
Marriage   ―   
Low-Quality 1.19* 
(0.69) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
2.87 0.83 
Medium-Quality -0.28. 
(0.77) 
-1.13* 
(0.59) 
0.24 1.49 
High-Quality -3.16*** 
(0.78) 
-1.27** 
(0.61) 
2.48 0.53 
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Table 6.2 − continued. 
 
  Men Women Ratio of 
Coefficients 
χ² 
      
ρ  1.93 1.65   
σ  0.53 0.45   
N (observations) 3059 2858   
N (cases)  857 769   
Log likelihood -1794.63 -1500.61   
p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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CHAPTER 7 
Criminologists have long-recognized the importance of the family in explaining 
crime and delinquency (Nye 1958). Family environments are among the major foci of 
some of the most prominent theories of crime causation (e.g. Hirschi 1969, Gottfredson 
and Hirschi 1990, Agnew 1992) and the empirical links between crime and family 
characteristics are well established (Nye 1958; Hirschi 1969; Loeber and Stouthaber-
Loeber 1986; Sampson and Laub 1993; Wright and Cullen 2001). While much of this 
research has concentrated on the role of family environments in the development of 
childhood and adolescent antisocial behavior, researchers increasingly have 
acknowledged the influence of families on criminal behavior among adults (Sampson and 
Laub 1993; Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998; Laub and Sampson 2003). Despite some 
initial skepticism, the results of this emerging research agenda have shown with 
considerable consistency that marital relationships help restrain adult crime (Farrington 
and West 1995, Sampson and Laub 1993, Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998, Warr 1998). 
In fact, since marriage is negatively associated with criminal involvement even among 
those with a history of wrong-doing, marriage is regarded by some as among the most 
important developments in desistance from crime (Laub and Sampson 2003). 
Despite the empirical evidence that marital relationships play a significant role in 
helping some offenders turn their backs on crime, several key issues remain unresolved in 
the extant literature. First, are other types of adult family relationships also likely to 
promote desistance from crime? More particularly, do “the crime suppression benefits of 
marriage extend to those involved in cohabitation or other arrangements” (Laub, 
Sampson, and Wimer 2006, p. 469)? Despite the consistency with which marriage has 
been implicated empirically in the desistance process (Meisenhelder 1977; Gibbens 1984; 
Sampson and Laub 1993; Farrington and West 1995; Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 
1995; Laub and Sampson 2003; Sampson, Laub and Wimer 2006; King, Massoglia, and 
MacMillan 2007), the evidence that analogous family relationships also constrain crime 
has been much more mixed. Although some studies have indicated that cohabitation has 
no effect on desistance from crime (Yamguchi and Kandel 1985a, 1985b; Horney, 
Osgood, and Marshall 1995, Warr 1998), research based on in-depth interviews with 
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desisting offenders has documented the capacity of non-marital cohabiting relationships 
to promote changes in criminal and delinquent behavior (Shover 1983; Hughes 1998; 
Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002; Gadd and Farrell 2004). 
Second, notwithstanding the extensive empirical evidence in support of a 
relationship between marriage and desistance from crime (Meisenhelder 1977; Gibbens 
1984; Sampson and Laub 1993; Farrington and West 1995; Horney, Osgood, and 
Marshall 1995; Laub and Sampson 2003; Sampson, Laub and Wimer 2006; King, 
Massoglia, and MacMillan 2007), there remains some ambiguity in the literature as to 
why marriage helps promote desistance. There are several possible explanations that are 
cited in the literature (Laub and Sampson 2003; Sampson, Laub and Wimer 2006), but 
very little is actually known regarding the degree to which all or any of these 
explanations apply in the lives of offenders. This is due largely to the fact that very few 
studies have sought to evaluate these explanations against one another or the theories 
emphasizing them, preferring instead to concentrate on demonstrating the empirical 
relationship between marriage and crime (e.g. Farrington and West 1995; Laub and 
Sampson 2003; Sampson, Laub and Wimer 2006). When they have, they have tested 
them in ways that paid insufficient attention to the need to rule out rival hypotheses and 
explanations (Warr 1998; Maume, Ousey, and Beaver 2005). 
Third, researchers do not fully comprehend why some marriages are more likely 
than others to steer individuals away from crime. The impact of marriage on crime is 
clearly not categorical as has already been noted, but beyond an awareness that only 
“good” marriages seem to matter, researchers have not managed to illuminate the limits 
of marriage as a potential catalyst of desistance. For example, do the positive benefits of 
marriage also apply to women? Most of the literature documenting the links between 
marriage and crime is derived from studies of offending among male populations (e.g. 
Sampson and Laub 1994; Farrington and West 1995; Laub and Sampson 2003). Given 
that sex and gender may play especially prominent roles in the development of criminal 
and delinquent behavior and in the ways that people experience marriage, sex could be an 
important factor in helping to understand the limits of marriage as a cause of desistance. 
The purpose of this dissertation has been to help redress these shortcomings and 
to provide some answers to these lingering questions. In it, I examined: first, the extent to 
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which both marriage and cohabitation can contribute to desistance; second, the theoretical 
mechanisms through which marriage promotes behavioral change, and third, the degree 
to which these relationships foster desistance for both men and women. Despite some 
limitations to the study, my answers to these questions have helped provide a more 
complete impression of the role of marriage in the desistance process. To that end, the 
three empirical studies that comprise Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have helped also to yield a more 
refined understanding of some of the ways in which transformative life-events can deflect 
individuals away from their lives of crime and delinquency.  
 
 
Does Cohabitation Promote Desistance? 
In Chapter 4, I examined the extent to which cohabitation can help promote 
desistance from crime. In contrast to prior studies of the relationship between 
cohabitation and crime, I sought to investigate the extent to which the effects of 
cohabitation on crime are contingent on the level of attachment between partners and the 
strength of their emotional bonds. To that end, a specific goal of Chapter 4 was to 
understand whether similarities between the effects of marriage and cohabitation may 
have been obscured by variations in their effects across the population. 
 Despite finding that relationship quality moderates the effects of marriage on crime, 
the results of Chapter 4 indicated that it has little impact on the relationship between 
cohabitation and crime. Irrespective of the level of attachment between partners, the 
experience of entering and maintaining a cohabitating relationship has no effect on the 
likelihood that an individual will have committed one or more offenses. In fact, the only 
finding to suggest that cohabitation had any relevance for criminal behavior was the 
conclusion that people who remain in cohabiting relationships for longer periods of time 
are more likely than others to be involved in crime and delinquency. 
 
 
Why Does Marriage Promote Desistance? 
In Chapter 5, I sought to evaluate some of the mechanisms through which 
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marriage is hypothesized to promote desistance. These mechanisms included the 
development of social bonds and emotional interdependence, reductions in exposure to 
delinquent peers, and changes in self-perception. Each of these mechanisms is 
emphasized by one of three theories of desistance: social control; social learning theory; 
and the theory of cognitive transformation. Thus, in evaluating these mechanisms, a key 
objective of Chapter 5 was to test empirically the three theories of desistance as 
explanations for why marriage affects involvement in crime. In contrast to prior efforts to 
evaluate these explanations, in Chapter 5, I sought to isolate the empirical predictions that 
are unique to each perspective as well as those that are common to all three theories. 
One of the most important results to have emerged from this investigation was 
that the impact of marriage on desistance is conditional on the quality of the relationship 
as well as the social orientation of the partner. This result is especially important because 
it further clarifies the limits of marriage as a facilitator of desistance. Even the most 
optimistic observers of the marital effect acknowledge that it is not the act of matrimony 
that helps divert offenders from their lives of crime, but the nature of the marital 
relationship that determines the likelihood of change (Laub et al 1998, Laub and 
Sampson 2003). In particular, a number of studies have indicated that the effects of 
marriage on desistance are due to the effects of marital attachment on crime (Sampson 
and Laub 1993; Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998; Maume, Ousey, and Beaver 2005). 
Very few studies, however, have placed much importance on the social orientations of 
the partner and those that have done so appear to have emphasized its importance over 
that of attachment (e.g. Cernkovich, Giordano, and Rudolph 2002; Simons et al 2002). 
The results presented in Chapter 4 indicate that both the social orientation of the partner 
and the quality of the marital relationship matter: in the absence of either, marriage has 
no effect on the likelihood that an individual will desist from crime. 
In terms of the actual mechanism through which marriage affects desistance, the 
results of Chapter 4 are consistent with the proposition that marriage promotes 
disengagement from crime by establishing the informal social control of the individual 
(Sampson and Laub 1993; Laub and Sampson 2003), and by reducing an individual’s 
exposure to criminal peers (Warr 1998). In other words, the impact of marriage on 
desistance is not attributable entirely to either informal social control or social network 
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change (e.g. Sampson and Laub 1993; Warr 1998). As explanations for the effects of 
marriage on desistance, these results are consistent with social control theory and social 
learning theories. By contrast, Chapter 5 revealed only limited support for the 
propositions of the theory of cognitive transformations, at least as far as they relate to 
explaining the relationship between marriage and desistance. Even though marriage is 
associated with changes in reflected appraisals and, by assumption, in how individuals 
perceive themselves, these and other indicators of cognitive transformations fail to 
distinguish re-offenders from desisting offenders once other factors are taken into 
account. Thus, there is little evidence to support the mechanism described by that theory. 
 
 
Does Marriage Promote Desistance among Men and Women? 
In Chapter 6, I examined the extent to which the effects of marriage on crime 
were moderated by sex. In doing so, I also took account of possible sex differences in the 
relevance of relationship quality as a conditioning factor. Sex differences in rates of 
offending, the propensity to marry, or even the likelihood that men and women will find 
themselves in the types of relationships that are most likely to lead to desistance could 
undermine the ability of marriage to promote desistance among women. Moreover, sex 
differences in the meanings that men and women attach to marriage might mean that even 
though marriage promotes disengagement from crime for men, its effects among women 
are less pronounced. Many commentators have argued also that the causes of female 
criminal behavior are different from the causes of male crime (e.g. Chesney-Lind and 
Sheldon 2004); hence, marriage may play no part in desistance by female offenders. 
The results of Chapter 6 challenge the validity of these claims and suggest that 
marriage promotes disengagement from crime for men and women. In fact, Chapter 6 
suggests that marriage affects crime among women in markedly similar ways to how it 
affects crime among male offenders. In particular, among female offenders, the impact of 
marriage on desistance is conditional on the quality of the marital relationship in much 
the same way as it is for men. While these results do not necessarily imply that the 
processes that underpin desistance from crime are entirely the same for men and women, 
they do suggest that the crime-suppressing benefits of marriage can be enjoyed by both 
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sexes.  
 
 
Limitations of the Study 
A key limitation of this study is that it fails to take account of the process by 
which individuals select into marriage or cohabitation. Neither marriage nor cohabitation 
is an entirely randomly-occurring event. More importantly, even if both types of 
relationships are made possible by some degree of serendipity, it is likely that a number 
of factors play a systematic part in determining whether individuals are unable to develop 
the kinds of marriages that are most likely to promote desistance from crime. As I noted 
in Chapter 3, some of these factors may be related to the time-stable characteristics of 
individuals.  In those situations, even if I have not been able to measure those 
characteristics directly, I have at least been able to exclude them as possible explanations 
for the observed effects of marriage on desistance from crime. The same has not been 
possible, however, with respect to time-varying factors that might influence the ability of 
an individual to form a high-quality relationship with a pro-social partner. These factors, 
in so far as they are unobserved, cannot be excluded as rival explanations for the patterns 
observed. 
As noted in Chapter 4, to the extent that this is a problem, it is most likely to be 
relevant to the study of the impact of cohabitation on crime. Given the interrelationships 
between cohabitation, marriage, and relationship quality, it is possible that I have 
underestimated the impact of cohabitation on desistance. Although, as I also noted in 
Chapter 4, this seems less likely in light of the other findings or conclusions of this 
dissertation, further research using analytical methods that are able to model the selection 
process is required in order to rule out this hypothesis more definitively. 
 
 
Theoretical Implications  
Given that the changes in criminal behavior that accompany these events are 
believed to be lasting changes, these life events have been labeled by many researchers as 
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“turning points” in the life-course and the associations between these events and 
subsequent patterns of criminal and delinquent behavior has led to the emergence of a 
theoretical perspective that emphasizes the importance of turning points in understanding 
changes in crime as they occur over the life-course. Although the term is rarely defined 
(e.g. Sampson and Laub 1993, Laub and Sampson 2003; Hughes 1998), its meaning can 
be inferred from the context of its application and its meaning in normal parlance. In 
general, turning points refer to discrete periods in the life of an individual during which 
the future course of some pre-existing pattern of development is altered. The most 
important defining characteristic of a turning point, therefore, is its relationship to prior 
patterns of development. The second most important characteristic of a turning point is 
that it is discrete. Turning points, as distinct from turning periods or transitions, comprise 
moments at which the individual actually changes life direction in one way or another. 
The idea that marriage constitutes a turning point in the lives of many offenders is 
an appealing one largely because it draws attention to the role that marriage plays in 
establishing behavioral change. As Laub and Sampson (2003) note, turning points are not 
the same thing as “major life experiences or expectable transitions” (Laub and Sampson 
2003, p. 40). Not all life experiences result in change; indeed, as noted in this 
dissertation, although high-quality marriages to pro-social spouses can promote 
desistance, other seemingly analogous relationships have no such effect. In that sense, 
turning points are not just manifestations of change: they are among its principal causes.  
The notion that change should be defined in relation to expected patterns of 
development, however, requires some description of the direction in which the 
individuals is likely to travel. This requires that an initial pattern or direction can be 
established, prior to the occurrence of the turning point, and that any change is followed 
by some continuity. Indeed, as Abbott (1997, p. 89) notes, “what makes a turning point a 
turning point rather than a minor ripple is the passage of sufficient time ‘on a new course’ 
such that it is clear that direction has indeed been changed”. Of course, as discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, in trying to study desistance, there is always the risk of inferring that a 
person has desisted even if she or he has merely abstained from crime and delinquency 
temporarily. Moreover, in light of the sporadic nature of criminal behavior (Matza 1964, 
Glaser 1967), it may be just as difficult to establish the expected patterns of development. 
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It is perhaps not surprising therefore, that some of the most direct evidence of 
turning points has emerged from qualitative interviews with desisting offenders who have 
described their own transitions away from crime in terms of turning points such as 
marriage (e.g. Laub and Sampson 2003). In large-scale, statistical analyses, however, 
such as those presented in this dissertation, it is difficult to conceive of a way to identify 
turning points given the need to monitor behavior for a significant period of time as well 
as the importance of observing subsequent stability in the developmental progression. 
Although the analytical strategy used in Chapters 4 and 6 can make some headway 
towards the resolution of this and related problems, at most, I was only able to monitor 
the behavior of respondents over a seven-year period. There is always the possibility that 
the changes in criminal offending that accompanied marriage were short-lived. 
The contingent nature of the marital effect further undermines the usefulness of a 
concept such as that of turning points. Presumably, the development of high-quality 
marriages takes some time. That is not to say that marital attachment necessarily 
improves over time, but it does suggest that the effects of getting married are likely to be 
gradual. It could be that offenders establish high-quality relationships, choose to marry 
their partners and, as part of the complete transition, experience a series of associated 
changes that make their continued involvement in crime less likely. Alternatively, it may 
be that active offenders get married and then gradually become more attached to their 
partners. As they experience these changes, they then undergo a number of other 
transformations that decrease their chances of criminal involvement. 
In neither case would offenders experience the kinds of abrupt shifts in direction 
that are implied by the concept of a turning point. In the first instance, it seems more 
likely that the change process commences even before the couple married even if the 
outward manifestations of the change do not become apparent until much later in the life 
of the relationship. In the second scenario, the turn might not even begin until after the 
couple married and their relationship started to mature. Although some of the proponents 
of the concept of turning points have acknowledged the gradual nature of these changes 
(e.g. Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998; Laub and Sampson 2003), in so far as they 
continue to use the concept they have not fully acknowledged its implications. If 
marriage affects crime through a process that, just like the process of desistance, develops 
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gradually over time and the beginning and end of which cannot be easily defined, then it 
makes little sense to describe that change as occurring at or around a single point. It 
seems more accurate and useful to describe the effects of marriage in terms of an open-
ended process of change or transition. 
Perhaps a more useful way to conceptualize the effects of life events on changes 
in criminal behavior over the life-course is to focus on life-course transitions. Defined as 
phases of development in which individuals assume new personal and social roles that 
affect different facets of their lives, including their involvement in crime, the concept of 
life-course transitions avoids the need to focus on discrete events and their effects on 
long-term changes in development. One the chief advantages of the concept of focusing 
on transitions is that doing so makes very few assumptions about the nature of change; 
that is, it implies that change can be abrupt or gradual, short-lived or permanent. At the 
same time, the concept of a life-course transition highlights the role of such changes in 
promoting changes in criminal and delinquent behavior. 
The concept of a transition also more accurately describes the effects of marriage 
on crime because, as indicated in Chapter 5, marriage appears to influence desistance by 
provoking a series of related changes. For example, part of the reason why individuals 
who enter high-quality marriages to pro-social spouses are less likely to engage in crime 
is that they are also more likely to experience reductions in their exposure to criminal and 
delinquent friends. These changes appear also to be associated with attitudinal change; 
specifically, those who abandon their delinquent friends are also likely to become less 
supportive of crime. Irrespective of which of these changes is the more consequential, the 
overall point to be made is that marriage probably constitutes more than a single turning 
point; instead, it probably consists of many.  
 
 
Implications for Criminal Justice Policy 
Following the publication of Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives, a number of 
newspapers and media sources reported the results of Laub and Sampson’s (2003) 
landmark study. In doing so, however, they seemed to place disproportionate emphasis 
on their finding that marriage did promote desistance from crime among many former 
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offenders. Indeed, the running head of many of these articles seemed to suggest that 
marriage worked in a way that most criminal justice initiatives did not. On the one hand, 
this sort of dissemination of the results of such an important research study is desirable. 
At the same time there is always the risk that the results of social science research could 
be misinterpreted or misapplied by policy-makers who are keen to latch onto some key 
findings at the expense of others. 
In democratic polities it may be difficult to conceive of marriage as a policy 
intervention. Governments and policy-makers can hardly assign subjects to marriages, 
but they can make changes that make marital relationships more or less preferable to 
other types of relationships. For example, many scholars have argued that the extension 
of social welfare systems in many countries throughout the 1960s and 1970s has had 
dramatic effects on the numbers of children born and raised in single-parent families 
(Murray 1984). Thus, by altering the eligibility of specific government programs, policy-
makers can alter the nature of family institutions. At the same time, they can also change 
the laws so as to discourage other family relationships such as cohabitation. In recent 
years, there has been heated debate in the United States over the status of same-sex 
marriages that has resulted in the introduction of legislation and litigation in many states 
aimed at altering the legality of marriages between gay men and women. Even though 
much of the debate may be ideologically-motivated, it clearly indicates that the state is 
able and is seen to be legitimate in its efforts to alter patterns of family formation.  
In the United States, state and federal governments have used state institutions to 
try to bolster the importance of marriage and the image of the family, preferred by social 
conservatives, at the expense of alternative family structures (Carlson et al 2004; 
Fitzgerald and Rebar 2004). While some of these policies may be based on the careful 
and critical deliberation of research, in many cases they are also based on the deep-seated 
ideological convictions of major party activists (e.g. Layman 2001). In fact, selectivity in 
the way even informed policy statements have made use of the extant research literature 
highlights the importance of preconceived policy agendas in determining how the results 
of social scientific research is used (e.g. Popenoe and Whitehead 2002). In such an 
environment, therefore, there is a constant risk that research demonstrating the beneficial 
effects of marriage or traditional family structures may be used to sell a preconceived 
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policy program, especially if such research also highlights the advantages of marriage 
over other family arrangements7. Thus, in discussing some of the policy implications of 
this project, I think it is necessary to begin by stating some important stipulations and 
admonitions.  
From the standpoint of the criminal justice system, there are some inherent 
dangers in developing policies that merely promote the importance of marriage. Even if 
marriage helps suppress criminal involvement for the majority of offenders, it might lead 
to an escalation of criminal activity for others. For instance, the results of the analyses 
presented in Chapter 4 suggested that individuals who spent longer periods of time in 
low-quality marriages were more likely than others to report some involvement in crime. 
Since this finding is based on between-individual differences in crime, it may reflect a 
heightened tendency for active offenders to be in dysfunctional marital relationships. 
However, the alternative explanation, that spending longer periods of time in a low-
quality relationship promotes involvement in crime, cannot be excluded.  
The mundanely obvious example of an exception to the crime-stopping effects of 
marriage is domestic violence. To argue that the difference between a marriage 
characterized by desistance and one characterized by marital violence is the degree of 
attachment or the quality of the marital bond is hardly useful. Without knowing why 
some individuals are able to develop high-quality marriages while others are not, efforts 
to promote marriage for the sake of promoting desistance should exercise considerable 
caution. The development of policies aimed at encouraging serious and persistent 
offenders to marry may, in some situations, have devastating consequences. The example 
of domestic violence is just one example of the possible dangers of promoting policies 
when the consequences of those policies are not fully understood.  
At the same time, an over-emphasis on marriage as being the harbinger of 
desistance could lead to missed opportunities to foster positive changes in the lives on 
                                                 
7 Irrespective of the legitimacy or state involvement in the affairs of families, it is 
important to differentiate between policies that are suggested by the results of research 
and those that are preconceived or predetermined that seek to utilize the results of 
independent research as justification for their implementation. 
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unmarried offenders. Although I could not find any evidence to support the contention 
that entering and maintaining high-quality cohabitating relationships promote 
disengagement from crime, as noted in Chapter 4, it is possible that the tendency for 
higher-quality cohabiting relationships to turn into marriages might have led me to 
underestimate the impact of cohabitation on desistance. Even if this interpretation appears 
unlikely in the context of the other results obtained in Chapters 4 and Chapter 6, before it 
can be ruled out more definitively, policy-makers should avoid developing policies aimed 
at strengthening marriage by undermining cohabitation. This seems especially important 
given that many good marriages may begin as high-quality cohabiting relationships.  
More importantly, without knowing why cohabitation fails to promote desistance, 
any policy that aims to undermine non-traditional family arrangements in order to 
encourage desistance among active offenders is likely to fail. As noted in chapter 4, there 
are two broad differences between marriage and cohabitation that might explain why only 
marriage is capable of engendering changes in criminal behavior: first, the two types of 
relationships differ in terms of their legal standings; and second, the social norms and 
expectations that regulate behavior within these relationships may differ, in part, because 
cohabitation is a less developed social institution. The more cohabitation can imitate 
marriage, the more likely it is to promote desistance. From that perspective, policies 
aimed at weakening cohabitation as a social arrangement may actually further weaken its 
ability to promote desistance from crime.  The more our society denigrates cohabitation 
as an institution, the more it may just widen the gap between the two types of 
relationship. 
Although we should resist the efforts of policy-makers and activists to use their 
research in order to justify preconceived policy preferences, we should also recognize 
that the results of criminological research will often be used in such a way. In these 
situations, perhaps the most pragmatic approach is to ensure those policies are as fully 
and properly informed as possible, irrespective of their origins. Thus, while I do not think 
that the results of this research necessarily beckon policies that would aim to further 
institutionalize marriage or de-legitimize cohabitation, there are a number of tangible 
ways in which policy-makers might promote marriage as a source of desistance in the 
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lives of active offenders. In doing so, the overriding principle that should guide the policy 
development should be, first and foremost, to do no harm. 
One approach that may yield some success in terms of promoting marriage as a 
source of desistance is to concentrate on minimizing the harmful consequences of 
existing criminal justice policies on the development and maintenance of adult family 
relationships. There is some evidence that prior involvement in crime appears to reduce 
the probability that an individual will marry (Laub, Sampson, and Wimer 2006; King, 
Massoglia, and MacMillan 2007). In addition, research also indicates that incarceration 
can have a particularly negative effect on marriage (Pettit and Western 2004; Huebner 
2005). Part of the deleterious impact of imprisonment on marriage could be indirect8. 
However, there are ways in which the experience of imprisonment may also directly 
damage the individual’s chances of establishing a high-quality marriage or his or her 
ability to sustain a pre-existing marriage. 
Two features of imprisonment are especially relevant. First, imprisonment 
involves the physical isolation of the prisoner from almost everyone other than the 
employees of the prison and other inmates. The isolation of the inmate population is also 
confounded by the placement of prisons in areas that often are distant from population 
centers, thereby reducing the ability of prisoners and their families to maintain contact. 
As Sykes (1958) noted, in the maximum security prison in Trenton, almost two-thirds of 
inmates had not received any visits in the previous year. Second, imprisonment also 
involves the separation of the sexes. Men and women are incarcerated in single-sex 
institutions and in the Federal prison system and forty-four of the fifty states this 
separation of sexes is taken to illogical extremes. Inmates in those jurisdictions are not 
entitled to private family or conjugal visits, meaning that even if they are visited by their 
husbands, wives, boyfriends, or girlfriends, their ability to maintain physical contact is 
often limited and almost always takes place under the watchful eye of prison guards 
                                                 
8 For example, in so far as imprisonment reduces the individual’s hopes for employment 
it may also reduce his or her chances of getting married. In similar respects, it might also 
be that imprisonment stigmatizes the individual and in doing so reduces his or her appeal 
as a marriage partner. 
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(Hopper 2001). Given that inmates taking part in conjugal visitation programs report 
greater levels of closeness and intimacy with their families (Carlson and Cervera 1991), 
at the very least, increasing the opportunities for inmates to spend time with their families 
in normal family environment could have a significant impact on their ability to maintain 
high-quality marriages and eventually disengage from crime. 
More broadly, however, recognizing the potential importance of marriage in 
promoting desistance among active offenders suggests that more attention should be 
directed towards reducing the isolating effects of imprisonment. This principle is 
especially important in the lives of offenders who are already married. For them, special 
efforts could be made to ensure that they are incarcerated in areas as close as possible to 
their families. Better still, perhaps greater efforts could be made to control married felons 
without resorting to imprisonment through the use of effective alternatives to 
imprisonment such as electronic monitoring (Padgett, Bales, and Blomberg 2006). At the 
same time, enabling unmarried offenders the opportunity to meet and interact with 
conventional others would surely provide them with better chances of developing the 
necessary social ties that might enable them to desist from crime on their release. 
Of course, one of the most important conclusions to emerge from this project is 
that the effects of marriage on crime depend on the quality of the relationship and the 
social orientation of the spouse. Thus, if policies are to be developed so as to strengthen 
the importance of marriage, attention should also be given to helping active offenders 
develop effective marriages; that is, marriages to pro-social partners that are 
characterized by high levels of attachment and strong emotional bonds. Although 
diversionary programs as well as those aimed at assisting prisoner re-entry often 
emphasize cognitive training, programs aimed at helping individual offenders develop the 
kinds of skills required to sustain healthy, functional romantic relationships may even be 
more effective in terms of helping those offenders desist from crime in the future. 
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